One and many: rethinking John Hick's pluralism by Lee, Yen-Yi
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ONE AND MANY:  
RETHINKING JOHN HICK’S PLURALISM 
 
 
 
By 
 
YEN-YI LEE 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to  
The University of Birmingham  
for the Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
              Department of Theology and Religion 
              School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion 
              College of Arts and Law 
              University of Birmingham 
              December 2011
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
                                    
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
As its criticisms have revealed, a closer look at the concept of the Real, the thesis 
of “all experiencing is experiencing-as,” and the criterion of the soteriological 
transformation have shown some difficulities in John Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis.  
Focusing on the theory of religious experience contended by Hick, this research 
explores the Kantian and Wittgensteinian elements of his hypothesis to ease the 
tension between its metaphysical and epistemological aspects. Since Hick’s 
hypothesis is based on the doctrines of religions within the Indo-European language 
group, this research introduces those traditions from outside this group to rethink its 
criteriology. These two attempts inevitably call for a refined model of Hick’s 
hypothesis. Both Hick’s hypothesis and the refined model reflect certain 
understandings of the notion of Religion. Meanwhile, every religious tradition also 
manifests its various dimensions. This research consequently suggests that the ideal of 
Religion can be considered in terms of the idea of functional unity and can be taken as 
the regulative principle to direct any model of religious pluralism, which is subject to 
be modified when it encounters any “anomalies” of religious phenomena -- this 
pattern can be further illustrated in light of the Confucian proposition of “the Li is one 
but its manifestations are many (理一分殊 li-yi-fen-shu).” 
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USE OF CHINESE TERMS 
This research will follow Wade-Giles romanisation and tongyong pinyin (the 
official romanisation of Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan, the Republic of China) as found 
in quotations, and accompanied by original Chinese characters (traditional Chinese). 
Chinese references will use both the English translation, if provided by the publisher, 
and their Chinese original, with hanyu pinyin added as necessary. Chinese 
romanisation, followed by hanyu pinyin in parenthesis, and corresponding Chinese 
characters are listed in the Chinese-English glossary in the end of this thesis. In order 
to avoid confusion over the order of Chinese full name, the surname of Chinese 
people will be presented first with capital letters. For example, this research will use 
“WANG Yang-ming 王陽明” or “WANG Yangming 王陽明,” instead of “Yang-ming 
WANG 王陽明” or “Yang-ming Wang 王陽明.” If the author uses a Western 
forename, this research will keep it and the hanyu pinyin of his or her full name will 
be provided both in the main text and the Chinese-English glossary. For instance, this 
research will use “Carsun Chang 張君勱” in the main text and then give the complete 
presentation of “Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai) 張君勱” in the Chinese-English 
glossary. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Research Background 
    As it has been pointed out, religious pluralism is not a product of modern time 
but an increasing awareness within Christian tradition towards the existence and 
significance of other religions. It reflects the self-understanding of Christians and the 
evaluation of their relationship with other faiths.1 Against this background, some 
Christian theologians use religious pluralism as an option for handling this religious 
diversity.2 Some may take pluralist approach as a hypothesis of comparative religion 
(Stephen Kaplan) or that of systematic theology and the philosophy of religion (Ernst 
Troeltsch and John Hick). Others may take it as a guiding vision (Karl Rahner) in 
ecumenical and metaphysical axiom (Huston Smith in developing the “perennial 
philosophy”). Still others take this as a foundation for an interreligious theology of 
liberation (Aloysius Pieris and Paul Knitter) and interreligious feminism (Ursula King) 
or in turn as a result of interfaith dialogue (Raimundo Panikkar and Wilfred Cantwell 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian theology 
of religions (London: SCM Press, 1983), chapter 4. Race has offered an overview of this trend and the 
main ideas of the theories of its modern representatives such as Ernst Troeltsch, John Hick and Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith.  
2
 This research follows Peter Byrne’s suggestion of taking religious pluralism as one intellectual 
response to the fact of religious diversity. See Peter Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism: 
Reference and Realism in Religion (London: St. Martin Press, 1995), vii. 
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Smith).3 This development within Christian tradition has later stimulated other 
religious traditions to uncover the pluralistic ideas of their own spiritual heritage or to 
rethink their own attitude towards their spiritual neighbours.4 Scholars of these 
non-Christian traditions may also borrow the theories of religious pluralism from the 
Christian tradition and use them as a reference or a starting point to conceptualise 
their own pluralistic resources.  
Among the representatives of religious pluralism in the West, John Hick (1922- 
2012) has been recognised as one of the most influential and controversial 
philosophers of religion in the twentieth century. He has established the most 
comprehensive discourse of religious pluralism and has been taken as one of the 
preeminent representatives of this trend within the West.5 Hick’s pluralistic discourse 
is based on his experience of communicating with Muslims, Hindus and so on in 
1970s in Birmingham, UK. This experience is in turn applied to elucidating the 
                                                 
3
 Here this research just follows Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s categories, for the details, see 
Schmidt-Leukel, “Pluralisms: How to Appreciate Religious Diversity Theologically,” in Christian 
Approaches to Other Faiths, eds., Alan Race & Paul M. Hedges (London: SCM Press, 2008), 89-92. 
4
 This statement is made on the base of the introduction given by Harold Coward in his book, 
Pluralism in the World Religions: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000). In this book, 
Coward surveys, in addition to Christianity of which he gives the most comprehensive discussion, 
Judaism, Islam, Baha’i theology, Hinduism and Buddhism. In the last chapter, Coward points out that 
there are some similarities of the pluralisms in these traditions. They share a common logic that One is 
manifested in the many, take “religion” as varied instruments to reach the One and superimpose one’s 
own criteria of validity upon other religions. There are also some main difficulties that are common 
among these pluralisms. Apart from the danger resulting from the superimposition of one own criteria 
upon others, there are divergence between the theistic and the non-theistic religions and the problem of 
equality.  
5
 See, for example, Gavin D’Costa’s “Foreword” to Christopher Sinkinson’s The Universe of Faiths: A 
Critical Study of John Hick’s Religious Pluralism (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2001); Paul Eddy, John Hick’s 
Pluralist Philosophy of World Religions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), xi; David Cheetham, John Hick: A 
Critical Introduction and Reflection (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 1; Peter Byrne, Prolegomena to 
Religious Pluralism: Reference and Realism in Religion, vii-xi. 
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doctrines of these religious traditions to justify his hypothesis. As Hick explains, the 
original purpose of his work is to “make a preliminary exploration of a range of 
problems that are only now entering the purview of western philosophy of religion, 
and to suggest a possible approach to them.”6 Amongst those problems the most 
controversial is that, in this global era, Hick wants to question the assumption that 
there is only one true religion7and to improve inter-faith dialogue and the interactions 
of the faith communities of religious traditions to face the problems of human 
existence.8 This intention can be seen through his career of committing himself to 
develop a theory for considering religious diversity. 
Every religion in this vision is assumed to be a “worldview” or “comprehensive 
doctrine” to guide a form of life as whole. Hick’s hypothesis is inspirational and 
instructive in that context. However, Hick’s hypothesis has been criticised as a 
product of post-Enlightenment9 or modernity thought,10 in that it assumes and insists 
on the One that is the transcendent and the centre to which human beings are 
religiously responding. Further, in a world through which post-modern thinking has 
                                                 
6
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), xiii. 
7
 Hick, A Christianity of Theology of Religions (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 
23-24. 
8
 Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (London: Macmillian Press Ltd., 1985), 44. 
9
 For the details, see Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths, chapter 7. 
10
 See Don Cupitt, Mysticism After Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), chapter 2. 
Lindbeck’s criticism on what he calls the experiential-expressive model is applicable to Hick’s theory, 
see George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1984), chapter 2. 
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permeated, religion might have become just one of many communities in a human 
society.11 The situation of the world at the present time is that there are many 
religious sub-communities such as Christianity and Buddhism within a community 
grouped as religion in a society. With the increasing awareness of this condition, there 
have been philosophers and theologians such as Don Cupitt who launched a 
post-modern approach to face the diversity of religions. In light of this, is Hick’s 
model still relevant? Or, to what extent could Hick’s hypothesis meet the challenge of 
post-modern thinking? Does it still work in the so-called post-modern condition with 
the idea of anything-goes as its slogan? What kind of role can it play in explaining the 
diversity of religions in a post-modern and secular society?  
 
1.1 The Idea of Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis and the Related Issues 
    The main idea of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis can roughly be presented in 
philosophical terms as follows. Metaphysically, Hick postulates a transcendent and 
trans- categorical Real as the object to which human beings dwelling in this 
ambiguous universe are either religiously or naturally responding. Epistemologically, 
since the Transcendent Real is trans-categorical and the universe is ambiguous, any 
human consciousness can not be taken as the experiences that are precisely 
                                                 
11
 The difference between religion as a guide of human life as a whole and religion as a community in 
human society comes from Jürgen Habermas’ discussion. For the details, see Habermas, Between 
Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), chapter 4. 
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corresponding to the Real an sich and the universe but as experiencing-as. Any 
notions of the Transcendent that had been and are reflected in human language can not 
be understood, in Kantian expression, as the Real in itself but as the Real as being 
humanly perceived. With this idea in mind, all the world religions are to be 
understood as the various accumulations and achievements of human responses to the 
Real an sich and thus all of them should theoretically be on a par with one another. 
According to Hick, all the world religions share the same soteriological12 
characteristic in their doctrines for the transformation and betterment of human 
personality, the ethical and theological implication of which is a transformation from 
human self-centredness to Real-centredness by an endless effort in a series of lives. 
The soteriological transformation can thus be taken as the criterion for weighing the 
genuineness of the religions.  
Briefly speaking, the notion of the Real, the argument of human experience and 
the criterion of soteriological transformation constitute the structure of Hick’s 
hypothesis. But this triad conversely seems to be the source of doubt and questions 
towards the genuineness of Hick’s pluralistic position. Meanwhile, any attempts to 
                                                 
12
 Both “salvific” and “soteriological” seem to be used interchangeably in Hick’s works. Although 
Hick has made some discussion on his using of “soteriological” in his masterpiece An Interpretation of 
Religion (ex. page 10), in Who or What is God? And Other Investigations (see, p.36, for example), an 
anthology published in 2008, the term “salvific” is still kept unchanged (see p. 36). Since Hick has 
suggested the term “soteriological” in An Interpretation of Religion when investigating “religions,” and 
for the consistence of the usage of terminology, except some rare cases, this research will use 
“soteriological,” rather than “salvific” when treating the relevant issue. 
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improve Hick’s model also revolve around it.  
 
1.1.1 Problems with the Notion of the Real 
Hick’s demarcation between the Real in itself and the perceived Real is an 
analogy of Immanuel Kant’s noumenon/ phenomenon distinction. Hick postulates the 
Real an sich because “The Real itself is thus that which there must be if our human 
religious experience is not purely imaginative but is at the same time a mediated 
awareness of the ultimate transcendent reality. Putting it in Kantian-like terms, the 
Real is the necessary postulate, not of the moral life, as Kant held, but of the global 
religious life of humanity.”13 However, some difficulties with Kant’s philosophy 
could be found in Hick’s hypothesis. Christopher Sinkinson might be right when he 
indicates: “if Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena was difficult 
enough for himself to sustain, it certainly runs into similar problems in the work of 
Hick.”14  
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty is “Does the Real act causally upon us?” 
Hick himself notes that “this was a notorious problem for Kant in relation to sense 
perception” and argues that “in that case how can the noumenal world be said to 
cause our consciousness of the phenomenal world? However this problem does not 
                                                 
13
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, xxxiii. 
14
 Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths, 82. 
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arise in the adapted use of Kant’s distinction within the pluralistic hypothesis. For 
according to the great religions there is a ‘spiritual’ aspect of our nature- the imago dei, 
or our capacity to receive divine revelation, or the atman, or the Buddha nature- that 
resonates to the universal presence of the transcendent reality, in virtue of which we 
are religious animals.15 That is to say, for Hick we human beings can be directly 
aware of the phenomenal appearance of the Real and then indirectly refer that there is 
a transcategorical Real by religious experience, rather than by sense perception. 
Nevertheless, there is a tendency of the postulate of the Real to become an empty 
notion and, as Paul Eddy has pointed out, this would still not avoid the dismissal that 
human religious experience and its object, the Real, are delusions or projections of 
human consciousness.16 Further, since the Real is trans-categorical, how can we 
boldly claim that there is only one Real rather than many “ultimates,” as John Cobb Jr. 
and David Ray Griffin have argued?17 Still further, as Ninian Smart has suspected, it 
seems impossible to judge from a phenomenological perspective that all religions are 
responding to the same truth.18 
                                                 
15
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, xxviii- xxix. 
16
 See the last chapter of Paul Eddy’s work, John Hick’s Pluralist Philosophy of World Religions, 
where he, after reviewing William Forgie’s criticisms of Hick, paraphrases Michael Stoeber’s 
discussion that “And thus one is forced to ask what, in fact, differentiates Hick’s neo- Kantian 
constructivism from the essentially identical reductionist, non-realist models?” See Eddy’s book, 172. 
17
 For the idea of “many ‘ultimate,’’ this research temporarily relies on Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s 
introduction in his “Pluralisms,” in Christian Approaches to Other Faiths, eds. Alan Race & Paul M. 
Hedges, 96-99. 
18
 Ninian Smart, “Truth and Religions,” in Truth and Dialogue, 50; cited in Alan Race, Christians and 
Religious Pluralism, 85. 
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Even if the postulate of the Real can be rationally defended, the relation between 
the Real and the relevant idea of the ambiguous universe might lead to other questions. 
According to Hick’s argument, the ambiguity of the universe results from the 
Transcendent Real establishing an epistemic distance. Because of the ambiguity and 
the epistemic distance, human beings can freely respond to the Real either religiously 
or naturalistically and conceptualise the Real in personal and non-personal terms.19 
The problem within this argument is that the Transcendent Real seems to be a 
personal Real, which could either be a monotheist essence stripped of its Christian 
garment or be value-free clothing on its Christian and monotheist body.20 Putting this 
in another way, the Real an sich is apparently still endowed with some attributes so 
that some substantive knowledge of it can be made. Further, as the Real an sich seems 
to merely set the epistemic distance and the ambiguous universe and might judge the 
achievement human beings made in their soteriological transformation some day in 
the future, Hick’s hypothesis implies a tendency of Deism.21 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, revised edition (London: Collins Fount Paperbacks, 1977), 
67. On that page, Hick contends that “In creating finite persons for fellowship with himself God has 
give to them the only kind of freedom that can endow them with a genuine (though relative) autonomy 
in relation to himself, namely cognitive freedom, the freedom to be aware or unaware of their creator. 
He has created them at an ‘epistemic distance’ from himself through their emergence in a world which 
God has set apart from himself as a separate creaturely sphere. This world has an ambiguous character 
in that it is capable of being responded to either religiously or non-religiously.”  
20
 Gavin D’Costa argues that in this labour Hick merely replaces the term “God” by “the Real.” See 
Gavin D’Costa, “The New Missionary: John Hick and Religious Plurality,” International Bulletin of 
Missionary Research 15 (April 1991), 66. 
21
 Eddy also argues that Hick’s discourse on the Real allows some substantive knowledge of the Real 
and his religious epistemology presupposes a personal Reality since that only such a reality could 
“create” the cognitive affairs. For the details, see Eddy, John Hick’s Pluralist Philosophy of World 
Religions, 168-192. 
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    Still further, in Hick’s hypothesis, it seems that there are two quite different 
objects for physical/moral and religious experience of human beings: The object of 
religious experience is the Real an sich while that of the physical and moral 
experiences is the ambiguous universe. However, considered in terms with Hick’s 
epistemology, there should be only one entity, which implies that the Real an sich and 
the ambiguous universe are identical. A tension within Hick’s hypothesis thus emerges. 
But it seems that Hick does not make any clarification of this seemingly theoretical 
dilemma.  
 
1.1.2 Questions of Argument of Human Experience 
    Hick applies the Kantian dichotomy of noumenon and phenomenon in a loose 
way to provide a preliminary explanation for the occurrence of the holy images within 
different traditions. What follows from Hick’s theoretical structure is his idea that 
different cultural traditions have different responses to the Transcendent or the Real 
an sich. In order to account for the phenomenon of the diversity of these holy images, 
Hick appropriates Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing-as and enlarges it into experiencing-as 
and argues that all experiencing, from physical, moral and religious levels, is 
experiencing-as.22 It is perhaps because Hick tries to combine these two systems that 
                                                 
22
 Hick reserves a very limited space (amounts to one page) for the analysis of the aesthetic experience 
in the last section of chapter 9 of his An Interpretation of Religion. The role of aesthetic experience and 
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he reinterprets Kant’s universal categories of human understanding into a set of 
relative ones and considers them as culturally-related concepts and terms. However, 
this approach leads to at least two questions.  
Some critics such as Terry F. Godlove and Harold Netland23 have indicated the 
legitimacy of Hick’s analogy of Kantian categories of understanding (Verstand) as 
questionable since, for Kant, these categories are universal while in Hick’s theory they 
appear to be transformed into something subjective and relative. Another question that 
is closely connected to the notion of the Real and thus has been mentioned above is 
that there seems to be a theoretical deficiency in Hick’s argument that all experiencing 
is experiencing-as. If the meaning of the situation is the product of human 
understanding and interpretation, then when facing the same environment, any idea of 
human experience at its religious level can remain the outcome of the combination of 
personal habit, educational background, custom and so on. In this regard, the 
significance of the notion of the Real an sich in Hick’s system is crippled. Hick’s 
interpretation of Kant thus leads to an intensification of Kantian subjectivism and a 
tendency of non-realism.24 Some even indicate that Hick’s position is potentially 
                                                                                                                                            
significance in the idea of his all experiencing is experiencing-as seems to be not Hick’s concern. 
Therefore, this research will only focus on the physical, moral and religious significance and relevant 
exepreinces in all the following discussions. 
23
 Terry F. Godlove, Reading, Interpretation, and Diversity of Belief (cited in Sinkinson, The Universe 
of Faith, 78); Harold A. Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism: The Challenge to Christian Faith 
& Mission (Leicester: Apollos, 2001), 224. 
24
 See Eddy, John Hick’s Pluralist Philosophy of World Religions, 172-173. 
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swaying between what he called religious critical realism and non-realism.25  
 
1.1.3 Some Doubts Towards the Criterion of Soteriological Transformation 
    Hick’s theory of the Real and the argument of human experiencing-as might have 
suggested a comprehensive perspective for considering the diversity of religions. 
However, Hick’s use of soteriological transformation as a basis for distinguishing 
between “true” and “false” religions appears to be not as universal as he has argued 
and thus also invites some questions.  
Paul Rhode Eddy contends that Hick’s soteriocentrism, the claim of the common 
structure of soteriological experience of all religions, does not entail a common 
experience.26 Kenneth Rose, from another angle, indicates that one of the two main 
problems with Hick’s hypothesis is the reductionist tendency of his soteriological 
criterion that may nullify the difference between and diversity among the great 
religious traditions.27 Netland evaluates Hick’s model from a missionary point of 
view. Netland notably criticises Hick’s understanding of salvation. Netland argues that 
                                                 
25
 Interestingly, when explaining the reason why he concentrates his study on John Wilson, D. Z. 
Phillips and John Hick, Bråkenhielm also notes the tension between British Empiricism and 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Bråkenhielm takes Wilson’s approach to philosophy of religion as 
empiricist while Phillips as being determined by later thought of Wittgenstein. Hick’s philosophy is an 
unusual combination of these two approaches. See Carl-Reinhold Bråkenhielm, How Philosophy 
Shapes Theories of Religion: An Analysis of Contemporary Philosophies of Religion with Special 
Regard to the Thought of John Wilson, John Hick and D Z Phillips(Doctoral thesis at the University of 
Uppsala 1975), trans. Craig Mckay(Lund: Liberläromedel/Gleerup, 1975), 10. 
26
 See Eddy, John Hick’s Pluralist Philosophy of World Religions, 127-135; 189-192, for example. 
27
 Kenneth Rose, Knowing the Real: John Hick on the Cognitivity of Religions and Religious 
Pluralism (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1996), chapter 5. 
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Hick’s idea of salvation is merely a formal expression that lacks specific content and 
that “minimizes soteriological differences by speaking as if all religious share a 
common goal and understanding of the nature of salvation.”28 Moreover, Netland 
questions if there remains any element that is distinctively religious about 
soteriological transformation in Hick’s theory.29 A relevant reflection can be made 
from a different angle: why is human response via religious experience to the Real 
necessarily of moral or even soteriological sense?30  
Similar questions might be raised from those religious traditions within which 
the soteriological transformation is absent. For example, David Cheetham has 
mentioned that the consequence of Hick’s eschatology and the quandary of his 
pluralistic hypothesis to work as a first-order or a second-order theory are the two 
questions that need to be reflected. To put it further, for the former, there should be 
just one true religion that can be verified to be much closer to the good fulfilment of 
human existence and the Real at the end of the post-mortem life. Then, would this 
outcome not conflict with Hick’s idea of “religious diversity”?31 Hick argues his 
pluralistic hypothesis on the philosophical level and intends it as an explanatory 
                                                 
28
 Harold A. Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism, 236-237. 
29
 Ibid., 237, note 16. 
30
 This point was inspired by Keith E. Yandell’s question towards Hick’s philosophy of religion. 
Interestingly, however, Yandell’s intention, from evangelist point of view, is to accuse Hick’s approach 
of emptying the theological and divine attributes of the Real or God. For the details, see Keith E. 
Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction (London & New York: Routledge, 
1999), chapter 6. 
31
 Cheetham, John Hick, 158-159. 
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framework for interpreting and understanding world religions. However, there could 
be just one step towards a new form of religion or universal faith while suggesting or 
spreading it to others as a more acceptable perspective on world religions. This might 
lead to a result that goes against the primary concern of Hick’s own religious 
pluralism.32 Moreover, to say that a particular theology leads to human 
transformation is one thing while to say that it consists in or is identical to human 
transformation is another.33  
    Another challenge can be expected in terms of the most advanced development 
of neuroscience. It is said that in the future age of the Machines, the human brain 
could be liberated from the physical constraints of the body and there would exist a 
kind of brain-wave-controlled robots, called brain-machine interfaces.34 If this vision 
is boldly explored in the coming generations, so-called human beings can continue 
their life by merely transplanting their brains from one robot to another and their 
personality can thus become perfect through this process, resulting in an abundance of 
religious soteriological transformations. Pressing further, in the age of brain-machine 
interfaces, everyone could have only one life without knowing the time when it comes 
to an end. The soteriological transformation in that era might give little rationale for 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., 159-167. 
33
 This is L. Stafford Betty’s comment on Hick’s position. See L. Stafford Betty, “Critical Response: 
The Glitch in An Interpretation of Religon,” in Problems in the Philosophy of Religion: Critical Studies 
of the Work of John Hick, ed. Harold Hewitt, jr. (London: MacMillan, 1991), 101. 
34
 Cf. Miguel A. L. Nicolelis, “Mind out of Body,” Scientific American 304, no. 2(February 2011), 
61-64.  
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human beings to live in the world.  
To some extent, soteriological transformation provides a way of accounting for 
the meaning of one’s life in this world. What can not be fulfilled or any significant 
questions of life (e.g., why moral behaviour does not necessarily lead to the happiness 
in this life) are expected to be realised in another life. Hick enlarges the ideal of 
soteriological transformation to include as many traditions as possible. However, the 
broader the extension or the denotation of the notion of soteriological transformation 
is, the less its intension or connotation. Furthermore, as it has been indicated, religious 
experience might come from some experiences such as a new sense of the 
mysteriousness of the universe and a radical awareness of contingency of one’s life 
and condition in this world.35 In this regard, this transformation might need to be 
reconsidered and may not serve as the common feature of world religions. It can 
therefore not be adopted as the criterion for measuring religions.  
 
1.1.4 Hick’s own Responses 
Hick has tried to respond to these preceding criticisms in his books, first in The 
Rainbow of Faiths (1995, or under the title of A Christian Theology of Religions) and 
then systematically in the “Introduction” to the second edition of An Interpretation of 
                                                 
35
 Louis Dupré, The Other Dimension: A Search for the Meaning of Religious Attitudes (New York: 
The Seabury Press, 1979), 27-31. 
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Religion (2004) and restates his ideas later in Who or What is God? and Other 
Investigations (2008) and Between Faith and Doubt: Dialogues on Religion and 
Reason (2010). Amongst his publications, the “Introduction” to An Interpretation of 
Religion can be taken as Hick’s restatement of his theory.  
Concerning the notion of the Real, Hick argues again that the Real itself is the 
necessary postulate for the global religious life of humanity36 and it is a most natural, 
economical hypothesis and “a ‘best explanation.’”37 Since the Real an sich is 
trans-categorical and is being experienced by human beings as variant images, the 
distinctions such as being personal or non-personal is trivial truth38 and the 
manifestations of the Real in different religious traditions can not be understood as a 
form of polytheism but just the poly aspect of it.39  
As regards the argument of human experience, Hick repeats that human beings 
can not experience the Real directly but its presence is mediated in human beings’ 
limited conceptual and linguistic systems.40 Hick even argues that it is a “spiritual” 
aspect of human nature – the imago dei41 as the capacity to receive divine 
                                                 
36
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, xxxii-xxxiii. 
37
 Ibid., xxvi-xxvii. 
38
 Ibid., xxix-xxx; xxxiii-xxxvi. 
39
 Ibid., xxvii-xxviii. 
40
 Ibid., p. xxii. 
41
 Theologically, this term should be read as “imago Dei” in Latin, denoting “the image of God.” The 
original significance of this term in Genesis is man was created in the image of God. But Hick seems to 
use “imago dei,” as the case presented in his An Interpretation of Religion, xxix. For the notion of the 
image of God or “imago Dei,” see F. L. Cross & E. A. Livingstone, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of the 
Christian Church, 3rd edition revised (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 825, for example. 
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revelation – makes this mediation possible and that his adapted use of Kant’s 
noumenal and phenomenal distinction can avoid the problem of the noumenal 
causality.42  
The soteriological transformation, which Hick believes takes place worldwide in 
the great religious traditions, can be seen as an evidence for the influence of the Real. 
From this point of view, it again justifies the thesis that all the world religions are the 
products of their own continuous responses to the Real and none of them is morally 
and spiritually superior to the rest of human race. All human beings, both male and 
female, are in the process of this transformation.43 In this regard, this transformation 
can be used as the criterion for assessing religions.44 
 
1.1.5 Beyond John Hick?  
It seems that even in the second edition of his magnum opus, Hick’s arguments 
and defence for his doctrine are still questionable. As it has been shown above, there 
are still some questions (e.g., the impact from the latest advancement of 
neuroscience45 on the significance of soteriological transformation) that Hick 
                                                 
42
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, xxviii-xxix. 
43
 Ibid., xxxviii-xxxix. 
44
 Ibid., xxvi. 
45
 Hick does pay attention to some discussion of neuroscience to justify his position of mystical and 
religious experience. The New Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience, Neuroscience 
and the Transcendent (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) is the result of Hick’s investigation on this 
area. 
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seemingly never considers.  Moreover, there are other questions (e.g., the relation 
between Real and the ambiguous universe) that might never be overcome without 
refining Hick’s model.  
Furthermore, it appears that although Hick often mentions the main ideas of 
several great traditions to support his argument, the religions in the purview of his 
discussion are mainly Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. 
Interestingly, among these religions, the first three are categorised by some scholars as 
prophetic religions and the last two as mystical religions and, due to the common 
background of Indo-European language group, these two groups seem to share certain 
words, ideas, myths and so on.46 Consequently, it might be much easier for Hick to 
apply his framework in analysing the similar notions and doctrines of these traditions, 
no matter how it might misunderstand and thus distort the respective ideas. However, 
when it steps out from these two groups into those religious or spiritual traditions that 
have emerged in Eastern Asia,47 some further questions such as the applicability of 
Hick’s soteriological criterion may be raised.   
Hick’s main thesis has already solidified, making it unrealistic to expect any 
dramatic changes to his overall structure, as seen in his most recent book, Between 
                                                 
46
 Cf., Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions (London: SCM Press, 
1993[originally published in 1989 by Doubleday and Collins Publishers]), xi-xii. 
47
 Hans Küng termed the religious traditions in East Asia, especially in China the religion of wisdom 
and, in addition to the prophetic and mystical religions, took it as the third great river system. For the 
details, see Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions, xi-xvi. 
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Faith and Doubt.48 However, it may be more practical to suggest an alternative 
model or to improve Hick’s own framework by rethinking Hick’s achievements and 
his critics. Besides, one might gain inspiration through this review for the discussion 
of diversity of religions.  
Some academic attempts at exploring Hick’s ideas have been made by those who 
are interested in producing a better model for religious diversity. Other projects have 
also been conducted as alternatives for the discussion on this issue. 
 
1.1.5.1 Improving Hick’s Project 
Kenneth Rose, for example, has tried to improve Hick’s project in Knowing the 
Real. In chapter 5 of that book, Rose indicates that the “nature” and the “function” of 
the Real in Hick’s project could just be an otiose thing seeing that it may not really 
have an impact on human beings. Besides, Hick’s application of Kant’s notions is just 
quasi-Kantian, or, even more, goes against Kant’s philosophy. For Kant, categories of 
human understanding are universal and necessary. They also serve to temporalise 
what has been thought while Hick’s parallels are “culture-relative” and already 
temporalised. Thus, Rose argues that the way to reconstruct Hick’s hypothesis is not 
to appeal to Kant’s philosophy but to re-understand Hick’s own ideas of the cognitive 
                                                 
48
 Similar point is made by Coward. In a note on page 165 of Pluralism in the World Religions, 
Coward indicates that “Hick has continued to refine his position without any fundamental change.”  
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ambiguity of the universe, human cognitive freedom, faith as interpretation and the 
rationality of trusting one’s own experience. In Rose’s proposal, the Real, together 
with human beings, becomes the causal factors for human religious experience and 
there will be no noumenon/phenomenon distinction or dichotomy in it. For Rose, 
“there is only the fluid distinction between the degree of reality that a finite organism 
can apprehend and the whole of reality itself, which transcends the capacities of all 
organisms, potential and actual. One can always move more deeply into that 
transcendent dimension of the Real, though one can never exhaust it.”49 It seems that 
Rose’s scheme might not succeed in developing a pluralistic hypothesis by using the 
resources within in Hick’s theory without resorting to Kant’s heritage, since his 
project of improving Hick’s framework is still dependent on the Kantian approach. 
Moreover, the way he eliminates the dichotomy of noumenon and phenomenon and 
reinterprets the role of the Real and the human beings as partial causes when they 
encounter each other leads to the question of the nature of the Real. In Rose’s 
modification, the Real seems to be personal. Hick originally intended to neutralise the 
notion of the Real. But Rose’s amendment intensifies its personal tendency instead.  
    In his article “John Hick’s Pan(en)theistic Monism,” Yujin Nagasawa discusses 
the tension between the dualistic and monistic elements in Hick’s metaphysical 
                                                 
49
 Rose, Knowing the Real,133. 
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system and points out that nonphysicalist monist view can be helpful in overcoming 
that tension. Nagasawa first points out Hick’s dualist position of the mind-body 
problem in his discussion on religious consciousness and his monist stance of his 
religious pluralism maintains that every religion responds differently to the single 
transcendental Real. Since Hick holds that the mental activities are different from the 
physical events in the brain, there are two ontological entities, one is mental and the 
other is physical, in his metaphysical assumption. However, when considering the 
notion of the Real in his hypothesis, Hick apparently postulates one transcendental 
Real as the ground of different forms of religious experience. In this manner, Hick’s 
claim implies that there is only one ontological entity. Thus there is an obvious 
tension in Hick’s system. After offering three attempts at reconciling this tension, 
Nagasawa suggests that, by applying Kant’s noumenon/phenomenon distinction, the 
dualist tendency in Hick’s system can be understood in epistemological sense, that is, 
two contrasting ways of understanding the same reality. Neither conscious experience 
nor physical science can exhaust reality in itself. In this regard, Hick can avoid the 
problem of mind-body interaction and preserve only one fundamental entity, the 
transcendental Real. Nagasawa closes his article with an inspirational question that 
the next step would be to determine either pantheism, identifying the universe with 
God, or panentheism, taking the universe as a constituent of God, Hick’s metaphysical 
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system entails and which of them is more convincing.50 Nagasawa’s analysis implies 
the Spinozan tendency of Hick’s metaphysics since Hick appears to claim that there 
are at least three realities, the Real, the mental entity and physical entity and that the 
last two are contained in the first one.51 The spirit of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis 
might be in line with Spinoza in that for Spinoza there is only one substance, “human 
mind is part of the infinite intellect of God” and thus human knowledge, especially 
the self-knowledge, is the means of freeing themselves from the servitude of mortal 
body and the only one way towards their greatest happiness and peace of mind, the 
only way to salvation.52 Nagasawa’s suggestion that the pantheist or panentheist 
approach or the identity of the Real with the universe might make Hick’s system more 
cogent is significant. Nagasawa’s analysis that it is the Kantian demarcation between 
noumenon and phenomenon that legitimates the two contrasting ways of the same 
reality is also informative. However, it could be the Wittensteinian element of 
experiencing-as that does offer a convincing explanation of the diversity of religions.  
 
                                                 
50
 Yujin Nagasawa, “John Hick’s Pan(en)theist Monism,” paper presented in Symposium in honour of 
John Hick, 10th-11th March, 2011 at the University of Birmingham; to be incorporated into Religious 
Pluralism and the Modern World: An Ongoing Philosophical Engagement with John Hick, ed. Sharada 
Sugirtharajah(Forthcoming).  
51
 In one of the Open End Meetings held at his house on 13th April, 2011, Hick admitted that there are 
three entities, the Real, the mental and physical entities, in his systems in his answer to Nagasawa’s 
question. However, the relations among these three entities seem unsolved and remain open in that 
discussion. 
52
 Cf., Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza: An Introduction to His Philosophical Thought, reprinted with a new 
introduction and revisions (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1988), chapters 3 and 4. 
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1.1.5.2 Alternatives for Religious Pluralism 
1.1.5.2.1 Realist Approach 
In Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, Peter Byrne suggests a model of 
pluralism with three theses:  
 
(1)All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making common 
reference to a single, transcendent reality. (2)All major traditions are likewise 
equal in respect of offering some means or other human salvation. (3)All major 
traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited accounts of the nature 
of this reality: none is certain enough in its dogmatic formulations to provide 
the norm for interpreting the others.53 
 
    All the arguments in his Prolegomena are made to support these three theses. 
Byrne attempts to apply the idea of “reference” from philosophy of language and 
philosophy of science to develop a theory of referential realism in which the existence 
and the Transcendent is plausible. 54 By “reference” Byrne basically means a form of 
cognitive contact between a subject and an object.55 It is employed to close the gap 
between language and reality that have been opened up by the theories of those 
pluralists such as Hick’s Kantian framework.56 Generally speaking, the position of 
Byrne’s epistemology is epistemic liberalism, which maintains a fundamental 
agnosticism towards the Transcendent but acknowledges the possibility of increasing 
                                                 
53
 Peter Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, 12 & 191. 
54
 Ibid., chapter 2. 
55
 Ibid., 12. 
56
 Ibid., 194. 
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understanding of the Transcendent by the cumulative efforts of evolving religious 
traditions.57 The theory of religious language in grasping the Transcendent is 
metaphorical. Meanwhile, it acknowledges that any religious thought about the 
Transcendent is to some extent culturally limited and relative.58 Byrne preserves the 
idea that salvation is closely related to the Transcendent by suggesting it as a common 
salvific success in achieving some relationship to a transcendent good. These 
phenomena of salvific success are supposed to be found among all major religions 
and thus this idea should be taken as a second order property.59 Byrne argues his 
revised proposal is philosophical and its concern is the likeness and the similarities 
between the religious traditions that can serve the definition of religion.60 
    Byrne’s work is highly intellectual and theoretical. Through all the chapters in 
his book, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism appear to be merely used as cases in 
investigating other scholars’ arguments (see Prolegomena, p.64, for example). The 
only exception is his discussion on Masao Abe’s understanding of Buddhism. Abe’s 
reading of Buddhism looks at the theme of “reality-as-emptiness” to be the denial of 
the ultimate; according to Byrne, this could be radical and thus cannot easily fit into 
some commentators’ versions of pluralism. Byrne seems to suspend his judgement on 
                                                 
57
 Ibid., chapter 5. 
58
 Ibid., chapter 6. 
59
 Ibid., chapter 4. 
60
 Ibid., chapter 3. 
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Abe’s interpretation of Buddhism while at same time allude that there could be some 
problems with it.61 The three theses of Byrne’s pluralism and his attitude towards a 
seemingly radical strand of Buddhism reflect that his version of pluralism is still 
restricted within those traditions that have been surveyed and used to support Hick’s 
hypothesis. Moreover, the epistemology provided by Byrne does not seem to be an 
epistemological framework that elucidates the possibility and the process of 
communicating with the Transcendent, but to be certain principles for the argument of 
the formation and the content of religious experience, which have already been 
contended by Hick. Although he has tried to distinguish himself from the theories of 
Hick and other pluralists, to some extent, Byrne’s project seems to be a variant of 
Hick’s pluralism. The main ideas of Hick’s hypothesis (the notion of the Real and its 
relationship to humans, the thesis of religious experience, the nature of religious 
language and the conception of salvation in its broader sense) appear to be 
rearticulated through Byrne. Therefore, although Byrne has tried to employ different 
resources to produce his version of pluralism, as its basic ideas are Hickian, the 
questions launched towards Hick’s theory are also applicable to his model. 
Probably sticking to or subconsciously influenced by the Christian and 
monotheist tradition, John Cobb, Jr and David Griffin suggest a model of religious 
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pluralism with three ultimates: God as the supreme being, pure creativity as the 
highest embodiment of which is in God and the universe as another but lower 
embodiment of the creativity. It is the shaping activity and ordering of God that 
determine the form of cosmos and thus make three types (i.e., theistic, acosmic and 
cosmic) of religious orientation and experience. Mark Heim suggests a Trinitarian 
ultimate approach of pluralist model with various kinds of salvations and thus 
different religious ends. However, for Heim, Christianity represents the highest goal 
because it is more consistent with the nature of the ultimate.62  
    There is a common feature among the foregoing patterns of religious pluralism, 
that is, the attachment to the notion of the ultimate in one way or another. This 
phenomenon has its roots in the theological tradition in the West. Generally speaking, 
it could be the encounter of the primordial Christian faith with the Greek philosophy 
that produced the notion of God in light of Platonic Form or Idea. As known, it is the 
God that transcends the time, change, matter, flesh, history and so on and thus is 
eternal and absolute. This notion has then dominated the Christian God in its theology 
until modern time.63 Apart from this, the implication of the Logos that was 
introduced through Greek philosophy into Christian theology has firstly enhanced the 
                                                 
62
 For the ideas of Cobb and Griffin and of Heim, this research temporarily relies on Perry 
Schmidt-Leukel’s introduction. See Schmidt-Leukel, “Pluralisms,” in Christian Approaches to Other 
Faiths, eds. Alan Race & Paul M. Hedges, 97-98. 
63
 Cf. Diarmaid MacCulloch, A History of Christianity (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 31-34; Peter 
Hodgson & Robert King, eds., Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Tradition and Tasks, 3rd 
edition (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2008), 92-93. 
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combination of ontology, theology and logic, which has been named by Martin 
Heidegger as Onto-theo-logy to indicate Western metaphysics,64 since in ancient 
Greek philosophy Logos was on the one hand taken as the universal principle of the 
cosmos and on the other as reason and speech or thinking and speaking.65 
Additionally, because this perspective assumes that theoretically Logos as the ultimate 
principle of the cosmos can be grasped by human reason and thus expressed by 
human speech,66 God as the ultimate can also be inferred by human reason by means 
of sets of concepts and propositions and arguments. The basis of this position is the 
idea that there is a correspondence between human language and the reality. The main 
problem with this approach could be that the assumption of correspondence theory of 
truth might still result in the debate as whose religious language has authentically 
revealed, expressed or articulated the only one truth. Consequently, whether this 
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 Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford, Blackwell,1999), 149-150. 
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 Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol.1: The Earlier Pre-Socratics and the 
Pythagoreans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 420-424; Guthrie, when discussing the 
philosophy of Heraclitus, outlines eleven meanings of Logos in the fifty century or earlier on these 
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definition or formula expressing the essential nature of anything; and (11) one of the commonest in 
Greek that sometimes can be found being used in certain contexts where there is no idiomatic 
word-for-word English equivalent. ZHANG Longxi 張隆溪, The Tao and the Logos: Literary 
Hermeneutics, East and West (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1992), 26. For these 
materials, I am indebted to ZHAO Kuiying’s 趙奎英 discussion of her book, Comparative Study on 
Basic Topics of Chinese and Western Linguistic Poetics (中西語言詩學基本問題比較研究 Zhong-xi 
yu-yan-shi-xue ji-ben-wen-ti bi-jiao yan-jiu) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 2009), chapter 2. 
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 As Heidegger has pointed out, logos as speech or discourse means to make manifest “what is being 
talked about” in speech or lets something to be seen. See David Farrell Krell ed., Martin Heidegger: 
Basic Writings, revised and expanded edition, with a New Foreword by Taylor Carman (London: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2008 ), 78; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996[first published in 1962]), 56. 
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approach can be treated as a feasible and genuine pluralism is still a question. 
 
1.1.5.2.2 Reflection and Proposal from Non-Realist Position 
Like the other pluralists mentioned above, Hick shares this basic non-realist 
position.67 However, he also rejects the propositionist method for the justification of 
the existence of God. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Hick discards the notion of 
God. Rather, as what Kant had done in his critical philosophy (although the 
immortality of the soul, the existence of God and free will can all merely be postulates 
of theoretical reason, they can be verified or justified by the exercise of practical 
reason),68 Hick seems to prove the existence of God, or the Real an sich, by the 
justification of the rationality of religious experience and the effect of the 
soteriological transformation of human beings. This strategy has been criticised by 
those philosophers and theologians from the camp of post-modernist thinking as 
nostalgia for realism and reluctance to part with it69 or who stands for post-liberalist 
theology as being negligent of the significance of the cultural-linguistic system.70 
They argue that the postulate of a Transcendent or the affirmation of the religious 
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 See note 16. 
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 This was Kant’s purpose. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. Mary 
Gregor(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997), 3-7. Besides, a similar observation of Hick’s idea 
has been indicated by Christopher Sinkinson. He argues that a closer inspection of Kant’s theological 
concerns will reveals many more parallels with Hick’s own work. See Sinkinson, The Universe of 
Faiths, 84. 
69
 Cupitt, Mysticism after Modernity, 40. 
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experience might still be theistic and thus would contradict with the pluralistic 
position. 
Don Cupitt, for example, utilises the implication of Logos as speech, speaking 
and language but rejects the notion of God or the Real as something “over there.” 
Cupitt suggests that we human beings are always inside our own heads71 and 
everything is within the flux of our language.72 However, human beings also create 
language. Hence, though language precedes our experience, the culture formed by 
language precedes nature. Thus there is nothing to be considered as being primary or 
foundational. Everything is secondary.73 In Cupitt’s vision, God is just a 
non-objective symbol that evokes religious feelings and thus the Christian “God” is 
interchangeable with other equivalents in other religious traditions. Any religious 
tradition in some sense can be seen as an art.74  
 Cupitt’s thinking is in line with postmodernism and his proposal is inspirational 
in that he stresses the significance of the language in shaping our experience, indicates 
that the equivalents as holy symbols in different religious traditions are 
interchangeable and thus rescinds the reality of the Transcendent. But Cupitt seems to 
misplace the priority between language and experience. Even if both of them are 
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always in the flux of change, experience will still come before the making of the 
language to conceptualise and express it, especially at the very beginning of the 
history of human cultural and linguistic system. The reciprocal influence between 
language and experience and even the priority of language over experience in forming 
different human experiences should come later.75  
 
1.1.5.3 Pluralistic Ideas from Other Traditions 
Hick himself has argued that there are also different expressions of pluralistic 
idea in different religious traditions when he defends that his enterprise is not just a 
post-Enlightenment Western imposition. Hick has also quoted some paragraphs that 
have their own implication for religious pluralism to support his idea.76 However, 
even if his strategy can meet this challenge, as indicated above, Hick’s discussion is 
still restricted to the prophetic and mystical traditions. The kinship and some 
similarities and parallels between the prophetic and mystical religions and 
consequently the connotation of their pluralistic idea that resemble with one another 
might facilitate Hick to establish and seemingly justify his hypothesis. However, 
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 Bråkenhielm’s comment on the general idea of apriorism and Peter Winch’s understanding of the 
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Hick’s claim may neglect that there could be some crucial difference between the 
philosophical backgrounds that breed these idea. At this point, although Hans Küng’s 
hypothesis of three river systems of religious traditions77 does not exhaust all the 
religions in the world, his typology is useful in picturing the characteristics of the 
main world religions.  
Küng contends that, due to the fact that both the prophetic and mystical religions 
belong to the Indo-European language group, certain ideas and thoughts might have 
been shared between them. In addition to the prophetic and mystical religions, East 
Asia has a very different type of religious tradition that might be different from those 
two systems of religious faiths. Küng indicates that, generally speaking, 
Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism and Chinese folk religion are under the umbrella of 
the religion of wisdom. These traditions have co-existed since they emerged in 
Chinese history. Interestingly, although there were ever some conflicts between these 
traditions, due to this historical background, the idea of diversity of religions has 
become something like “collective sub-consciousness” that is inherited from 
generation to generation. Küng names this type the religion of wisdom with sage as its 
central figure.78 Whether Küng’s argument is acceptable and sound is not the concern 
of the present study. It is his idea of the three river systems of human religious faiths 
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that matters. Interestingly, as can be found in An Interpretation of Religion and any of 
Hick’s other significant works, his hypothesis is based mainly on the analysis of the 
prophetic and mystical systems of religions.79 Thus, a close look at the religious 
traditions outside these two systems might open a new possibility of thinking about 
the diversity of religions. 
Due to the impact of the religious pluralism from the West, some Chinese 
philosophers and scholars also attempt at interpreting this idea to suggest an 
alternative for the discussion of diversity of world religions and interreligious 
dialogues. For example, CHENG Chung-ying 成中英 (1935-) has proposed an 
“integrative religious pluralism,” the principal idea of which is that “all religions are 
to be regarded as integral parts of a holistic developmental process of humanity and 
its understanding of the world,”80 by using some organic thinking of the Book of 
Changes. LI Chenyang 李晨陽 tries to unpack the pluralistic elements in 
Confucianism by the analysis of the Confucian notion of harmony or 
harmonisation(He 和) in order to offer some pluralistic ideal to world philosophy and 
world-cultural politics.81  
LIU Shu-hsien’s 劉述先 (1934-) achievement of exploring the Confucian 
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proposition of “the Li is one but Its Manifestations are many (理一分殊 li-yi-fen-shu)” 
can be taken as the most representative one. The insight of Liu’s work is that he 
interprets the Li of that proposition in light of Cassirer’s idea of regulative principle 
and functional unity. Liu contends that in this manner the Li can be considered in light 
of offering human beings guidance on ways of living and coexistence.82 Originally, 
Liu’s intension is to provide a Confucian perspective on the development of Global 
Ethic. In his proposal, Liu suggests that the ideal of humanity or humanum can serve 
as Li as the regulative principle and the functional unity in guiding people from 
different traditions in search for the minimum consensus of the implication of the 
Global Ethic since it seems that this idea is expressed variously in many human 
traditions. Liu’s interpretation might also be applicable in the field of religious 
pluralism. Briefly speaking, if the ideal of Religion can be taken as the Li as the 
regulative principle and the functional unity, then various religious traditions can be 
seen as the manifestations of that idea and they can be taken as being related to one 
another. If this idea can be further explored, then, with the background that is different 
from the prophetic and mystical systems of religions, it might lead to a different 
picture for religious pluralism. 
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1.2 Assumption 
After brief review of Hick’s hypothesis, the related issues, Hick’s own responses 
and some attempts made at refining or at suggesting alternatives for considering 
religious diversity, it seems that Hick’s project as a paradigm has become antiquated. 
However, some scholars have undertaken (e.g., Kenneth Rose) and have argued that 
there could be some theoretical resources within Hick’s theory to overcome its own 
difficulties. For example, Jerry H. Gill, after reviewing the argument of the 
epistemology of religion in Hick’s Faith and Knowledge, indicates that Hick’s 
application of Wittgenstein’s “seeing-as” does not go far enough. Moreover, Gill 
suggests that a more thorough analysis of the second part of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations might offer a possibility of overcoming the limitations of 
traditional epistemological approaches that Hick has followed.83 It seems that if these 
resources can be explored and exercised properly, one can reconsider the questions 
that Hick seems to be unable to cope with and the competing patterns mentioned 
above.  
As stated above, there is a triad of Hick’s hypothesis: metaphysically it 
postulates a dual concept of the Real and an ambiguous universe, epistemologically, it 
suggests the thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as, and ethically and 
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criteriologically it takes the doctrines of the soteriological transformation as the 
standard for measurement of the authenticity of world religions.  
As exhibited previously, (1) Hick has seemingly never clarified the relationship 
between the Real and the ambiguous universe; (2) the hybrid of Kantian and 
Wittgensteinian elements with his theory makes Hick’s position sway between critical 
realism and non-realism, and (3) the soteriological criterion could not be a 
characteristic of world religions as universal as Hick has claimed and is set for a more 
basic quest for the meaning of life.  
It seems that some criticisms against Hick’s model could properly be met if: (1) 
the Real an sich can be identified with the ambiguous universe, that is, they are one 
and the same reality, (2) both the Kantian and Wittgensteinian elements can be further 
explored to reformulate the process of the making of religious experience, and (3) the 
criterion of soteriological transformation could be regarded as one of the religious 
doctrines that developed to answer the search for the meaning of the place and role of 
human beings in this world, or the ambiguous universe.  
With this assumption, Kantian elements could mainly aid in explaining the 
metaphysical stance and Wittgensteinian components could help in strengthening 
epistemology of Hick’s hypothesis. Both resources can be found within Hick’s theory. 
With regard to the criterion of the soteriological transformation, in addition to the 
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questions that have been mentioned above, examples from beyond the prophetic and 
mystical religions might help rethink its significance and justify the rethinking of it in 
light of the idea of the search for meaning of human beings. At this point, the 
traditions from the East Asia may serve this purpose.  
This refined model will then also have its own triad that is a variant from Hick’s 
idea. Metaphysically, it contends that the Real an sich is identified with the 
ambiguous universe. Epistemologically, it keeps the main idea of Hick’s proposition 
of all experiencing is experiencing-as but goes much deeper to unpack the insights 
from Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies. It suggests that Kantian elements should 
be confined within the analysis of human perception and understanding while 
Wittgenstein’s ideas should be applied into the explanation of the diversity of 
religions. In Kant’s philosophy, there is a particular intuition called “intellectual 
intuition” that is assumed to be the channel for knowing the noumenon. In this case, 
the “impulse” of, in Hick’s words, the spiritual aspect of human nature for human 
beings to “communicate” with the Transcendent Real can be re-understood in light of 
“intellectual intuition.” Meanwhile, in Kant’s philosophy, there is some pure concept 
of human reason called “transcendental idea” that denotes the absolute totality of all 
possible experiences. The two categories of the personal God and the non-personal 
Absolute can thus be regarded in light of the Kant’s transcendent idea as directing the 
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formation of religious experience. Concerning those culture-relative categories, they 
can be tackled in terms of Wittgenstein’s notion of language-game. The foregoing 
suggestion can be interpreted in terms of Hick’s idea of experiencing-as as all 
religious experiencing is the spiritual aspect or intellectual intuition that is 
experienced as various kinds of religious experiences. In regards to the ethical and 
soteriological features, it is suggested to be one of the religious doctrines in response 
to the search of meaning of the place and role of human beings in this ambiguous 
universe. It aims to reach the goal that Hick originally intends to achieve: the 
pluralistic hypothesis as a second-order theory to survey the religious plurality.  
In the vision of this refined model, it is the ambiguity of this universe inhabited 
by humans that stimulates their spiritual impulse as quests concerning the meaning of 
life and one’s place in it. Certain individuals, especially those recognised as saints or 
prophets, were utilising the language they were familiar with to grasp, express and 
conceptualise this kind of impulse. These articulations might accumulate generation 
by generation and thus make what we now name as a “religious tradition.” In this 
manner, the ideal of Religion might be understood as a form of language game within 
which human beings substantiate their meaning of life through their religious 
experience made in dealing with84 the ambiguous universe. This ideal of Religion 
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could then serve as a regulative principle and functional unity when considering 
religious pluralism. Any model of religious pluralism can be seen as following a 
particular understanding of the ideal of Religion. Besides, every religion should also 
be treated as one of the concrete manifestations of the ideal of Religion. There thus 
comes the tension between any given model and the reality of the diversity of 
religions and further leads to a re-understanding of that ideal and to the refinement, 
revision or even abandonment of any given model and the coming of an alternative.  
Although this research suggests a more Wittgensteinian approach to reinterpret 
Hick’s hypothesis to make it more pluralistic, there are still some differences between 
the theories that have been developed by so-called religious non-realists. The main 
source of their ideas is taken from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The approach 
mainly differentiates itself from the non-realist camp in two points. First, the idea of 
language game is confined within the field of religious activities of human beings. 
This research does not take Religion as one form of language-games of human 
activities to argue that the criteria and the standards that are outside the religious 
                                                                                                                                            
“dealings,” “handlings.” Heidegger used this idea to elucidate the encounter of human beings with the 
Being of the entities around them. Heidegger indicated that “The Being of those entities which we 
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Such dealings have already dispersed themselves into manifold ways of concern. The kind of dealing 
which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of 
concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of ‘knowledge’.” See 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 95. 
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activities can not be applicable in religious affairs.85 Rather, this research will still 
agree with the idea that religion can not be cut off from other human affairs and thus it 
can be investigated and studied by any other discipline. Moreover, this research 
employs the idea of the immediate experience that was discussed by Wittgenstein in 
the period of transition of his philosophy and uses this experience in terms of the 
notion of “intellectual intuition” of Kant’s philosophy to account for the formation of 
religious experience. In this way, religious language will not merely be composed of 
religious concepts and phrases, the meaning of which lies in the ways they are used in 
that language. 
    To sum up, the improvement of Hick’s hypothesis will be conducted by 
exploring Kantian elements in reconstructing its metaphysical aspect, by exploring 
Wittgenstein to rebuild its epistemology and enhance its pluralistic dimension, and by 
introducing the implications of Confucian proposition of the Li and its manifestations 
to suggest a perspective on the Ideal of Religion and a refined model in considering 
the religious diversity.  
    A general comparison between Hick’s hypothesis and its refined model can be 
given as follows: 
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 Hick’s Hypothesis The Refined Model 
Metaphysically 
1. Kantian distinction 
between the Real an sich 
and the Real as being 
perceived 
 
2.Two Entities 
The Real an sich and the 
ambiguous universe 
1. Kantian distinction between 
the noumenon and phenomenon 
with the emphasis on the 
noumenon as the ontologically 
sufficient reason for the 
phenomenon and 
epistemologically as the ground 
for the origin of various human 
experiences 
 
2.One Entity 
The Real an sich is identical 
with the ambiguous universe 
Epistemologically 
All experiencing is 
experiencing-as 
1. The cooperation of the 
greatest freedom of human 
cognition, two transcendental 
ideas and the universal 
categories of human 
understanding is the first step of 
the formation of religious 
experience. 
 
2. All experiencing is 
experiencing-as should be 
confined within the 
culture-related categories, the 
various human linguistic 
systems. 
Criteriologically 
Soteriological 
transformation from 
ego-centredness to the 
Real-centredness 
There is no one and universal 
criterion of judging the 
genuineness of any religion. 
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1.3 Position 
Hick’s project intends to be comprehensive in accounting for human behaviour 
from his seemingly philosophically neutral but actually religious and even theological 
perspective. It includes both the religious and non-religious groups and thus it 
suggests a theory of religious pluralism with a tendency of inclusivism and even 
exclusivism. Although Hick maintains that the notion of the Real is a more neutral 
term and thus is more acceptable to all religious people, it’s theory however 
presupposes that (1) even the end of the naturalistic way of responding to the Real is 
of religiousness and (2) all the religious traditions will eventually converge at the end 
in the practice of soteriological transformation. Every one will eventually become a 
“religious” being. Further, Hick’s theory might work when it is applied in explaining 
the formation of all religious traditions.  
However, when the idea and the value system of those religious traditions no 
longer dominates any particular society or region but becomes one of the various 
options for people to choose from as a perspective and a principle of their ways of 
understanding the world and living lives, the system has changed and the centre has 
shifted. In this case, to claim that non-religious persons also respond to the Real an 
sich that is transcendent to this universe, or, at least to our world, in a naturalistic way 
could not be convincing for people outside the religious community. Therefore, for 
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any discussion or rethinking of the issue of religious pluralism in this era, the reality 
of the place of Religion in a society or an area should be firstly considered.  
There are many groups and communities in a society (e.g. political, economic, 
scientific, etc.). Nonetheless, these groups are not entirely separated from one another 
but are in an interrelated situation. One may consider politics from a psychological 
perspective while others can discuss the political issues in light of religion. From 
another angle, people from a particular community may consider other communities 
from their point of view. For example, a religious person might inevitably think about 
literature or psychological event in accordance with their religious background. 
People from any particular community might bring his knowledge when 
understanding and stepping into other communities. His or her background will 
become the focus point when s/he conducts any activities. Thus when a religious artist 
is creating art, the religious concern could have more or less influence him or her or 
even work as the theme of his or her work. 
Since “Religion” has already become one of the communities in a human society 
or area, no matter how substantial it is, the issue of religious diversity should be 
confined within such community and the relevant activities. That is to say, this is now 
part of the agenda of religious groups as Christianity or Buddhism within a religious 
community. Therefore, different from Hick’s purpose, the present research confines its 
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audience to religious persons and to those who are interested in the studies of 
religious pluralism. However, it does not mean that the present research excludes 
those non-religious groups and persons. Its discussion, if sound, reasonable and 
convincing, could still be taken as an approach of understanding religious 
phenomenon in human society and human history. Based on this position, its 
discourse, analysis and the relevant argument will be descriptive, phenomenological 
and more philosophical. It will try to describe, analyse and investigate the origin and 
the formation of religious experience of human beings and of the different religious 
traditions. But the question of the actuality of religious experience will not be the 
main concern of the present research.  
 
1.4 Structure and Principal Arguments 
This research has envisioned an alternative picture for understanding the 
diversity of religions and religious pluralism. However, the way from the Hick’s 
model to a more refined one is a complicate journey. With the hopes of achieving this 
goal, the steps of this research will be conducted as follows. 
This research will take a critical review of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis as a point 
of departure. This step aims to illustrate the triad: the notion of the Real, the 
proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as and the criterion of soteriological 
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transformation of Hick’s hypothesis. In the meantime, this research will try to respond 
directly or indirectly to critics of Hick’s theory. Then, this research will highlight the 
problems with the triad with respect to these replies. Further, this research will 
attempt to point out the theoretical resources within Hick’s hypothesis to improve his 
framework (chapter 2).  
After the exposition of Hick’s hypothesis, its critics and its internal theoretical 
resources, the research will continue the journey with an investigation of these 
resources. Owing to that Hick’s model is characterised as Kantian, the research will 
first go back to Kant’s philosophy to reconsider the way that Hick has employed Kant. 
The significance at this step is to explore the implication of the distinction of 
noumenon and phenomenon, intellectual intuition and the transcendental idea for 
Hick’s hypothesis. This research will suggest: (1) the Real an sich can be identified 
with the ambiguous universe; (2) the two categories of personal God and non-personal 
Absolute can be translated in terms of Kant’s transcendental idea; and (3) the 
particular capacity can be reconsidered in light of the notion of “intellectual 
intuition.” As for the pluralistic aspect, it seems to rely on the exploration of 
Wittgensteinian idea within Hick’s hypothesis (chapter 3).  
This research will move on its journey to examine the Wittgensteinian aspect of 
Hick’s theory. The purpose of this step will be the reconnection of the idea of 
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experiencing-as back to Wittgenstein’s notion of language-game and family 
resemblance. This will bring light to the process of the formation of religious 
experience and to enlarge the implication of the ideas of language-game and family 
resemblance for the discourse of religious pluralism, the idea of Religion and for 
Hick’s hypothesis. If it works, then, with the insight of intellectual intuition, the thesis, 
all experiencing is experiencing-as, can be reinterpreted as all religious experiencing 
is the product of the cooperation of the immediate experience of the intuiting the Real 
an sich intellectually and the employment of human religious concepts and terms in 
this ambiguous universe (chapter 4). 
Hick’s hypothesis is based on the prophetic and mystical systems of religions 
that belong to the Indo-European language group. In this manner, Hick’s argument of 
the universality of soteriological transformation and of taking this transformation as 
the criterion for measuring the genuineness of religions might encounter some 
difficulties when it is applied outsides these two systems. Thus a detour to those 
religions from the East might be helpful in the investigation on this issue. Further, as 
briefly shown above, the quest of human beings for the meaning of life could be 
something more basic than the soteriological transformation. Therefore, one of the 
tasks this detour hopes to present is that the soteriological transformation could 
merely be one of the approaches toward the spiritual quest of human beings. If it is 
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the case, then this transformation should not be taken as the main criterion. To be a 
philosophical and second order theory in considering religious pluralism, the criterion 
for determining the authenticity of any religion should be suspended. Further, based 
on the observance of those religious traditions, it is supposed to discover certain 
pluralist insights from the traditions’ characteristics which are different from the 
Indo-European language group. If this is the case, then the insight might provide an 
alternative perspective on religious pluralism. This research will attempt to show that 
among the traditions outsides this language group, the Confucian proposition of “the 
Li is one but its manifestations are many” can be taken as the synthesizing idea of the 
pluralistic ideas from the East. With the cosmology it originated, its pluralistic insight 
might provide an alternative perspective on religious pluralism and the diversity of 
religions (chapter 5). 
In order to unpack the implications of the Confucian proposition for Hick’s 
hypothesis and the studies of religious pluralism, this research will visit the Chinese 
vision of Nature and the origin and development of that proposition. Following this 
track, this research will come to a modern interpretation suggested by Liu Shu-hsien. 
As has been shown above, Liu’s concern is the establishment of Global Ethic on the 
ideal of humanity (humanum) discourse. Inspired by Ernst Cassirer’s idea of 
functional unity and his distinction between the constituent and the regulative 
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principles, Liu suggests that the Li can be understood as the regulative principle in 
regulating the search of the ideal of humanity. Based on Liu’s suggestions, this 
research will attempt to employ the idea of the Li as the regulative principle and the 
functional unity in the understanding of the ideal of Religion and the issue of religious 
pluralism (chapter 6).  
At this point, this research will offer a brief review of Hick’s hypothesis to see 
the possible refinement that could be made by the expected model. This research will 
also be tested with the main idea of some existing religious traditions (chapter 7). 
What follows will be an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of this 
refined model as a hint for future work (chapter 8). 
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CHAPTER 2 
AN EXPOSITION OF JOHN HICK'S PLURALISTIC 
HYPOTHESIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a critical review of Hick’s pluralistic 
hypothesis as the starting point of this research. It will examine first the triad of the 
notion of the Real, the proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as and the 
criterion of soteriological transformation of Hick’s hypothesis, and evaluate the critics 
of Hick’s theory. Based on this observation, it will point out further problems with the 
triad of Hick’s hypothesis that could be disposed of by using its own theoretical 
resources. At the end, this chapter will try to identify the Kantian and Wittgensteinian 
elements within Hick’s hypothesis that may work in this direction. 
 
2.0 Prolegomena 
With the interaction and mutual-understanding between human cultural traditions, 
to understand that there are variant forms of thinking of the universe and the different 
ways of realising this world is the basic attitude that each of us, as a member of this 
global village, should try to cultivate. However, to be aware of the diversity of 
religions is one thing, to accept the fact is another, and to explain the acceptance and 
recognition is still another.  
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  John Hick, as a theologian, devotes himself to the development of Christianity in 
the present time and, as a philosopher of religion, rethinks the role of Christianity in 
the Global age and its communication with other world religions. In his own view, he 
has proposed his “pluralistic hypothesis” as the ‘best explanation’ or the most 
comprehensive and economical explanation of the facts of the history of religions (i.e., 
the data provided by religious experience as reported in its plurality of forms)1 or to 
“make a preliminary exploration of a range of problems that are only now entering the 
purview of western philosophy of religion, and to suggest a possible approach to 
them.”2 Putting it differently, Hick’s concern is that since there are different 
belief-systems in the world, there might be different forms of the Ultimate. What he 
attempts to do is to question the assumption that there is only one true religion3 and 
to improve inter-faith dialogue and the interactions of the faith-communities of 
religious traditions to face the problem of human existence.4  
Hick uses the parable of the blind men and the elephant from Buddhist tradition 
to illustrate his idea: 
 
[…]An elephant was brought to a group of blind men who had never 
encountered such an animal before. One felt a leg and reported that an elephant 
is a great living pillar. Another felt the trunk and reported that an elephant is a 
                                                 
1
 Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 51; 
Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 110-111. 
2
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), xiii. 
3
 Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions, 23-24. 
4
 Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985), 44. 
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great snake. Another felt a tusk and reported that an elephant is like a sharp 
ploughshare. And so on. And then they all quarrelled together, each claiming 
that his own account was the truth and therefore all the others false. In fact of 
course they were all true, but each referring only to one aspect of the total 
reality and all expressed in very imperfect analogies.5 
 
In this parable, Hick believes that the Real is represented in different terms in the 
different faiths: “They call it Jahweh, Allah, Krishna, Param Atma, and also holy, 
blessed Trinity: The real is one, though sages name it variously.”6 
    As noted in the previous chapter, there have been a number of criticisms and 
questions of Hick’s enterprise. Metaphysically, for example, Hick’s Kantian 
distinction between Real an sich and Real as being humanly experienced has invited 
the similar attack that was originally launched towards Kant (§1.1.1). 
Epistemologically, Hick’s appropriation of Kantian categories and applying them into 
the discussion of the shaping of religious experience has encountered the question of 
his misuse of Kant’s idea (§1.1.2). In regard to the criterion of soteriological 
transformation, especially its Christian characteristic, it has also resulted in some 
critics such as that the criterion that has presupposed only one ultimate end that might 
conflict with Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis (§1.1.3). Even the above parable has 
received the challenge that Hick is standing on the vantage point as the one who 
brought the elephant to those blind men and claims to be the only person who grasps 
                                                 
5
 Hick, God and the Universe of Faith, revised edition (London: Collins Fount Paperbacks, 1977), 140. 
6
 Hick, God and the Universe of Faith, 140. 
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the truth.7 Although Hick has responded to these comments in many of his 
publications and has argued that he is only employing those philosophical resources 
he mentioned in developing his theory in a loose and general way, these questions 
seem to remain. What if those theoretical resources within Hick’s systems are used in 
at least a more precise way than Hick himself? Can those difficulties with Hick’s 
system thus be solved? Is it possible to improve Hick’s idea by means of the same 
resources and consequently to make it more feasible in dealing with the diversity of 
religions?8 A consideration of these issues is the main task of the present chapter.  
The task will be conducted in two parts. First, this chapter will critically 
demonstrate Hick’s religious “pluralistic hypothesis.” (§2.1) This part will focus on 
the notion of the Real (§2.1.1), the proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as 
(§2.1.2) and the criterion of soteriological transformation (§2.1.3). Some relevant 
criticisms on Hick’s model will be directly or indirectly discussed. The second part 
will consist of some comments on Hick’s theory (§2.2). This part will firstly make 
some clarification on Hick’s hypothesis (§2.2.1), then indicate further questions that 
might not be solved without modifying Hick’s framework (§2.2.2). Finally it will 
point out the theoretical resources within Hick’s thesis to improve or reconstruct his 
                                                 
7
 Philip Almond, “John Hick’s Copernican Theology,” Theology 86, no. 709 (January 1983), 37; Gavin 
D’Costa, “Elephants, Ropes and a Christian Theology of Religions,” Theology 88, no.724 (July 1985), 
260.  
8
 See Jerry H. Gill, “John Hick and Religious Knowledge,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 2, no. 3 (Fall 1971), 129-147. Gill’s idea has been generally mentioned in note 79 of previous 
chapter. 
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hypothesis. This section will serve as a preparation for the discussion of next two 
chapters (§2.2.3). 
 
2.1 A Critical Review of John Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis 
2.1.1 Hick’s Metaphysics 
From the metaphysical perspective, there are two entities in Hick’s pluralistic 
hypothesis: one is the transcendental Real and the other is the ambiguous universe. 
According to Hick, it is the transcendental Real, described as the Real an sich, that 
“sets” the ambiguity of the universe and thus simultaneously “creates” the epistemic 
distance for human beings inhabiting in the ambiguous universe to freely respond to 
the Real an sich.9 The images of God, Allah, Dao and so on that are worshipped by 
human beings of different religious traditions in the ambiguous universe should be 
understood as various manifestations of the Real an sich or the Real as being 
perceived. In brief, the transcendental Real is the focus and centre for human beings 
to respond to while the ambiguous universe is the field for them to practice their 
various responses.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 See, Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 67, for example. 
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2.1.1.1 The Notion of the Real 
2.1.1.1.1 A Dual Concept 
The core of Hick’s “pluralistic hypothesis” is “the Real,” a word which he 
suggests as a generic name and most appropriate term10 for the referent of a single 
ultimate ground of the necessary condition of our existence, our highest good and of 
all human soteriological transformation, a transformation of human existence from 
self-centredness to Reality-centredness,11 or the “noumenal ground” of certain 
experiences, such as that the Real an sich has an “impact upon us,”12 and of “the 
intentional objects of the different forms of religious thought-and-experience.”13 
Although the term the Real may not be such a widely accepted term as God both for 
ordinary people and for theologian and academic studies in the East and the West,14 
to use this term, in Hick’s opinion, can avoid the question of the meaning of God as a 
divine person and can take account of those traditions that the ultimate Reality in 
them is non-personal. The idea behind this argument is that there is only one ultimate 
ground for all religious traditions. Therefore, the difference between the traditions of 
                                                 
10
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 10-11. 
11
 A Christian Theology of Religions, 63 & 69  
12
 Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 67. 
13
 An Interpretation of Religion, 350. 
14
 This is Paul Badham’s reflection on Hick’s usage. Badham suggests “to continue to use the 
mainstream religious words, such as “God”, “Allah”, “Braham” or dharmakāya and then to stimulate 
further reflection by using less specific terms such as “the Real” or “the Transcendent” or “the Ground 
of Being”. Prolonged discussions prior to the launch of the interfaith series of “God conferences” 
suggested that “God” was the most widely accepted tem for the Ultimate and that it was widely 
regarded as appropriate in both personal and impersonal understandings.” For the details, see Badham, 
“Hick’s An Interpretation of Religion,” in Problems in the Philosophy of Religion: Critical Studies of 
the Work of John Hick, ed. Harold Hewitt, jr. (London: MacMillan, 1991), 90-91.  
                                    
53 
 
the personal God and that of the non-personal Absolute can be taken as different 
manifestations of the Real an sich as the ultimate ground. That is to say, there is a 
distinction between the noumenal Reality, and, as the phenomenal manifestations of it, 
that is, the God figures and the Absolutes of the different traditions.15 
According to Hick, this distinction is analogous to the distinction between 
noumenon and phenomenon or between things-in-themselves and things as they 
appear to human consciousness argued by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. 
Briefly speaking, in Hick’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, the noumenon or 
things-in-themselves can only be known by some faculty of non-sensible intuition that 
we human beings do not have, and the phenomena or things as they appear to human 
consciousness, which are the manifestations of things-in-themselves, are represented 
by and are the results of the operation of the combining of sensory perception and the 
categories contained within the understanding of human cognition.  
By applying Kant’s idea to his framework, Hick points out that, although the 
Real an sich is the ultimate ground of various aspects of human activities, what we 
human beings perceive and think is not the Real an sich or the noumenal Real but the 
Real as humanly experienced and thought in terms of our varying religious 
conceptualities and spiritual practices. The Real an sich is beyond or outside the 
                                                 
15
 This is Hick’s reply to Paul Badham, see ibid., 104. 
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human conceptual field or, in short, is ineffable or transcategorial.16 In other words, 
from human point of view, the Real an sich is totally transcategorial or ineffable in 
that the nature of the Real cannot be described in terms of human concepts.17Although 
the Real as being perceived is not the same as the Real that is not perceived, it does 
not follow that they are two entities; the latter is the origin of the former while the 
former is the manifestation of the latter.  
Regarding the origin of and the divergence between the personal God and the 
non-personal Absolute, Hick argues that it is the basic two categories, as the twelve 
categories in Kant’s theory, in human responses to and understanding of the Real that 
lead to the notion of Deity or God (the Real as personal) and that of the Absolute (the 
Real as non-personal). Both are then made concrete in terms of the filled time of 
history and culture as a range of the experienced Gods and Absolutes, i.e., 
respectively, the personae and the impersonae, of the various religious traditions.18 
Or, from the perspective of the activities of the cognition, human beings’ minds will 
impose these two basic categories in the making of religious experience.19 Hick 
maintains that the personae and the impersonae are the joint products of the 
transcendent presence and earthly imagination and of divine revelation and human 
                                                 
16
 See, for example, An Interpretation of Religion, xx-xxi. Since Hick has reiterated this idea in many 
parts of his books, here this research just gives a similar paragraph as a citation. 
17
 Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 82 &109. 
18
 An Interpretation of Religion, 245; A Christian Theology of Religions, 29. 
19
 A Christian Theology of Religions, 29. 
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seeking.20 Thus, Hick concludes, “each tradition has a dual concept of God as both 
transcategorial in the ultimate divine nature and yet religiously available in virtue of 
qualities analogous to but limitlessly greater than our own.”21 
 
2.1.1.1.2 The Real is Ineffable and Transcategorial  
Although the Real an sich is ineffable or transcategorial, Hick reminds us that 
even this kind of “description” of the Real an sich should be considered in the context 
of the distinction between purely formal and logical attributes, which do not tell us 
anything about the object we talk about, and substantial attributes, such as goodness, 
power, personality and so on. Hick suggests that the idea of “transcategorial” or 
“ineffable” here should be understood in terms of the formal attributes.22 Since the 
Real an sich is transcategorial or ineffable, the notions such as God, Allah, Dao and so 
forth in different religious traditions are the products of conceptual and linguistic 
systems. Also, they are human responses to the Real an sich in the historical forms of 
life within different religions.23  
Seeing that the Real an sich is ineffable or transcategorial, it is impossible to 
refer to It directly or literally as to be one or many, person or thing, conscious or 
unconscious, purposive or non-purposive, substance or process, good or evil, loving 
                                                 
20
 An Interpretation of Religion, 266. 
21
 Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 76. 
22
 An Interpretation of Religion, 239; Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 83; 109-110. 
23
 For the details, see An Interpretation of Religion, 233-236. 
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or hating.24 This formulation can be taken as Hick’s indirect response to the question 
of polytheism of the Real,25 of the Real and Unreal (e.g. George I. Mavrodes)26 and 
of “several ‘ultimates’ (e.g. John Cobb, Jr, and David Ray Griffin).27 As for the term 
“poly” and the usage of the “Real” and the “Unreal,” in Hick’s own words, are upaya, 
“skilful means,” a Buddhist concepts basically meaning a parable or a similes to 
communicate the truth,28 to be applied to describe the “ultimate Reality.” (This term 
is also another “upaya”!) To dispute this term is to trap oneself into the mystifying 
barrier of language and any related attacks on Hick’s theory will misfire. In the case 
of the “several ‘ultimates’” argument, in agreement with Hick’s own comment that 
whether the idea of it is coherent is debatable,29 this research will add that even 
though the different “ultimates” correspond to different religious orientations, these 
“ultimates” should still be understood as, in Hick’s phrase, the “Penultimate,”30 and 
are the varied manifestations of the “ultimate Real.”  
 
 
                                                 
24
 An Interpretation of Religion, 350. 
25
 Ibid., xxvii. 
26
 Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 74. 
27
 For the idea of “many ‘ultimate,’’ this research temporarily relies on Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s 
introduction in his “Pluralisms,” in Christian Approaches to Other Faiths, eds. Alan Race & Paul M. 
Hedges, 96-99. 
28
 Hick’s understanding of this concept can be seen in his article “Religion as ‘Skilful Means’ (2004),” 
John Hick’s Official Website. Available from 
http://www.johnhick.org.uk/jsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56:skilful&catid=3
7:articles&Itemid=58. Accessed on 7 August 2011. 
29
 An Interpretation of Religion, xxvii. 
30
 Ibid., 201. 
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2.1.1.1.3 The Role of the Real 
Although the Real an sich is transcategorial or ineffable and can not be humanly 
experienced or thought and thus it could have no relationship with variant religious 
phenomena,31 for Hick, it is still necessary to postulate the Real an sich. The reason 
is that, epistemologically, for Hick, the precondition of the rationality of the religious 
belief lies in the affirmation of the position of the Real an sich. Otherwise, all the 
understanding of the Transcendent, the Eternal One and so on will merely fall into the 
subjective objection of human moral attributes or a particular conception of forms of 
life as divergent language-games.32 Only in affirming the role of the Real, or the idea 
of theos, can our interpretation and understanding of the religions be “religious,” 
rather than be “naturalistic,” as in the explanation of some sociologists, psychologists 
and ethnologists.33  
     From another angle, theoretically, due to that the personae and the impersonae 
are “the joint products of the transcendent presence and earthly imagination and of 
divine revelation and human seeking,”34 the properties or projections that are 
characterised by human consciousness may be taken as some combination of the 
                                                 
31
 This is George I. Mavrodes’ question. See Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 74. To 
certain extent, Mavrodes’ question is worth noticing. We can then raise a further question that why our 
experiences of and responses to the Real should be always taken as “religious”? However, I think that 
this kind of inquiry is beyond my competence at this moment and is not the concern of this thesis. I 
should leave it aside here. 
32
 This is the main contention of religious non-realism.  
33
 An Interpretation of Religion, 6. 
34
 Ibid., 266. 
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subjective factors and the primary qualities. Therefore, ideally, by removing the 
subjective factors the primary qualities of the object can be displayed. The primary 
qualities can be regarded as something that belongs to the object of our perception and 
experience. Meanwhile, those qualities that are being detected by human awareness 
are the elements that stimulate human responses. Thus, on the religious level, there 
shall be something that exists “there” as the object of the religious experience 
although its “qualities” may be experienced in various ways in terms of different 
human traditions. 
In Hick’s theory, “something” is given the name the Real an sich. Although the 
Real that is humanly experienced and thought can not be identical with the Real an 
sich, it does not means that they are two entities. Real an sich is the root of the Real as 
being perceived and the latter is the manifestation of the former. In this manner, there 
should be no scepticism in Hick’s religious critical realism. To borrow the term from 
the criticisms but use it with slight different purpose, Hick’s theory can be 
characterised as “transcendental agnosticism”35 seeing that Hick does not intend to 
elucidate any details about the nature of the Real: “transcendent” in the sense that the 
                                                 
35
 This is Gavin D’Costa comment on Hick when he discusses Hick’s discourse on the nature of the 
Reality. According to D’Costa, Hick’s position is “transcendental agnosticism” in the sense that it 
“affirms the transcendent divine reality over against naturalistic positions, while refusing to state that 
the eschaton may eventually be theistic rather than non-theistic.”(p.172). D’Costa’s argument is 
established on Hick’s books and essays that were published before 1985 and he wants to argue that, 
until the radical development in 1980s, the image of the transcendent reality shall be theistic. For the 
details of the argument, see D’Costa, John Hick’s Theology of Religions: A Critical Evaluation 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1987), 170-183. This term is inherited by Sinkinson when he 
reflects on Hick’s epistemology, see Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths: A Critical Study of John Hick’s 
Religious Pluralism (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001), 55. 
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Real is beyond human beings’ experience and “agnosticism” refers to the nature of the 
Real as epistemologically ineffable or transcategorial in Hick thesis.  
Further, as noted above, the Real an sich is the ultimate ground of the necessary 
condition of our existence, our highest good and all human soteriological 
transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Real-centredness. Once 
the foundation of human religious interpretation and understanding of religions has 
been given, the object of human religious responses would not be an “empty notion.” 
Simultaneously, what can be inferred from Hick’s theory is that the soteriological 
transformation, the significance of the Real and the relevant religious concerns can 
only be manifested or be actualised in the universe that human beings dwell in.   
 
2.1.1.2 The Ambiguous Universe 
According to Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, the universe that human beings 
inhabit is for them ambiguous. The universe is ambiguous in the sense that it is 
capable of being comprehensively understood both religiously and naturalistically- so 
that both options are objectively possible and both alike incur the risk of being 
profoundly mistaken.36 It is the “ambiguity” of the universe that makes it full of 
significance for human beings to appreciate and explore. Also, it is the ambiguity that 
                                                 
36
 Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 82. 
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makes certain distance in terms of which human beings can have a range of freedoms 
to understand the universe they are dwelling in. This distance is an epistemic distance 
that is “preserved” by the Real an sich for human beings to be free to be aware or 
unaware of its presence.37  
 
2.1.1.2.1 Significance38 as the Feature of Ambiguous Universe 
Hick has argued in his early work that all awareness of environment is awareness 
of it as significance39 and claims in the later development that the significance is the 
universal feature of our environment as we perceive and inhabit it.40 Different people 
may grasp different significances in the same environment in terms of their different 
backgrounds. Meanwhile, varied significances constitute the notion of the same 
environment.41 For example, one may merely experience Heidelberg as an ancient 
town with the River Neckar flowing by, while another individual may recognise its 
importance for the Reformation. Both are reactions to the same Heidelberg. Both also 
                                                 
37
 Cf. Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 67. 
38
 Actually, Hick has tried to make the differentiation between “meaning” and “significance” and 
claimed that he proposes to use the less prejudged term “significance” when he discusses “the nature of 
faith” in his Faith and Knowledge. The main reason that leads Hick to such consideration is that 
“meaning” has been so overworked and misused as to almost useless today. As in the following 
quotation, He also defines “significance” in his own usage. For the details, see Faith and Knowledge, 
1st ed., 111-112. However, it seems that in the later essays or books, he still uses both of these two 
terms. See, for example, The New Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience, 
Neuroscience and the Transcendent (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), chapter 12. Nevertheless, 
this research will only use “significance” when referring to Hick’s discourse in order to distinguish it 
from the phrase of “the search for meaning” that is to be suggested in its later chapters.  
39
 See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 1st edition (New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), chapters 6 
& 8. 
40
 An Interpretation of Religion, 131. 
41
 Ibid., 129-131. 
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represent aspects of Heidelberg and constitute the image of Heidelberg. What make 
these reactions different are the levels of significance. For the significance on one 
level may be more concrete and firm (a town accompanied by a river) while that on 
another level may not be so widely apprehended. Thus, there are degrees of 
“freedom” when we respond to an environment or a situation in accordance with our 
knowledge, condition and so forth. Hick indicates that this is also the characteristic of 
the universe that we perceive. In cognising the universe, we also keep this kind of 
freedom. Vertically, in Hick classification, this characteristic results in three or four 
levels of significances of the universe, that is, its physical, ethical and religious 
significance. Horizontally, since the significances grasped by people in a particular 
environment may result from a particular set of cultural structures, customs, ideas, 
concepts, and so on, this characteristic also explains the occurrence that the universe 
can be comprehensively understood both religiously and naturalistically and the 
existence of varied religious traditions.42 Hick names the degrees of free responses to 
the surrounding where we are situated in epistemic distance.  
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 This explanation can be found in Hick’s many books, for example, An Interpretation of Religion, 
xviii; Problems of Religious Pluralism, chapter 2; God and the Universe of Faiths, 67. The idea 
presented here is a summary of an interpretation that is based on the researcher’s understanding. 
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2.1.1.2.2 The Epistemic Distance “Preserved” for the Free Exercise of Human 
Cognition 
In addition to acting as the ground for the occurrence of understanding the 
universe either religiously or naturalistically and the phenomenon of the diversity of 
religions, according to Hick, on the religious level, the epistemic distance still works 
as the room for the exercise of human autonomy for his or her own responsibility for 
his or her life within the temporal world as a place for his or her soul-making. 
To put it further, because of the ambiguity of universe, human beings are in a 
range of freedoms to cognise or be aware of and to give response to it in various, 
conflicting or complementary, ways. In accordance with this idea, religious persons, 
as compared with non-religious ones, are conscious of the presence of the Real an 
sich with the exercise of their cognitive freedom. For those people, the Real an sich or 
the universe can be less religiously ambiguous or there is even no religious ambiguity. 
Therefore, those figures in different religious traditions, such as Jesus of Nazareth and 
Muhammad, may have the compelling awareness of the Real. It could be inferred 
from this stance that epistemic distance should change in accordance with the degree 
of one’s awareness of and responses to the Real over his or her many lives. Once s/he 
has compellingly experienced the presence of the Real at one of the phases of his or 
her many lives and acts religiously and genuinely according to what s/he has 
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experienced, the epistemic distance should disappear. In Christian tradition, Jesus of 
Nazareth should be taken as the most significant and relevant example.  
It seems that just because Jesus was aware of the presence of God (the Real an 
sich being perceived as God), he acted as a response to God. In other words, the 
awareness of the presence of God changed Jesus view of life and world. Before this 
happened, there might be many lives of Jesus and he could still exercise his cognitive 
freedom. However, after this kind of awareness, for Jesus, the universe would no 
longer be religiously ambiguous and thus he felt the utter demands of God’s love and 
the overwhelming consciousness of the truth of theism.43 This implies that Hick does 
not maintain a discourse with an inner inconsistence that those being equipped with 
the cognitive freedom are not able to respond freely before they have the compelling 
experience of the presence of the Real.44 Meanwhile, it is reasonable for Hick to 
maintain that the present epistemic distance of anybody is the right distance for him or 
her from God since this distance depends on one’s effort through many lives and thus 
the spiritual change is individual and universal in Hick’s system: being individual in 
the sense that it happens in accordance with one’s work while being universal in the 
                                                 
43
 This is a tentative response to Sinkinson’s criticism of Hick’s notion of cognitive freedom. With a 
review of the comments made by Penelhum and Helm on Hick, Sinkinson argues that “Hick does not 
describe Jesus as exercising cognitive freedom in his response to God, but as being ‘overwhelmingly 
conscious’ of the truth of theism, and finding God’s love ‘utterly demanding’.” See Sinkinson, The 
Universe of Faiths, 60. 
44
 This is one of Sinkinson’s criticisms of Hick’s theory, see his book, The Universe of Faiths, 58-62. 
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sense that the idea of this “distance” is applicable to everyone.45 
Once we appreciate this condition, or, to be specific, that we treat Hick’s thesis 
as an approach of seeing the world religions, it is reasonable that a believer can, 
philosophically, adopt the pluralist hypothesis while remaining emotionally convinced 
that the universe is religiously unambiguous since the former is relevant to the public 
attitude toward other religions or traditions while the latter is the matter of one’s own 
private belief. Additionally, a distinction should be made between the author’s own 
personal belief and what s/he has argued for before launching any criticism. To be a 
Christian theologian, like Hick, is one thing, s/he can work on clarifying, defending 
and establishing the doctrine of his or her own tradition. To be a pluralistic 
philosopher is another, for s/he can still propose a theological framework of reflecting 
the world religions. In short, there could be no tension between one’s own faith and 
his or her awareness of the religious ambiguity.46  
To sum up, it can be said that the ambiguity of the universe is set for 
epistemological and theological reasons. For the epistemological reason, it is the 
ambiguity that opens the possibility for human beings to freely respond to the Real an 
                                                 
45
 This is another response to the criticism that is made by Gavin D’Costa. For the details, see Gavin 
D’Costa’s criticism in his John Hick’s Theology of Religions, 95. 
46
 Sinkinson claims that, for a believer, there is a tension between accepting the religious ambiguity in 
terms of philosophical reasons and remaining emotionally convinced that the universe is religious 
unambiguous. His purpose is to point out that Hick’s theology is driven and influenced by the 
philosophical resources that he has appropriated. For Hick, as a theologian as well as a philosopher of 
religion, even the philosophy he adopts has affected the making of his theology, the model he suggest 
can still work as a framework for readers or any believers from different religious traditions. For 
Sinkinson’s opinion, see Christopher Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths, 52-55. 
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sich to distinguish the religious interpretation from the non-religious one. It also then 
preserves the space for explaining the diversity of religions in light of the proposition 
of all experiencing is experiencing-as. As for the theological reason, it is the 
ambiguity that accounts for the idea of the soul-making or person-making in the 
process of various experiences of life in this universe. Meanwhile, it saves the Real an 
sich from the accusation of not intervening the misfortune and suffering of human 
beings. It also justifies the soteriological transformation as happening among all 
religious traditions and can thus be used as the criterion to judge the authenticity of 
any religion.  
This metaphysical position of the distinction between the Real an sich and the 
Real as being perceived, the ambiguity of the universe and the epistemic distance 
further results in an epistemological approach that is characterised by Hick as critical 
realism. Hick contends that, in addition to the insight of Immanuel Kant’s 
noumenon/phenomenon distinction, this epistemological principle had already been 
succinctly stated before by St. Thomas Aquinas as “Things known are in the knower 
according to the mode of the knower”47 and later by Wittgenstein’s notion of 
“seeing-as,” the main element of which that Hick adopts is the idea that “we see it as 
we interpret it.”48  
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2.1.2 Hick’s Epistemology 
The approach of Hick’s epistemology of religion is critical realism. He employs 
“the principle of credulity” and the idea of all experiencing is experiencing-as to argue 
for the rationality of religious belief and experience. Due to the ineffability of the 
object of religious experience, Hick suggests that the content of this experience 
should be understood in terms of Richard Swinburne’s “the principle of credulity.”49 
In the meanwhile, Hick justifies the rationality of religious experience by exploring 
Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing-as into the proposition of all experiencing is 
experiencing-as and then applies this proposition into explaining religious plurality.  
 
2.1.2.1 Critical Realism 
Religious critical realism is a position that Hick differentiates himself from naïve 
(religious) realism and by which he defends the core of religion in his response to 
religious non-realism. According to Hick, “naïve (religious) realism” basically, 
suggests that the reality is in itself as what we perceive it to be.50 From the realistic 
viewpoint, although the transcendent of each religious tradition refers to something 
that stands transcendently above or supports from the below and offering meaning or 
                                                 
49
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value to our existence, those concepts of God, the Divine, the Dao, the dharmakāya, 
etc. are referred literally to something that is both in relation to us and transcends 
above us. By contrast, the stand of religious non-realism, opened by Ludwig 
Feuerbach and then advocated and developed by R. B. Braithwaite, John Randall, D. 
Z. Phillips, Don Cupitt and others, is that the ideas of God are merely human 
projections and the idealised reflection of our own nature.51  
In agreement with the critical realism, an epistemological trend emerged in the 
first half of twentieth century, Hick uses the term of religious critical realism to 
characterise his epistemology. The purpose of Hick to hold such a position is to avoid 
the scepticism towards the notion of the Real and to affirm the rationality of religious 
belief.  
The main idea of critical realism, according to R. W. Sellars, one of the 
representatives of this epistemological camp, is that in the process of human 
perceiving an eternal object, there are attitudes, expectations, beliefs, memories and 
so on that constitute the awareness of it. Thus, human perceiving always involves 
more than sensing. That is to say, when we perceive something, there is stimulus and 
a complex subjective interpretative response in that process. It acknowledges that we 
always perceive an eternal object and recognise and emphasise the subjective 
                                                 
51
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dynamic role in characterising the object. However, what we perceive can not be 
identical with the eternal object.52 It is possible that the content of human perceiving 
is an illusion or an error. Even though, for critical realism, we are perceiving some 
actual properties of the object “there” or at least some projections, characterised by 
some intuited characters, of them. Critical realists will claim that there are some 
eternal objects causing the sense data that corresponds to them in primary qualities. 
Such illusions and errors could be ruled out by comparing with the evidence of 
different senses or of different persons. In this manner, there will be no scepticism in 
this position.53  
    Applying the tenet of critical realism to his own religious critical realism, what 
differentiates Hick’s position from religious naïve realism is that it considers the 
conceptual and interpretive element with human sense perception, i.e. the subjective 
contribution to all human awareness. It stresses on the sensory data we intuit are 
private to our perceiving consciousness and by which we can live in relation to the 
object that exists outside or transcend our own minds.54 In this manner, our “sense 
perception is a complexly mediated awareness of the physical world.”55 That is to say, 
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on the one hand, Hick affirms the function of human linguistic and conceptual 
systems in the description of the Transcendent or the Real an sich; on the other hand, 
he distances himself from the naïve realism and highlights subjective factors in the 
making of religious experience or beliefs. For Hick, it is the customs, historical events, 
geographical setting, social fabric and so forth that form the “subjective factors” 
which act as the interpretive elements in human understanding and responding to the 
Real in different traditions. It is the “subjective factors” that forms “the mode of the 
knower.” Moreover, the emphasis on these subjective factors in the making of 
religious consciousness also rebuts the idea that the transcendent Real is nothing but 
an illusion or a human subjective projection on the ground that, echoing to critical 
realism, the way to ascertain the rationality of the religious experience reported by 
religious persons is to see whether the reporters are regarded as fully sane, sober and 
rational persons. It also includes our moral and psychological estimate of the persons 
whose claims are consistent with our other knowledge, i.e., the wider experience will 
provide a context within which the special experience is criticised.56 In this manner, 
those holy images of religious traditions can not be taken as “empty notions” but as 
something beyond human understanding. 
    Even if the position of the Real an sich could be justified and its “nature” could 
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be metaphorically described, how could the reality of our religious experience be 
verified? Hick, adherent to the empiricist tradition, on the one hand, applies Richard 
Swinburne’s “the principle of credulity” into his argument and tries to justify the 
similarities between sensory experience and religious experience by enlarging 
Wittgenstein’s idea of “seeing-as” into all experiencing is experiencing-as.  
 
2.1.2.2 The Principle of Credulity 
The starting point of Hick’s legitimising the place of religious experience and the 
rationality of religious belief is his premise that religious belief, as a form of cognition 
by acquaintance, is akin to sense perception and that the awareness of God is faith in 
its primary sense.57 This standpoint can be traced back in his early work Faith and 
Knowledge where Hick reflects on the position in Thomist-Catholic tradition of 
treating the religious faith as propositional truths.58 The second part of the second 
edition of that book is even entitled clearly “Faith as the Interpretation Element within 
Religious Experience.”59 For Hick, although taking religious beliefs as propositional 
truths is a very important step in the early history of the development of the church, it 
followed a wrong direction seeing that the theologians within it treated faiths as 
proposition to be assented to rather than as real responses to God’s revelation in the 
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life of Jesus of Nazareth.60 Hick’s argument is that “the cognition of God by faith is 
more like perceiving something, even perceiving a physical object, that is present 
before us than it is like believing a statement about some absent object.”61 What does 
it mean by the thesis that religious belief is much more like sense perception? For 
Hick, the similarity between the feature of religious belief and of the sensory 
perception can be first explained by “the principle of credulity” of Richard 
Swinburne.  
According to the quotation of Hick from R. Swinburne, the idea of “the principle 
of credulity” is that of “what one seems to perceive is probably so. How things seem 
to be is good ground for a belief about how things are.”62 Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that we can apply arbitrarily this principle to anything.63 Hick explains that the 
general rule that we exercise is that “it is rational to regard our apparently perceptual 
experiences as veridical except when we have reason to doubt their veridicality.”64 
Hick argues that we can make use of this principle in the cases of religious faiths, 
especially the profession of having the experience of the presence of God.65 For those 
who, such as Jesus of Nazareth, claim that s/ he had strongly and continually 
experienced the presence of God, the reality of God is rational and the consciousness 
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of it can be served as the ground of their living and their ways of responding to the 
environment in this world. They are entitled to believe their own experience. As for 
the criterion of those reports, Hick suggests that it depends on whether the reporters 
are regarded as fully sane, sober and rational persons. Further, it includes our moral 
and psychological estimate of the persons whose claims are consistent with our other 
knowledge, i.e., the wider experience will provide a context within which the special 
experience is criticized. Thus such persons as Jesus, St Paul and Martin Luther have 
been entitled to claim on the basis of their own experience to know that God exists 
and their contentions could then serve as the well-grounded human belief for that.66  
 
2.1.2.3 The Proposition of All Experiencing Is Experiencing-as 
Another dimension of the similarity is the interpretive element within sensory 
perception and religious belief, or within the physical experience and religious 
experience. In order to illustrate this idea, Hick further analyses the nature of the 
whole fields of human experience and, by appropriating and then enlarging 
Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing-as, claims that all conscious or intentional experiencing 
is experiencing-as. What this strategy implies is that the basic similarity among all 
experience is to establish the rationality of religious experience. If the rationality of 
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religious experience is denied, then the certainty of all human experiences will be 
shaken. 
 
2.1.2.3.1 Significance as the Most General Characteristic of Human Conscious 
Experience 
Corresponding to the idea that significance as the feature of ambiguous universe, 
Hick indicates that significance is also the most general characteristic of human 
conscious experience. 
By “significance” Hick originally meant “the fundamental and all-pervasive 
characteristic of our conscious experience which de facto constitutes it for us the 
experience of a ‘world’ and not of a mere empty void or churning chaos.”67 That is to 
say, the significance is the outcome of human beings’ experience of the world as 
something significant so that they can motivate human beings to react to them. Hick 
continues, “Except perhaps in very early infancy or in states of radical breakdown, the 
human mind is always aware of its environment as having this quality of 
fundamentally familiarity or intelligibility.”68Therefore, Hick argues that 
“significance” in this context is different from its semantic meaning and “is the most 
general characteristic of conscious experience as such.”69 Hick then points out that 
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recognition is one of the elements of conscious experience because in everyday 
experience we always recognise something as a this or a that and it involves being in 
a certain dispositional state in relation to it and that such a thing is located in a 
situation, which is composed of a set of objects and could evoke its own appropriate 
dispositional response.70 Hick elucidates this idea by explaining the operation of 
concept in everyday life and by pointing out that all concepts are social products 
having their life within a linguistic environment to justify his proposition that all 
(conscious) experiencing is experiencing-as.71  
For instance, modern people can normally recognise or identify a fork without 
noticing that they are in fact performing an act of recognition or identification. They 
are indeed seeing a fork as a fork with the application of the concept of a fork. 
However, a Stone Age savage would not be able to recognise a fork at all and might 
instead take it as a marvellouly shining object full of mana due to his lack of the 
concept of a fork. Hick thus concludes, “To recognise or identify is to experience-as 
in terms of a concept.”72 Further, he claims that this suggestion is true of natural 
objects, such as identifying a moving object in the sky as a bird in terms of the 
concept of a bird.73 Hick then points out that the actuality that we can identify or 
recognise something as a this or a that is similar to Wittgenstein’s idea of 
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“seeing-as.”74 Hick suggests that this idea can be enlarged into “experiencing-as.” 
According to Hick’s understanding, one can experience the same object as it has 
natural and physical, moral and ethical, or religious significance. Further, in the later 
stages of his epistemology of religion, Hick calls the correlate of “experiencing-as” 
“significance” and equates “experiencing-as” with “recognising” and proposes that 
“all experiencing is experiencing-as.” 
In order to introduce Wittgenstein’s idea of “seeing-as” into his hypothesis, Hick 
begins his investigation on experiences with discussing the puzzle pictures and 
ambiguous diagrams such as the Necker-cube, Jastrow’s duck-rabbit and Köhler’s 
goblet-faces. All these illustrations can be perceived in two perspectives. For instance, 
the duck-rabbit can be simultaneously seen as a rabbit and as a duck; both shapes 
have equal weight.75 Hick summarises Wittgenstein’s point as follows: 
  
We speak of seeing-as when that which is objectively there, in the sense of that 
which affects the retina, can be consciously perceived in two different ways as 
having two different characters or natures or meanings or significances; and 
very often, in these two- dimensional instances, we find that the mind switches 
back and forth between the alternative ways of seeing-as.76   
 
Hick contends that since different senses normally do not function in isolation 
and we perceive and recognize by means of their cooperating as a single complex 
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means of perception, the term “experiencing-as” derived from “seeing-as” should be 
used to refer to the end-product of this in consciousness.77  
It is easy to tell that Hick’s purpose is first to analyse the elements of common 
understanding of experience by modifying Wittgenstein’s idea and then bring the 
religious experiencing into the concept of experience to justify the epistemological 
structure of religious belief. Religious belief is much more like sense perception and 
that “the awareness of God itself […] is faith in its primary sense.”78 Based on this 
proposition that all experiencing is experiencing-as and the related discourses, Hick 
further shows levels of significances of the same object while one is experiencing it. 
In other words, for Hick, another feature of experiencing-as is that it occurs at various 
levels of awareness.79 
 
2.1.2.3.2 Levels of Human Experience 
In Hick’s epistemology, there are at least three levels of significance produced in 
the process of human experience: physical/natural, moral/ethical and religious. 
Physical and natural significance for people basically means it can evoke human 
beings to respond appropriately to the natural world, i.e., the situation, to survive or to 
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avoid the mortal danger.80 Moral and ethical significance for people means that to 
experience persons as persons is to exercise the concept of a person.81 This is the 
foundation of human society and community. Religious significance denotes that to 
exercise the religious concepts is to experience the world as the situation of the 
presence of the Transcendent.82 Hick argues, “These are successively higher-level 
recognitions in the sense that each later member of the list presupposes and goes 
beyond the previous one.”83  
For Hick, religious significance is the highest level, moral and ethical 
significance is the next, and natural and physical significance is the lowest. These 
levels of significance are corresponding to what Hick calls “cognitive freedom” – an 
idea related to the concept of epistemic distance discussed in the previous section 
(§2.1.1.2.2). On the physical level, the response of human beings to their respective 
environments is of the most restricted freedom since the physical objects are concrete 
and unambiguous. However, on the religious level, human beings can exercise the 
most cognitive freedom to comprehend the universe because of its vagueness and 
ambiguity.  
In brief, the common element of these three levels of experiences is recognising 
or identifying, or as noted earlier, interpreting, and evoking the appropriate 
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dispositional response. By extricating the basic epistemological similarity of varied 
levels of experiences,84 Hick validates the religious experience. Hick argues that: 
 
It is justified in basically the same way as our belief about ‘what there is and 
how things are’ in our total environment: namely, by the impact of that 
environment upon us, our consciousness of which is our experience of it.85 
 
It can be derived from this paragraph that, if religious experience is denied, then 
the certainty of the whole realm of our experience will be shaken.86 Nonetheless, in 
Hick’s hypothesis, there is still some element that makes the religious experience 
differ from the sensory and moral experience and thus it could be seen as the 
threshold for human beings to “communicate” with the Transcendent. Hick argues 
ambiguously and mystically that the “spiritual” aspect of our nature – the imago dei, 
the image of God, or our capacity to receive divine revelation – can resonate with the 
universal presence of the transcendent reality. This is the channel that the Real an sich 
can have “impact” or “act” upon us.87 According to Hick, the words “resonates”, 
“impacts”, etc. used in this kind of area should be taken as metaphors.88 Besides, 
these metaphorical languages express the fact that we are open to the universal 
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presence of the Real with the aids of the inadequate human concepts.89 
With the aids of this spiritual aspect within human nature and the justification of 
the credulity and rationality of religious experience, the idea mentioned above (§ 
2.1.1.1.1) that the persona and the impersona arising at the interface between the Real 
an sich and the human consciousness are the joint product of the transcendent 
presence and earthly imagination and of divine revelation and human seeking might 
become logically reasonable. With the exercise of this pair of persona and the 
impersona and the idea of language game, Hick applies his proposition of 
experiencing-as into the field of religious plurality. 
 
2.1.2.3.3 Implication for Religious Diversity 
The function of Hick’s proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as is that it 
first distinguishes the religious experience from other experiences because human 
beings can experience the environment as being of this or as being of that significance. 
In Hick’s own words, we can experience the ambiguous universe either religiously or 
naturalistically. The idea can also be applied to explain the diversity of religions since 
their differences are based on the primordial experience of their founders with 
employment of their own cultural and linguistic systems. The difference between 
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these religions is the result that their followers or believers use different sets of 
religious concepts to experience the Real an sich. We think and behave, in terms of 
the system of concepts, the language, which is carried from one generation to 
generation and consequently there is a relativity of language or system of concepts. 
Hick signifies that actually this idea can be elucidated in light of the notion of 
language-game of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.90  
    The implication of the proposition of experiencing-as is that all religions in this 
universe are the fruits of various human responses with their cultural and linguistic 
systems to the Transcendent Real. Thus, for example, Christians experience the 
Transcendent Real as the God while the adherents of Daoism might experience It as 
the Dao. Neither of them can argue that their holy image is the only one true picture 
of the Real an sich and thus the relevant teachings and doctrines are the only one truth 
claim. The Real an sich is one but the sages name it differently.  
Admittedly, religious experience plays an important role in Hick’s theory and is 
initially a type of individualistic experience. However, as exhibited, Hick also lays 
stress on the place of tradition rather than marginalising its significance. Even though 
there is a shared characteristic of experience among individuals throughout the world 
religions, it does not follow that the tradition can be neglected when discussing the 
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making of individual religious experience. It is tradition that substantiates individual 
experience and varies its content. Moreover, the reality of individual religious 
experience can still be examined by those measures that are just mentioned earlier.91 
In this regard, it might be inappropriate to argue that Hick ignores the role of tradition 
in the shaping of religious experience and in the process of human responses to the 
Real an sich. It could consequently be wrong to understand Hick as an expressivist 
who contends that the inner experience of believers can be the only measure to test 
the truth and value of religious doctrine. The tradition and its relevant factors such as 
idea and social system do play an important role in the operation of religious 
consciousness.92 
 
2.1.3 Hick’s Criteriology 
The criteriological aspect of Hick’s hypothesis lies in the soteriological 
transformation. Broadly speaking, it is a transformation of human existence from 
self-centredness to Real-centredness. According to Hick, this transformation comes 
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from a very basic ethical requirement, the Golden Rule, which can be found in all 
world religions. Therefore, it can serve as the criterion for the assessment of the 
authenticity of religions and religious activities. This transformation is also an 
evidence of the “impact” from the Real an sich on human beings.93 That is to say, it is 
an evidence for the existence of the Real an sich. 
 
2.1.3.1 Soteriological Transformation as A Variant of Kantian Ethics 
The implication of “soteriological” transformation, according to Hick, springs 
from the Greek soter, saviour, and Latin salus, salvation. Both terms then become 
linked with the Christian conception of “being saved by the atoning death of Christ 
from God’s righteous judgement upon sinners.”94 For Hick, this notion can be 
understood in a broader sense since there is a striking similarity of this phenomenon 
within the world religions. Furthermore, its implication can be derived from the 
paradigm of the saints in various traditions that the basic characteristic of this 
transformation is moral goodness. It is a basic ethical requirement.95  
Hick argues that such an ethical requirement has been expressed in the Golden 
Rule – it is good to benefit others and evil to harm them – the variations of which can 
be found in the great world religious traditions. Accordingly, if all human beings can 
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live in conformity with this rule, there would be no wars, no injustice and so on.96 
According to Hick, the idea of Golden Rule has been philosophical presented by 
Kant in his categorical imperative,97 which reads, “rational beings all stand under the 
law that each of them should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but 
always at the same times as an end in himself.”98 Actually, this idea is also what Hick 
has emphasised when he discusses the exercise of the cognitive freedom on the moral 
level.99 When it is considered in light of Hick’s hypothesis, the categorical imperative 
could be presented as “religious persons all inspired by the Real that each of them 
should treat himself and all others, never merely as a physical beings or ‘It,’ but 
always at the same times as moral beings or ‘Thou’.” Hick himself has already 
displayed this implication.100  
    Hick’s analysis of the soteriological transformation with his introduction of 
Kant’s moral theory and the range of moral goodness seemingly leads to an 
impression that there is no element that is distinctively religious about such 
transformation in his theory.101 Some critics even indicate that Hick’s moral ethic 
looks remarkably similar to a modern liberal agenda.102 However, there could be 
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some slight difference between Hick’s idea and the modern moral issues. That is to 
say, there is still something “religious” in Hick’s thesis. Further, although repeating 
the idea of his moral position with the quotations from Kant’s moral theory in 
different works,103 for Hick, there is “something” that works as a “catalyst” for the 
awareness of imperfectly personal creatures on the part of living completely at the 
personal level. In Hick’s system, “something” refers to the ineffable or the 
transcategorial “Real,” which is postulated by Hick for the guarantee of genuineness 
of human religious experience. It is the Real an sich, or our awareness of the Real an 
sich that inspires and prompts us to go beyond the self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness. In other words, it is the commitment of our own self to “the 
Real” that brings about this transformation.  
Analogically, or to use Kant’s technical term loosely, Hick’s moral theory could 
be regarded as an implicit type of heteronomous ethics since the raising and the 
guarantee of the moral awareness of ordinary people mainly rests on the 
manifestations and inspiration of the Real an sich. According to Kant, heteronomy 
basically means that “our will seeks the moral law that is to determine it anywhere 
else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own making of universal law.”104 This 
kind of moral law may rely on the ontological concept of perfection, a divine and 
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supremely perfect will or happiness.105 This picture of ethics is different from Kant’s 
autonomous ethics which holds that human beings are making the law for themselves, 
the law springs from their own will,106 or, “the will can regard itself as at the same 
time making universal law by means of its maxim.”107 If the understanding of Hick’s 
position here is appropriate, then the discussions of moral issues that have been seen 
as part of the moral liberal agenda shall be understood as being dealt with from 
religious or theological perspectives.  
 
2.1.3.2 Soteriological Transformation as a Process from Self-centredness Towards 
the Real-centredness and as the Criterion for the Judgment of the Authenticity of 
Religions 
Hick points out that there is a striking similarity of this phenomenon within the 
world religions. For example, in Buddhist tradition it should be referred to 
“enlightenment”; in Hindu, it manifests as “liberation”; in Islam it refers to the total 
surrender of the self to the God.108 The concrete example or the evidence of such 
transformation can be found in the lives of saints in different traditions. Those saints 
have embodied or are embodying the transformation in diverse ways. They all exhibit 
certain qualities such as charity and purity. Some may achieve the transformation 
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through individual meditation while others may return themselves to the harmony 
with the Real by political practice.109 
As exhibited above, the evidence of the “impact” on human beings from the Real 
is what Hick sees as having taken place in different world religions, which he variably 
calls a “soteriological transformation,” a transformation of human existence from 
self-centredness to Real-centredness, or a “transformation of our human situation 
from a state of alienation from the true structure of reality to a radically better state in 
harmony with reality.”110 According to Hick, this transformation is a process of 
soul-making. What does the soul-making mean? It means that human being, as being 
created in the “image” of God is to be transformed into the “likeness” of God by the 
sufferings and difficulties in the world. It is also a transition from the lower level of 
animal life (Bios) to the higher level of eternal life (Zoe).111 In Hick’s theory, such 
process could not be finished within a single life but may last for several lives. We 
may need to take our present existence as one of many lives in which the process 
moves towards a better state. Hick uses “rebirth” or “reincarnation” to conceptualise 
this scenario and thinks that the related ideas of the great world religions are different 
forms of it. To put it within a religious context, Hick further calls it “cosmic 
optimism,” which means that we can receive or achieve the soteriological 
                                                 
109
 Ibid., 303; 307. 
110
 Ibid., 10. 
111
 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 253-261; 281-291. 
                                    
87 
 
transformation to a new relationship or a newly discovered identity with that ultimate 
reality.112 Such an idea is based on Hick’s Irenaean Theodicy which suggests that 
God created humans as spiritually and morally immature creatures that, through their 
own free decisions within a world coping with variant trials, are able to become 
perfected beings.113 For Hick, since the soteriological transformation has taken or is 
taking place in different religions in the past and in the modern world, it can be 
regarded as “being universal” and can serve as the basic criterion for judging religious 
phenomenon. 
 
2.2 Preliminary Remarks 
2.2.1 Clarification 
What is implied is that although Hick admits the categories in his model are 
culturally different, there are still two basic categories that are universal, i.e., the Real 
as personal and the Real as non-personal, or the personal God and the non-personal 
Absolute. Hick contends that in the making of religious experience the human mind 
will always impose these two basic categories.114 They are universal in the sense that 
they are contained within us human beings a priori, like the categories are contained a 
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priori within understanding (Verstand).115 Additionally, by means of these two 
categories, analogous to Kantian notions,116 we can apprehend objects of religious 
experience; or in Hick’s own words, “we are aware of our supernatural environment 
in terms of certain categories which the mind imposes in the formation of religious 
experience.”117 Consequently, the concepts of God, Allah, Vishnu, etc. are the 
humanly thought persona of God in accordance with the category of the Real as 
personal, while the concepts of Dao, Nirvana, Sunyata, etc. are also the humanly 
experienced impersona of God. Both categories are, as Hick affirms, made concrete in 
terms of the filled time of history and culture. In other words, the personal God and 
the non-personal Absolute, as the two pure categories in Kantian sense, are 
“schematized” in a range of “names” or “images” by people with their “experience” 
of the Real an sich in different traditions. Since these categories are schematised by 
people with their experience in the filled time of history and culture, it is possible that 
different religions can arise at different times in the same culture (e.g. Hinduism, 
Jainism and Buddhism). This is in fact a picture Hick has clearly presented in the 
early 1980s.118  
In his interpretation of the diversity of religions, can Hick be seen as a person 
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who plays the role like the one who brought an elephant to a group of the blind men? 
The answer will be both “Yes” and “No.” “Yes” in the sense that Hick has tried to 
propose a theoretical framework for explaining the existence of the different religions. 
In this regard, Hick’s position should be considered on a philosophical-explanatory 
level119 seeing that his theory does not attempt at a newly competitive form of 
religion to other established faiths. To put it in another way, this does not mean that all 
the living religions are blind to the Real and only Hick’s version has sight.120 Even 
Hick himself does not know the true nature of the Real. This is the reason that the 
answer of the question is also “No.” Hick, like the author of Lao Tzu Tao Teh Ching 
who apologised for his description of the root and the vital force of the world that “I 
do not know its name; I style it ‘Dao’; and in the absence of a better word, call it the 
‘The Great’” (Tao Teh Ching, chapter 25),121 simply calls something undefined, 
transcendent, mystical and being the ground of soteriological transformation – “the 
Real.”  
It is in his earliest book Faith and Knowledge that Hick first introduced Kant’s 
epistemological thesis into his publications to explain the notion of significance. 
Interestingly, compared to his later view in An Interpretation of Religion where Kant’s 
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most basic epistemological insight is his emphasis on the mind’s actively interpreting 
sensory information in terms of concepts,122 in that period Hick understood the model 
of Kant’s epistemology as a correlation between the external object and the structure 
of human consciousness.123 
In order to avoid the attacks that his model conflicts with Kant’s ideas and to 
avoid criticisms similar to Kant’s philosophy, Hick’s strategy seems to look like the 
following: he claims that he is not keeping strictly to the phenomenon/noumenon 
distinction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and he is not concerned at all with the 
problems with or any assessment of Kant’s philosophy.124 He characterises his 
appropriation of Kant’s ideas as “a highly generalised version” of Kant’s 
epistemology.125 He also claims that the basic Kantian principle “had in fact already 
been succinctly stated long before by St Thomas Aquinas.”126  
In fact, the basic two-world view since Plato’s distinguishing intelligible world 
from sensible world has been a central idea in Western philosophical tradition. One of 
the philosophical issues that results from this world-view is the relation and the 
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tension between human understanding, and the external object. A similar imprint can 
also be found in Hick’s analysis of the nature and logic of faith in his Faith and 
Knowledge. Furthermore, arguing that Kant is employed in a loose way does not 
really protect Hick from the same questions levied against Kant. Rather these tactics 
could cause other difficulties in Hick’s theory, such as his vacillation between Kant 
and Wittgenstein. 
This could imply that Kant’s philosophy is merely one of the theoretical 
resources that Hick draws on to elucidate his ideas. However, despite the fact that he 
has later regarded himself as a Kantian or claimed that his philosophical thought was 
greatly influenced by Kant,127 it seems that in his appropriation of Wittgenstein’s idea 
of “seeing- as,” one idea of which is “we see it as we interpret it,” that Hick departs 
from Kant’s argument of the transcendental and universal categories of human 
understanding. For, in Hick’s view, “the mode of the knower, to use St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ term, “varies from religion to religion”128 and the categories are coloured by 
culture and tradition and thus can not be equated with Kant’s (such as thinghood and 
causality). Hick himself has admitted this difference between himself and Kant.129 
Hick is indebted to Kant for the noumenon/phenomenon distinction that helps him in 
illustrating the nature and role of the Real. But the idea that seems to affect the 
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pluralistic position of Hick’s epistemology of religion is Wittgenstein’s notion of 
“seeing-as,” which he has interpreted into the idea of “experiencing-as.” And by 
analogising the cases of seeing the puzzle pictures, Hick illuminates the religious 
experience of the Real an sich.  
Then, in which way can Hick claim that Kant is the biggest single influence on 
his thought? The answer would be Hick’s soteriological criterion. From Hick’s earliest 
book Faith and Knowledge to his later publications, his analysis of the significance on 
the moral level has always been coloured by Kant’s deontological ethics. As discussed 
in the previous section (§ 2.1.3.1), Hick’s soteriological transformation could even be 
seen as a translation of Kant’s categorical imperative. Nonetheless, the motive that 
prompts imperfect human beings to treat others humanly originates from their 
awareness of the manifestation or presence of the Real an sich. From the perspective 
of Kant’s moral philosophy, Hick’s moral position could be treated as a type of 
heteronomus ethics – the core of which remains Kantian. It can be said that Kant has 
influenced Hick the most on this point. Additionally, Hick’s achievement might be 
taken as a further development or modern interpretation of Kant’s practical 
philosophy. 
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2.2.2 Further Questions 
Even if the relevant criticisms or challenges can be met in the foregoing 
understanding and interpretation, Hick’s hypothesis still leaves certain questions 
unanswered.  
First of all, as mentioned above, the relation between the Real an sich and the 
ambiguous universe is “ambiguous” in Hick’s discourse. Metaphysically, Hick seems 
to be saying that, although the relationship between the Real an sich and the universe 
is undetermined in his system, it is the Real that makes it ambiguous to preserve an 
epistemic distance for the free exercise of human cognition. Epistemologically, Hick 
contends that all experiencing is experiencing-as. However, he is also suggesting that 
there are some levels of human experiences and that the surroundings for the making 
of all kinds of experience should be the same one, which is the ambiguous universe. It 
can be understood that at the physical/ natural, and moral/ethical levels, one can 
experience a concrete object, such as something or someone. However, at the 
religious level, how does the experience work when facing the abstract conception of 
the Real? If the Real an sich and the universe are identical and one, then the tension 
would not exist. If they are two starkly different objects, one concrete and the other 
abstract, how can they be perceived by all human experiencing with the same 
epistemological structure? It seems that Hick has never clarified this position. 
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Secondly, Hick believes that the two categories of the Real as personal and 
non-personal are related to the “spiritual” dimension of our nature. Hick argues that 
this “spiritual” aspect of our nature – the imago dei or our capacity to receive divine 
revelation – can resonate with the universal presence of the transcendent reality 
mystically. This could be the inner ground of human beings for the Real to “impact” 
or “act” upon them. Moreover, the two categories of the personal God and the 
non-personal Absolute might be connected to idea of experiencing-as in order to 
account for the occurrence of various holy images found in different religious 
traditions. Just as an ordinary person can see the puzzle picture of the duck-rabbit as a 
duck or as a rabbit by applying of the notion of the duck or the rabbit to the picture, a 
religious person can experience the Real “as” either personal God or non-personal 
Absolute by combining the category of the Deity or that of the Absolute and various 
culturally-conditioned concepts. That is to say, it is the exercise of the spiritual aspect 
within human nature with the two categories of the personal God and the 
non-personal Absolute with the culturally-conditioned concepts that constitutes the 
religious experience. The two categories could still be used or translated in the 
Kantian sense while the culturally-conditioned concepts can be understood in terms of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. However, Hick does not explore this dimension 
further. The reason could be that Hick has not exhausted sufficiently the relevant ideas 
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in Kant or in Wittgenstein. (For example, Hick can push his employment of 
Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing-as further and consider it together with the notions of 
language-game and family resemblance.) This may further lead Hick to slip between 
the epistemological positions of Kant and Wittgenstein. The question that needs to be 
asked then, which has been mentioned in previous chapter (§1.1.2), is this: for Kant 
these categories are universal while in Hick’s theory they appear to be transformed 
into something subjective and relative. If both theoretical resources within Hick’s 
hypothesis are further explored and integrated, can these problems be solved?  
The third controversial question in Hick’s system is that of soteriological 
transformation. Hick argues that there is a striking familiarity of this phenomenon 
around the world religions, but will this not contradict Hick’s pluralistic position, 
since it presupposes a single end for believers of all religious traditions? Why is the 
establishment of this soteriological scenario necessary? What is this purpose? In 
Christianity, it relates to its understanding of the “fallen” condition of humanity and 
serves as a theory for the explanation of the suffering and evils. This is the Christian 
way to find the meaning of their misfortune. If that is the case, could the search for 
meaning be more basic than the idea of soteriological transformation in human 
religious activities, and thus be more universal in religious phenomena? In this regard, 
taking the soteriological transformation as one of the aspects of religious doctrines 
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that are developed to answer the search for the meaning of life of human beings might 
help Hick’s hypothesis to be a genuine philosophical and second-order framework in 
the investigation on the diversity of religions.  
 
2.2.3 Theoretical Resources within Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis 
It is the bold contention of this research that there are theoretical resources in 
Hick’s hypothesis to improve his own theory and resolve some of the difficulties 
encountered (§1.1.5.1). Broadly speaking, there are two main philosophical resources 
that coexist and correlate with one another in Hick’s thought: Kant’s and 
Wittgenstein’s philosophies. 
If Kantian seeds have been planted both in Hick’s epistemology and moral theory, 
a review of the argument of the noumenon/phenomenon distinction in Kant’s 
epistemology and practical philosophy could be useful first to clarify the problem 
with the relation of the Real and the religious experience and then to reconsider the 
relation between the Real and the ambiguous universe. There can be several avenues 
for further exploration. For example, the significance of the Real an sich as the 
“noumenal ground,” could be reconsidered. Since Kant’s transcendent idea is the pure 
concept of human reason and is understood as the absolute totality of all possible 
experience, translating the two categories of the personal God and the non-personal 
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Absolute of Hick’s hypothesis might shed some light on the analysis of the formation 
of religious experience. Meanwhile, because Kant’s notion of intellectual intuition is 
an intuition that is presupposed to be a pure sense to know the noumenon, it could 
also be seen as the equivalent of the idea of cognitive freedom at the level of religious 
experience of Hick’s theory.  
Turning to Wittgenstein, in addition to the exploration of the notion of seeing-as, 
Hick has also mentioned the ideas of language-game and family resemblance when he 
attempts to analyses religious plurality and consider the notion of Religion. Since 
Hick’s thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as comes from Wittgenstein’s 
seeing-as and the later has close connection with the ideas of language-game and 
family resemblance, going back to Wittgenstein may shed more light on Hick’s 
pluralistic position.  
In sum, Kantian elements could help in explaining Hick’s metaphysical stance 
and Wittgensteinian ideas could help in strengthening his epistemology. Before doing 
this, one must first consider Hick’s attitude towards these resources, then identify to 
what extent Hick draws support for his thesis from them before going further to 
reflect on the possibility of utilising them to improve Hick’s hypothesis. All of these 
will be the main concern of the coming two chapters. 
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Summary 
    With a critical review of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis and the assessment on the 
relevant criticisms, this chapter has pointed out that Hick is epistemologically 
Wittgensteinian while metaphysically and ethically, and thus criterologically, Kantian. 
It could be the ambivalence of his position that Hick has trapped himself into 
theoretical difficulties. Metaphysically, the relation between the Real an sich and the 
ambiguous universe is imprecise. Epistemologically, there seems to be two types of 
categories of his theory that are used by Hick in explaining the formation of religious 
experience and its plurality. Criteriologically, there is a tension between soteriological 
transformation and Hick’s pluralism because the former presupposes that the paths of 
all religious practices will eventually converge while the later implies the end of those 
paths might be different. Further, when examined closely, there could be something 
more basic behind all these human religious quests.  
    Based on the foregoing observation, this chapter has indicated that the Kantian 
and Wittgensteinian elements within Hick’s hypothesis could be explored to cope with 
these dilemmas. Kant might help in solving such difficulties as the relation between 
the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe and the role and the function of the 
categories. Likewise, Wittgenstein might aid in elucidating the possibility of the 
variety of religious experience, the understanding of the ideal of Religion and the 
                                    
99 
 
phenomenon of the diversity of religions by means of his notion of family 
resemblance and of language-game.  
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CHAPTER 3 
KANT’S HERITAGE 
The purpose of this chapter is to unpack the theoretical resources of Kant’s 
philosophy within Hick’s hypothesis. It will begin with reviewing Kant’s critical 
philosophy followed by an examination of Hick’s application and concepts in 
formulating his hypothesis. This chapter will then suggest ways in which Hick can 
tackle some of the problems of his hypothesis by (1) interpreting the two categories of 
the God and the Absolute in terms of Kant’s transcendental idea, (2) exploring the 
idea of the greatest freedom and the capacity to experience the Real an sich of human 
consciousness in light of the intellectual intuition in Kant’s critical philosophy, and (3) 
considering the Real an sich as the noumenal ground of its manifestations in light of 
ontological implication of things-in-themselves. 
 
3.0 Prolegomena 
As it has been pointed out, Hick’s theory can be called quasi-Kantian since he 
does not use Kantian terms in their strict sense,1 a characterisation made by Hick 
himself.2 However, there are indeed some similarities between Kant and Hick.  
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As a philosopher of religion in the Christian tradition, Hick’s attempt is to 
provide a framework to explain diverse religious phenomenon. One of the most 
significant characteristics of his argument is the idea of the demarcation between the 
Real an sich and the Real as being humanly perceived. This idea is inspired by 
Immanuel Kant’s distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. The Real an sich 
is one while, due to the various human cultural traditions, its concrete manifestations 
are many. As a Christian theologian, Hick is always concerned with the role and the 
development of Christianity. This has been reflected in his discussion of the nature of 
religious language, the doctrine of the incarnation of God and the Trinity, the image of 
Jesus and so on. The intention of all these labours is to make Christianity more 
acceptable to people in the present-day. A similar concern can also be found in Kant’s 
idea of religion, especially in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
(originally published in 1793 CE)3 where he also considered the image of Jesus and 
the rationality of Christian doctrines. For Kant, the image of Jesus should be 
understood as a God-like human being and as a prototype of human behaviour in the 
                                                                                                                                            
(http://www.johnhick.org.uk/jsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50:ondoing&catid
=37:articles&Itemid=58 ).  
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 There has been a discussion on the English translation of the title, Die Religion innerhalb der 
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explanation of the role of Kant’s idea of religion and its relation with morality or moral philosophy. 
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to the analysis made by Stephen Palmquist, it could be the closest one to Kant’s intention in this book 
and in his all critical philosophy. For the details, see Stephen Palmquist, “Does Kant Reduce Religion 
to Morality?,” Kant- Studien 83, no. 2 (1992), 129-148. George di Giovanni himself has also offered 
the reason for translating the title in this way. See the translator’s introduction to Immanuel Kant, 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, incorporated in Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational 
Theology, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
1996), 50-53. 
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pursuit of the highest good.4 In regards to the rationality of Christian doctrine, Kant 
argued that they should not be based on miracles but on the moral insight of the Holy 
Scripture.5 Concerning the philosophical part, there is a similarity between Kant’s 
critical philosophy and Hick’s three-level structure of human experience. Kant’s 
discussion of theoretical and speculative reason of human cognition corresponds to 
Hick’s understanding of natural and physical experience of human consciousness; 
moreover, Kant’s argument of practical exercise of human reason parallels Hick’s idea 
of the moral and religious experience of human beings. Meanwhile, the concept of 
intellectual intuition in Kant’s philosophy is akin to the greatest freedom of human 
will of Hick’s hypothesis. 
Although Hick thinks his own epistemology of religion has not been consciously 
affected by Kant’s theological idea of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason,6 against the theoretical background and due to the similarities between their 
commitments to reinterpret the Christian doctrines to make them more acceptable for 
their contemporaries, it is reasonable for them to have similar understandings of 
philosophy of religion. It is therefore natural for Hick to claim that Kant’s later 
philosophy of religion is close to his own epistemology of religion.7 Or, as Hick 
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himself contends in his autobiography, Kant has been most influential on his 
philosophical thought.8 However, it is also the common feature of the Kantian 
framework that causes similar problems with the philosophies of both Kant and Hick.  
It is familiar to all those who study Hick’s theory that the most relevant of Kant’s 
philosophy to it are the idea of categories and the distinction between 
things-in-themselves and appearances. As he has himself admitted, Hick’s application 
of Kant’s ideas into his philosophy of religion is in its loose sense. This is because the 
debates of Kant’s philosophy are not Hick’s concern when constructing his 
hypothesis.9 However, Hick’s quasi-Kantian approach consequently leads to further 
questions of his hypothesis. Hick’s position has thus also resulted in at least two kinds 
of investigation. Critics who consider Hick’s hypothesis as a Kantian variation 
examine it with the criticisms that have been made toward Kant. They can be roughly 
classified into two groups. One is the question of the division and relation between the 
Real an sich and the Real as being humanly experienced and the other is about Hick’s 
analogous exercise of Kant’s notion of categories. In regards to the former, it has been 
argued that the unsolved problem resulted from Kant’s distinction between noumenon 
and phenomenon can also be found in Hick’s Kantian theory (§1.1.1). For the latter, 
Hick’s application of the Kantian categories has already departed from, or even 
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 Hick, John Hick: An Autobiography (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), 321. 
9
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betrayed Kant; for Kant, those categories are universal while, for Hick, some of them 
are particular and relative (§1.1.2). On the other hand, those critics who are 
sympathetic to Hick try to highlight Hick’s own idea to present the original face of his 
hypothesis, as has been seen in Kenneth Rose’s work (§1.1.5.1). What these studies 
imply is that the discussion is still ongoing about Hick’s approach.  
As indicated by the end of chapter 2, a close examination will help us to see that, 
actually, Hick’s theory is epistemologically Wittgensteinian and metaphysically and 
criteriologically Kantian. And it is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that might make 
Hick’s ideas and position more truly pluralistic (§2.2.1). Does this mean that if Hick’s 
theory is not coloured by Kantian idea? Or, if he is not truly Kantian but just uses 
some of Kant’s insight (especially the noumenon/phenomenon distinction) to express 
his thoughts, those criticisms of Hick could be misfired? Or, turning the question to 
another side, if Hick becomes a real Kantian by employing Kant’s ideas more 
thoroughly, could those problems with Hick be overcome? And to what extent can 
Kant’s epistemology, philosophy of religion and moral theology really help Hick’s 
model and even echo Hick’s own idea? In order to answer these questions, a revisit on 
Kant’s philosophy and an investigation on Hick’s appropriation of Kant’s ideas are 
needed.  
Despite the fact that the strategy of reinvestigating Hick’s application of Kant’s 
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philosophy has been made by numerous disciples and researchers of Hick, this present 
research will differ from existing studies by highlighting the theoretical kinship 
between Hick and Kant lies in Hick’s claim that he is under great influence of Kant 
but will not regard himself as truly Kantian. However, what needs to be mentioned 
here is that, although in Kant’s later publications such as Critique of the Power of 
Judgement and Conflict of the Faculties, there were more discourses on religions and 
theology,10 the present chapter will mainly focus on Kant’s discussion of theoretical 
and practical uses of reason. One reason is that this is what Hick has employed in 
establishing his hypothesis. Another reason is that his crucial concern is the formation 
of religious experience. As will be later shown, this insight has been implied in Kant’s 
discussion of the dimensions of human cognition. 
 
3.1 The Core of Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
 Kant’s task of working in the field of pure philosophy to examine the source, 
the function and the limits of the speculative reason is to answer the question “what 
can I know.” This, with the denial of the transcendent use of theoretical reason, leads 
to the moral demonstration of the reality of the freedom to ask “what I ought to do?” 
In order to make this conceivable, the moral aspect further results in the question 
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“what may I hope for,” which is the concern of Kant’s philosophical doctrine of 
religion.11 All these inquiries can be seen as three phases of a journey the theme of 
which is one of Kant’s well-known propositions, “Ich mußte also das Wissen 
aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen.” 
 
3.1.1 What Can I Know? 
3.1.1.1 Kant’s Analysis of Human Cognition 
With the publication of the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 
Kant’s thought had stepped into the well-known field of critical philosophy. Kant’s 
attempt in his Critique of Pure Reason was to highlight the subject’s cognition in the 
process of creating knowledge. Before Kant, the theories of knowledge basically 
asked that all our knowledge must conform to objects, leading to possible misuses of 
the principles of reason. Kant took this as the root of some traditional metaphysical 
mistakes.12 That is to say, the absurdity in the process of knowing the object results 
from the exercise of reason. Thus he launched his task to examine the conditions of 
knowledge in human cognitive faculty. This shift in the epistemological position is 
                                                 
11
 In a letter to Stäudlin, Kant wrote: The plan that I made for myself some time ago as I prepare to 
work in the filed of pure philosophy called for the resolution of three problems: (1) What can I know? 
(metaphysics ); (2) What I ought to do? (morality ); (3) What may I hope for?(religion)- [the last of] 
which should be followed at the end by a fourth, “What is humankind?”(anthropology, [a subject] on 
which I have lectured every year for over twenty years). With the enclosed monograph, Religion within 
the Boundaries etc., I have tried to complete the third portion of my plan….. This letter is drawn by 
George di Giovanni in his Translator’s introduction to Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 
in Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 49. 
12
 See the prefaces to first and second editions of Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith 
(London: Macmillan, 1964). 
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characterised by Kant as a Copernican revolution in the enquiry into human 
knowledge.13 
As what revealed in the title of the work, the main concern of Critique of Pure 
Reason is to survey the “pure reason (reine Vernunft).” By “pure” Kant meant here 
that the nature and exercise of the reason is not mixed with the involvement of our 
sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand) or free from all experience.14 
In Kant’s own words:  
 
it is a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, 
that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its 
lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretentions, not by despotic decrees, 
but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws.15 
 
In short, the aim of the Critique of Pure Reason is to scrutinise the faculty of reason to 
elucidate the root of some metaphysical or transcendental illusions, such as the 
“knowledge” of soul and God, by pointing out the boundaries of its theoretical and 
speculative use. 
    In Kant’s architecture, human cognition can be divided into three parts. First is 
sensibility, with two a priori forms of space and time, which works as the gate of 
receiving the manifold of sensible intuitions, the objects as appearances 
                                                 
13
 It appears that Kant himself did not use the term Copernican revolution to refer to what he launched 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, but just provide an analogy to his task. For the details, see Immanuel 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 22-25 (B xvii-xxil). 
14
 See Ibid., 9; 57-58 (A xi-xii= B 23-24). 
15
 See Ibid., 9 (A xi-xii). 
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(Gegenständen als Erscheinungen) from the manifestation of objects as 
things-in-themselves (Gegenständen als Dingen an sich selbst). Second, 
understanding unites those that are received by sensibility with the function of its pure 
concepts, namely, the twelve universal categories, to form the object (Objekt)16, the 
object of human knowledge. All these are subject to the speculative use of reason. 
Finally, as for reason, in its own sphere, it is equipped with the transcendental ideas 
(including God, immortal soul and freedom), which are the parallels to the categories 
of understanding and the function of which is serving as the “absolute totality of all 
possible of experience.”  
According to Kant, the relation among sensibility, understanding and reason is: 
 
The understanding is an object for reason, just as sensibility is for the 
understanding. It is the business of reason to render the unity of all possible 
empirical acts of the understanding systematic; just as it is of the understanding 
to connect the manifold of the appearances by means of concepts, and to bring 
it under empirical laws.17 
 
Then what are those that can be known with the function of human cognitive 
faculty? For Kant, it is what is immanent (e.g., within the limits of possible 
experience) that can be known by human beings. Concerning those things that can not 
                                                 
16
 In English translation of Kant’s works, both of “Gegenstand” and “Objekt” seems to be translated 
into English by the same word “object.” For some experts on Kant’s philosophy, this could be a 
hermeneutical issue. Following some leading English translators of Kant’s work, this research puts 
“Gegenstand” and “Objekt” in parenthesis in corresponding context. For this suggestion, see Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 73.  
17
 Ibid., 546 (A664= B692).  
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be known are those that are transcendent (e.g., those pass beyond the limits of the 
possible experience).18 The analysis about the former is concerned with the 
conditions of natural experience and the possibility of natural science, i.e., the 
employment of the categories of pure understanding and the a priori forms of 
sensibility. The discussion about the latter is to clarify the transcendental illusions that 
result from the misemployment of those categories. Both the employment and 
misemployment of categories are subject to human reason. When the reason exercises 
with the sensibility and understanding within the limits of possible experience, it can 
constitute the objective knowledge of an object (Gegenstand). All the appearances 
that are constituted in this way within the experience area are called phenomena.19 
However, when the reason transgresses the limit of those experiences by using the 
materials from human sensibility and understanding, there will be no objects for it to 
form any knowledge but will lead to the illusions. Kant contended that this misuse of 
reason is the root of the problems with traditional metaphysics since those 
metaphysicians, theologians and the relevant scholars wanted to prove the ideas such 
as God and soul that transcend experience by the argumentation and concepts erected 
by human reason. For Kant, these ideas, in the theoretical and speculative use of 
reason, are merely the transcendental ideas. They are thinkable but are not knowable. 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 298-299 (A295-296= B352-353). 
19
 Kemp Smith originally used the word “phaenomena.” See Ibid., 265 (A 249). 
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These ideas are thinkable in the sense that they can be inferred by human reason 
according to the possible human experience and can be regarded by reasoning as the 
totality of all experience. Moreover, they are unknowable in that they can not be 
perceived and constituted by human sensibility and understanding to be the objects of 
human knowledge. Adhering to this position, Kant further rebutted the ontological, 
the cosmological and the physico-theological proofs of the existence of God and 
pointed out their impossibility.20 
 
3.1.1.2 Noumenon/ Phenomenon Distinction 
Is the notion of things-in-themselves, or the noumenon, a chimera or something 
being projected from human mind? For Kant, this involves the question of the 
argument on the distinction between things-in-themselves and appearance or the 
distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. This is also a question of how the 
unknowable things-in-themselves manifest to or are perceived by human cognition.  
From the viewpoint of Kant’s epistemology, the notion of things-in-themselves 
comes with “appearances.” By appearances, Kant meant those being constituted in 
terms of the function of understanding in unifying the manifold from sensible 
intuition. In contrast with this, by things-in-themselves Kant referred to something 
                                                 
20
 See Ibid., 485-531, for the details. For the simplified expression of the discussions of these 
arguments, see Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and 
Gertrude M. Clark (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), 43-108. The present research 
will merely stop here since this issue is not its concern. 
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that can not be intuited in the spatial location and thus is unknowable. But for Kant, 
this distinction does not mean that things-in-themselves and appearances are referring 
to two different objects. On the contrary, they should be regarded as the one and same 
object that has been considered from two approaches; thus comes the idea of the 
objects as appearance (Gegenständen als Erscheinungen) as the manifestation of 
objects as things-in-themselves (Gegenständen als Dingen an sich selbst).21 This 
dualism is also characterised as noetic dualism.22 In Kant’s epistemology, the concept 
of things-in-themselves serves almost as a regulative idea that delimits the boundary 
of the speculative use of pure reason, thus it only has its negative sense and is 
something which forces reason to transcend the limits of experience.23 The object 
(Gegenstand) in appearance has been given some properties in terms of human 
cognitive faculty and is different from the object as thing-in-itself (Objekt an sich).24 
Kant later affirmed this distinction and the certainty of things-in-themselves in his 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come Forth as 
Science: 
 
The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine 
                                                 
21
 Actually, there have been various debates on the distinction between things-in-themselves and 
appearances as whether they are referring to the same thing or mean two different entities. For the 
details, see Karl Ameriks, “Recent Work on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 19, no. 1 (January 1982), 1-24. Although Ameriks’ analysis was done almost two decades 
ago, the argument that it had discussed is still a significant problem for those who study Kant’s 
philosophy at the present-day era. 
22
 Merold Westphal, “In Defense of the Thing in Itself,” Kant- Studien 59, no. 1 (1968), 127. 
23
 Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 24-27(Bxx-Bxxvii).  
24
 Ibid., 88 (B 69). 
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idealism, but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as 
it is in itself.25 
    
Kant had given further clarification of this point when he objected to the view of 
idealism (especially the philosophy of Bishop George Berkeley) to that “All 
knowledge through the senses and experiences is nothing but sheer illusion, and only 
in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason is there truth”26 and claimed that 
“My idealism concern not the existence of things[….], since it never came to my head 
to doubt it, but it concerns the sensuous representation of things to which space and 
time especially belong.”27 In this refutation, it reflects that for Kant, 
things-in-themselves are not illusions but cannot be known by human cognition. Thus, 
Kant’s position of things-in-themselves can really be characterised as a type of 
“agnosticism”28— be an agnosticism in the sense that things-in-themselves can not be 
intuited empirically in terms of the pure forms of space and time and the twelve 
categories.  
A few words must be added here. It has been pointed out that, in Kant’s 
philosophy, things-in-themselves could contain both the transcendental ideas and 
                                                 
25
 Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come Forth as Science, A 
revision of the Carus translation with an introduction by Lewis White Beck (London: Macmillan, 1950), 
37. 
26
 Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come Forth as Science, p. 123. 
Similar objection also made by Kant in the section of “Refutation of Idealism” of Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
27
 Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come Forth as Science, 41.  
28
 This point has also been recognised by Hick’s critic, Sinkinson. For the details, see his The Universe 
of Faiths, p 77. 
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noumena.29 Epistemologically, things-in-themselves and noumena are taken as 
referring to the same things that are beyond human cognition. In regards to the 
transcendental ideas as things-in-themselves, they are beyond the limits of human 
possible experience and work as something being regulative of the experience. Kant 
himself claimed that: 
 
The doctrine of sensibility is likewise the doctrine of the noumenon in the 
negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding must think without 
this reference to our mode of intuition, therefore not merely as appearances but 
as things in themselves. At the same time the understanding is well aware that 
in viewing things in this manner, as thus apart from our mode of intuition, it 
cannot make any use of the categories.30 
 
    For the correspondence between the distinction of noumenon and phenomenon 
and the things-in-themselves and appearances, Kant even offered a precise 
articulation: 
 
Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the 
categories, are called phaenomena. But if I postulate things which are mere 
objects of understanding, and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an 
intuition, although not to one that is sensible－ given therefore coram intuitu 
intellectuali－ such things would be entitled noumena (intelligibilia).31 
 
The relation between the two pairs of ideas (i.e. noumenon and phenomenon & 
                                                 
29
 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 393. There is still another issue on 
Kant’s using of the notions of Thing-in-itself and Things-in-Themselves in his Critique of Pure Reason, 
see George Schrader, “The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy,” in Kant: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (London: Macmillan, 1968), 172-188. 
30
 Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 268-269 (B 308). 
31
 Ibid., 265 (A 249). 
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things-in-themselves and appearances) is clearly shown in this paragraph. It also 
indicates a way to “know” the noumena. That is, the noumena or things-in-themselves 
could be intuited intellectually without the aid of sensibility and understanding. At 
this point, Kant also argued that: 
 
If by ‘noumneon’ we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible 
intuition, an so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the 
negative sense of the term, But if we understand by it an object of a 
non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, 
namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we 
cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be ‘noumenon’ in the 
positive sense of the term.32 
 
Seeing that the appearances can be identical with phenomena and 
things-in-themselves with noumena, all the relevant analyses can also be applied into 
the noumena/phenomena distinction. Moreover, although Kant seemed to deny the 
possibility of human beings’ possession of the intellectual intuition, his clarification of 
this mode of intuition might help when it is applied into the investigation on the 
formation of religious experience.  
 
3.1.2 What Ought I To Do? 
There have been various cynical remarks on the question of the consistency of 
Kant’s position of the place of God in his critical system. Heinrich Heine’s 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., 268 (B307). 
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well-known critique commented that Kant threw God out in his Critique of Pure 
Reason but let Him back in his Critique of Practical Reason just because he found his 
old and poor servant Lampe needs God.33 Even several famous experts of Kant’s 
philosophy have also questioned Kant’s inconsistencies. For instance, Norman Kemp 
Smith argued that Kant’s reasoning on this issue is “quite the most archaic piece of 
rationalistic argument in the entire Critique.”34 Lewis White Beck also claimed that 
Kant’s argument for the idea of God in the sense of the practical use of pure reason is 
purely theoretical.35 
On the surface, these taunts might reveal the fault of the argument of God in 
Kant’s critical philosophy.36 However, it might neglect the different meanings of God 
in the Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason. For the God that 
Kant “threw out” in the former is the abstract Aristotelian God whose existence needs 
to be proved by varied rational arguments. By contrast, the God in the latter work is 
the God of consciousness, the Author of the moral order and the Lord of faith.37  
                                                 
33
 Heinrich Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany, trans. J. Snodgrass (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1959), 119. 
34
 Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan, 1918), 
522. This opinion cited here appears in Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1978), 27.  
35
 For the details, see Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1970[paperback, 2009]), 129-135. 
36
 Lewis White Beck also argues that Kant’s moral argument of the idea of God is to some extent a 
variation of a theologocal argument from design, the one which Kant himself had objected to. For the 
discussion of this issue, see Allen A. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, 129-136. 
37
 Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations, trans. Anthony Kerrigan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 5-6. Allen W. Wood also argued that Kant’s real purpose 
“is not to destroy theology, but to replace a dogmatic theology with a critical one: to transform rational 
theology from a complacent speculative science into a critical examination of the inevitable but 
perpetually insoluble problems of human reason, and a vehicle for the expression of our moral 
                                    
116 
 
Actually, this purpose has already been reflected by implication through Kant’s 
famous proposition of “Ich mußte also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz 
zu bekommen.38 (I have found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make 
room for faith.)”39 For in German, the verb “aufheben” has at least three meanings: (1) 
to “lift” or to “transcend,” (2) to deny, to sublate or to negate and (3) a development 
from a lower place to a higher place.40 Analogously, it seems that the implication of 
this proposition is firstly to deny or to sublate the result of the theoretical use of pure 
reason and transcend it as well and then to lift the pure reason to realm of faith as the 
sphere for the practical use of pure reason. It is a transition from the lower place of 
reason to its higher place. This interpretation could also echo the position of the 
primacy of morality that Kant devoted himself later on in his books such as Critique 
of Practical Reason.  
The transition from the theoretical use of reason to its practical use in Kant’s 
critical philosophy, or Kant’s “Aufhebung” of knowledge, started from the shift of the 
meaning of freedom from its function in the speculative realm to that in the practical 
sphere. Meanwhile, this shift can also be taken as the turning point of the implication 
                                                                                                                                            
aspiration under the guidance of an autonomous reason.” See Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology, 
17. 
38
 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1, in Immanuel Kant, Werke in zwölf Bänden (Frankfurt Suhrkamp 
taschenbuch, 1974), 33 (B xxx). 
39
 Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 29 (B xxx). 
40
 G. W. F. Hegel, another German Idealist and a famous critic of Kant’s philosophy, kept all these 
meanings in his philosophy. For the details, see Kai Froeb, “sublation,”“hegel,net” Avialable from 
http://www.hegel.net/en/sublation.htm#c . Accessed on 1 April 2010. 
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of Kant’s notion of “postulate.”(See below.) 
According to Kant, the idea of freedom is the keystone of the whole fabric of 
his system of pure reason. However, there is a difference in the role of freedom 
between the speculative use and practical use of reason.41 To be specific, in the 
theoretical use of reason, freedom is firstly discussed in the third antinomy of pure 
reason to consider the thesis and antithesis of the issue on the causality in the world. 
Roughly stated, the purpose of the discussion on the antinomy is to reveal that 
whether there is a freedom or not, whether there is another kind of causal relation that 
differs from the natural law, it can not be answered by speculative reason. For in the 
phenomenal world, if there is a notion of freedom being self-determined and 
self-sufficient, how can it be compatible with the natural law according to which 
everything has been determined (Antithesis)? On the contrary, if there is no cause as 
an absolute beginning of the causal relation in the phenomenal world, then how can 
everything in it be derived (Thesis)?42 However, as it has been pointed out, Kant’s 
distinction between things-in-themselves and appearance opens up the possibility and 
the key to rescue the freedom from the antimony.43 Kant has argued that: 
 
But the very same subject, being on the other sides conscious of himself as a 
thing in itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under 
                                                 
41
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 3. 
42
 For the details, see Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 409- 415(A 444-451= B472-479). 
43
 See Andrews Reath’s Introduction, in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, xii. 
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conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he gives 
himself by reason; and in this existence of his nothing is, for him, antecedent to 
the determination of his will, but every action- and in general every 
determination of his existence changing conformably with inner sense, even the 
whole sequence of existence as a sensible being- is to be regarded in the 
consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but the consequence and 
never as the determining ground of his causality as a noumenon”44 
 
What is implied in this paragraph is that there is a special causality that makes the 
agent determine himself when he views himself as a thing-in-itself by reason. In this 
situation, human beings will not need to act in observance with the natural law but can 
transcend beyond it. In Kant’s system, this argument is subject to the realm of 
practical reason and thus to the discussion of moral philosophy. The law that one 
gives himself by reason is a law of morality. It is the moral law that furnishes the 
reality of the idea of freedom. Kant had given a proposition that:  
 
[…] freedom is indeed the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral law is the 
ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For, had not the moral already been distinctly 
thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves in assuming such a 
thing as freedom (even though it is not self-contradictory). But were there no 
freedom, the moral law would not be encountered at all in ourselves.”45 
 
Simply put, through the self-legislating of human consciousness we can become 
aware of the reality of freedom and prove the reality of freedom. At this point, Kant 
argues that the moral argument is a sufficient and subjective argument for moral 
                                                 
44
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 82; similar point had been made by Kant in other places, such as 
the section II of the chapter II of the Book II, of this Critique.  
45
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, note on p. 4.  
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beings. Kant further contends that in this situation, the argument being subjective and 
sufficient should be termed believing and can not be supported by any theoretical 
demonstration or evidence.46 As a finite human being, the nature of freedom can not 
be understood in terms of cognitive faculty but its existence, as has been presented in 
the third antimony, and is nonetheless the issue being inquired by the theoretical use 
of reason. Human beings can only be conscious of the reality of freedom when we 
“free” ourselves from the causal relation in the phenomenal world and “free ourselves 
to” do something in the very same world. Thus, at this point, the postulate of pure 
reason in its practical sense as a necessary assumption of human observance of moral 
law47 has also been transformed into something real by means of the fact that human 
beings can legislate the moral law for themselves. By the law we “cognise” the reality 
of freedom while without freedom there can be no grounds for the possibility of the 
legislation of the law. It is at this moment that the speculative use of reason can 
possibly transition to its practical use.  
Besides, it is this transition that satisfies the notion of the verb “aufheben” in 
Kant’s proposition since the function of reason has been lifted up to a higher sphere 
with the denial of its misapplication at the lower level. Freedom then becomes the 
                                                 
46
 This is Kant’s argument in his Critique of the Power of Judgement (5:450). The original paragraph is 
drawn by Peter Byrne in his Kant on God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 86-87. Similar contention also 
appears on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 646 (A822-823= B850-851), where he discussed the 
difference between the theoretical and practical arguments of the existence of God. Wood defended the 
efficiency of this distinction in the chapter entitled “Kant’s Moral Arguments” of his book, Kant’s 
Moral Religion. 
47
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 9. 
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cause of human action and the determining ground of human will. It is in the sense 
that the freedom of human will can cause some effects in the phenomenal world that it 
can be said that there is a law of freedom. To put it differently, this concept of 
freedom as a cause is not for cognising of the object but for working as the 
determining ground of human will. Kant would further term this “causa noumenon.”48 
As it is subject to the boundaries of mere reason, the room for faith, it is one of the 
members of things-in-themselves and thus thinkable but unknowable.49 
 
3.1.3 What May I Hope For? 
    According to Kant, it is the unavoidable tendency of human reason to seek for 
the completeness or the totality of all conditions. This tendency then leads to the 
dialects of reason. The four antimonies in the theoretical use of reason are the obvious 
examples in this realm. In regards to practical reason, the dialect of reason will 
inevitably result in the pursuit of the highest good, the summon bonum, the 
coincidence of happiness with goodness. However, the idea of the highest good may 
not be realised in the phenomenal world since, as the living experience has taught us, 
those who act morally may not necessarily receive the proportional reward and, on the 
contrary, those who act badly may even gain more happiness and avoid punishment in 
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 Ibid., 43. 
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their life. Thus, for the necessity and the worthiness of moral action in observance of 
the moral law, the highest good must be ensured and attainable in some way. In Kant’s 
system, since this may not be met within the limits of possible human experience, the 
will eventually leads to two additional assumptions or postulates of pure reason: the 
existence of God and the immortality of soul.50 The immortality of soul is for the 
actualisation of the complete conformity of the human will with the moral law and the 
transformation of the personality from the worse to the morally better state in the 
endlessness of the duration of one’s life that can only be examined and judged by 
God.51 Consequently, the existence of God, the hypothesis of pure reason when it is 
considered theoretically, becomes a necessary assumption for moral practice to ensure 
the possibility of the highest good, “the exact correspondence of happiness with 
morality.”52  
Since both the assumptions of the existence of God and the immortality of soul 
depend on the demands of morality and their source in pure reason, they are subject to 
belief (Glaube) and, more precisely, rational belief.53 According to Kant, the relation 
                                                 
50
 The main purpose of this paragraph is to briefly introduce Kant’s practical philosophy without 
involving the relevant debates of its arguments. Kant’s idea of the postulates of practical reason and 
their relation to one another occupied, implicitly and explicitly, more than half of the discussion in his 
Critique of Practical Reason and has been summarised in his Preface to the first edition of Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.   
51
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 102-103. 
52
 Ibid., 103-105. 
53
 Ibid., 105. Originally, Kant just mentioned the assumption of the existence of God can be called 
“belief” and “rational belief.” This research broadens this notion since the immortality of soul is still an 
indispensible condition for the triad of the postulates of Kant’s practical philosophy. Without it, the 
betterment of human condition could be impossible and the highest good can not be actualised.  
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between these three concepts is that God and immortality should attach themselves to 
freedom and receiving stability and objective reality with it and by its means. Since 
the reality of freedom has been practically proved by the self-lawgiving reason, the 
possibility of these two ideas is also being proved.54 This reasoning of Kant’s 
philosophy can then be expressed tersely in his own proposition: “Morality thus 
inevitably leads to religion.”55  
 
3.2 Hick’s Appropriation of Kant and Its Problems 
    Hick’s employment of Kant in his system has led some similarities between him 
and Kant. A close examination of Hick’s theory of the three levels of human 
experience may show that there is a parallel between Kant and Hick’s discourse on 
epistemology, morality and religion. For the theory of knowledge, both Kant and Hick 
analyse the formation of human experience in terms of “categories” of human 
understanding, though their implications are slightly different. In the field of moral 
philosophy and religion, Kant suggested “freedom” as the keystone for the transition 
of human reason from the speculative to its practical use while, correspondingly, Hick 
contends as well that freedom of human cognition is the anchor of moral and religious 
                                                 
54
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 3.  
55
 In the preface to the first edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant said 
“Morality thus inevitably leads to religion, and through religion it extends itself to the idea of a mighty 
moral lawgiver outside the human being, in whose will the final end (of the creation of the world) is 
what can and at the same ought to be the final human end.” (Cited from Immanuel Kant, Religion and 
Rational Theology, 59-60.) 
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experience. Further, epistemologically, for Kant, the phenomenon and noumenon are 
two sides of the one and the same thing while, ontologically, the noumenon serves as 
the ground of the phenomenon. The channel to “know” the noumenon is something 
called “intellectual intuition,” which can not be found within finite human beings.56 
Analogously, for Hick, all the physical, moral and religious experiences are the 
experiences of the same ambiguous universe; the ambiguous universe in itself is the 
grounds of human knowledge of physical universe, moral universe and religious 
universe. The differences among these experiences come from the different degrees of 
freedom of human consciousness. However, it is also Hick’s indefinite application of 
Kant that, on the one hand, distinguishes him from Kant and, on the other hand, 
causes further problems with his theory. In order to present the way that Hick applies 
Kant’s theory into his hypothesis, some of Hick’s arguments will be quoted in length, 
if necessary. 
 
3.2.1 Categories Expanded? 
Hick has always applied loosely the theories of other thinkers to his theory. 
Inspired by Kant, in Hick’s system, there are the two types of categories, one 
seemingly universal and the other particular and culture-relative, as the twelve 
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categories in Kant’s theory, in human religious experience. Both further constitute 
“the mode of the knower,” to use St. Thomas Aquinas’ term, that “varies from religion 
to religion.”57  
According to Hick, the two basic categories in human responses to and 
understanding of the Real are Deity or God (the Real as personal) and the Absolute 
(the Real as non-personal). They are complementarily analogous to the two ways of 
conceiving and registering light as waves and as particles and are made concrete in 
history and culture as a range of the experienced Gods and Absolutes (i.e., 
respectively, the personae and the impersonae of various religious traditions).58 Hick 
claims that: 
 
Kant suggested that we are aware of our natural environment in terms of certain 
categories which the mind imposes in the formation of our conscious 
experience…. I am suggesting analogously that we are aware of our 
supernatural in terms of certain categories which the mind imposes in the 
formation of religious experience. The two basic religious categories are deity 
(the Real as personal) and the absolute (the Real as non-personal). Each of these 
categories is then made concrete, or in Kant’s terminology ‘schematized’- not, 
however, (as in his system) in terms of abstract time but in terms of the filled 
time of history and culture as the experienced Gods and Absolutes of the 
various religious traditions.59  
 
Concerning the particular categories, Hick indicates the difference between him 
and Kant by claiming that:  
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In Kant’s system of thought these [categories] are a priori and hence universal 
and invariable modes of human perception. The pure categories or pure 
concepts of the understanding (for example, substance) are schematised in 
terms of temporality to produce the more concrete categories which are 
exhibited in our actual experience of the world…. The situation is basically the 
same, I suggest, in the case of our awareness of the Real- though within the 
similarity these are also major differences….The main difference is that the 
categories (Forgie prefers to call them ‘category-analogues’) of religious 
experience are not universal and invariable but are on the contrary 
culture-relative. It is possible to live without employing them; and when they 
are employed they tend to change and develop through time as different 
historical influences affect the development of human consciousness….For 
Kant was solely concerned, in his discussion of the categories, with the 
construction of the physical world in sense perception. One who is concerned 
with the construction of the divine within religious experience has the option of 
accepting or rejecting Kant’s view of sense perception. We have already noted 
that Kant own epistemology of religion was quite unrelated to his 
understanding of sense perception. But this fact does not bar others, inspired by 
his basic insight, from seeing religious and sense experience as continuous in 
kind, thereby extending Kant’s analysis of the one, in an appropriately adapted 
form, to the other.60  
 
It can be observed in the above paragraphs that in explaining the construction of 
human religious experience, Kant’s notion of categories of pure understanding has 
been explored by Hick: one is the two basic categories of Deity and Absolute61 and 
the other is the culturally and traditionally coloured categories.  
Hick’s purpose in extending this is to account for the phenomenon of religious 
diversity in terms of religious experience. Obviously, when comparing with Kant’s 
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culture-relative ones as religious concepts that vary from culture to culture. See Hick, A Christian 
Theology of Religions, 46. 
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epistemology, some doubts towards Hick’s appropriation can be made. One concern 
that is frequently raised and that Hick has responded to in many places is the nature of 
his “categories.” Comments have been made that Hick’s usage has violated the spirit 
of Kant’s mode and thus the former can not be equated with latter.62 As presented 
above (§2.2.1), Hick himself has admitted this difference between him and Kant and 
argued that what he is discussing is religious experience rather than sensory 
experience. Further, for Kant the categories are innate and thus universal while for 
Hick the categories are culture-relative and human beings can live without using them. 
At this point, it can be said that basically Hick does not abandon Kant’s notion of 
categories in explaining the formation of sensory experience. Rather, based on its 
insight, Hick claims that all religious concepts, such as deity and emptiness, are also 
categories.63 From the side of human subjectivity, religious experience can thus be 
regarded as the product of the combination of categories as pure concepts and the 
categories as religious words or concepts. Although it has been pointed out that, the 
question of Hick’s application of Kant’s categories is not really a significant one that 
will weaken Hick’s argument of religious experience.64 However, what needs to be 
further considered is Hick’s argument of the certainty of religious experience since it 
might inevitably lead to “transcendental illusion.” This issue will be discussed 
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together with the issues of following sections. 
 
3.2.2 Real an sich/ Real as Perceived Distinction 
From epistemology to metaphysics, Hick has basically followed Kant. In line 
with Kant, when investigating human cognition and its relationship to the object, Hick 
stresses what comes from Kant’s insight, that is, “the mind actively interprets sensory 
information in terms of concepts.”65 Based on this common understanding of human 
cognition, both Kant and Hick will not deny the idea that human beings, either in the 
conscious or unconscious conditions, are inevitably and spontaneously receiving 
messages from their surroundings and combine them in terms of their own equipped 
faculties.  
In arguing the distinction of the Real an sich and the Real as perceived, Hick 
adopts Kant’s insight of the noumena/phenomena distinction but argues that he 
partially agrees and also partially disagrees with Kant’s idea that God is just a 
postulate for our moral life and can not be experienced. Hick says: 
 
However Kant himself (in his three Critiques) would not have sanctioned the 
idea that we in any way experience God…. God was not for him a reality 
encountered in religious experience but an object postulated by reason on the 
basis of its own practical functioning in moral agency. According to him the 
categorical character of moral obligation presupposes the reality of God as 
making possible the summon bonum in which perfect goodness and perfect 
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happiness will coincide…..But for Kant God is postulated, not experienced. In 
partial agreement but also partial disagreement with him, I want to say that the 
Real an sich is postulated by us as a pre-supposition, not of the moral life, but 
of religious experience and the religious life, whilst the gods, as also the 
mystically known Brahman, Sunyata and so on, are phenomenal manifestations 
of the Real occurring within the realm of religious experience. Conflating these 
two theses one can say that the Real is experienced by human beings, but 
experienced in a manner analogous to that in which, according to Kant, we 
experienced the world: namely by informational input from external reality 
being interpreted by the mind in terms of its own categorical scheme and this 
coming to consciousness as meaningful phenomenal experience. All that we are 
entitled to say about the noumenal source of this information is that it is the 
reality whose influence produces, in collaboration with the human mind, the 
phenomenal world of our experience.66 
 
    Hick further indicates the role of the Real an sich as the noumenal ground of its 
manifestations:  
 
[….] the Real an sich has the characteristics displayed by its manifestations, 
such as (in the case of the heavenly Father) love and justice or (in the case of 
Brahman) consciousness and bliss. But it is nevertheless the noumenal ground 
of these characteristics…. As the noumenal ground of them, the Real is so rich 
in content that it can only be finitely experienced in the various partial and 
inadequate ways which the history of religions describes.67 
 
Following Kant’s epistemological position of the negative sense of 
things-in-themselves, Hick claims that what he wants to use in the epistemology of 
religion is the implied idea that “the noumenal world exists independently of our 
perception of it and the phenomenal world is that same world as it appears to our 
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human consciousness.”68 The Real an sich as the noumenon indicates that 
“something there” and is although beyond human cognition but can have some kind 
of “influence” on human consciousness. For Hick, the purpose of justifying the 
certainty of the Real an sich is to argue that religious experiences are not subjective 
projection from or illusion of the human mind. This is also what Hick has tried to 
distinguish himself from the Religious Realism and Non-Realism. However, Hick’s 
discourse may lead to some further questions.  
    First of all, for Hick, the Real an sich is a postulate of religious experience and 
religious life. At this point, except that it is postulated as presupposition for religious 
activities, there seems to be no obvious difference between him and Kant.69 As it has 
been analysed before, Hick’s argument of this idea can be taken as a theological 
variant of Kant’s deontological ethics since the ultimate root of morality, especially 
the Golden Rule, is the Real an sich (see chapter 2, especially § 2.1.3.1). But Hick 
seems merely to suggest this without giving any argument. Further, if the Real an sich 
is a postulate, which means the possibility of its certainty has not yet been proved, 
how can it, in cooperation with the human mind, create the phenomenal world of 
human experience?  
By the inspiration from Kant, in responding to this question, Hick will argue 
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from another angle that the perception of various characteristics has their noumenal 
ground, which refers to the Real an sich. However, this raises another question: how 
can Hick contend that those manifestations are not merely the subjective projection of 
human consciousness and the illusion of human mind and even though they all 
originate from the same and one source?  
Further, Hick’s commitment to stress the role of and the influence from the Real 
an sich in human religious experience by using the phrase of “informational input 
from external reality” might also obscure the role of the activity of human cognition 
in human responses to the Real an sich. In this regard, Hick seems to claim the 
epistemological dimension of the Real an sich as the noumenal ground. Therefore, 
even if the existence of the Real an sich can be proved, the question of noumenal 
causality as how the noumenon can have influence on the phenomenon in Hick’s 
system remains unsolved.70  
Still further, it appears that Hick considers the implication of “postulate” merely 
in Kant’s epistemology without following thoroughly its practical implication that has 
also been indicated by Kant. For Kant the postulate is the assumption of moral 
philosophy and its possibility can be proved in the realm of the practical use of human 
reason through the justification of the reality of the freedom. But Hick’s 
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understanding is that, for Kant, God is merely an object postulated by reason on the 
grounds of its practical use and for the possibility of the coincidence of the perfect 
goodness and perfect happiness. God also works as a regulative idea by which some 
may regard as the cause of the order of the world.71 Apparently, recalling the 
foregoing analysis of Kant’s philosophy, at this point, Hick’s criticism of Kant 
misfires. 
For Kant, since he is concerned with the reality and the making of human 
experience, he never questions the existence of the tangible things. What Kant argues 
is that although these things in themselves are thinkable but unknowable, they can 
manifest themselves in human experience. By contrast, Hick argues for the certainty 
of a postulate, the Real an sich, by using Kant’s insight and to some extent infers 
epistemologically its existence from the characteristics such as justice and love 
produced by human beings. This approach again might trap Hick himself into the 
difficulty of what Kant called “transcendental illusion,” which basically means the 
“deceptive extension of pure understanding” beyond the boundary of possible 
experience.72 (See below). 
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3.2.3 Freedom of Human Cognition 
    The notion of freedom is shared between both Kant and Hick. This is perhaps 
partly due to the fact that both are greatly influenced by Christian theology and its 
understandings of human free will. But it may also be because Kant is the thinker who 
most affects Hick. Nonetheless, there are certain differences between them. 
As analysed before, for Kant, the notion of freedom is a postulate when it is 
epistemologically considered. But this postulate becomes an assumption of moral 
practice that can be substantiated in the practical use of human reason. Comparably, in 
Hick’s system, there are degrees of freedom of human cognition in different human 
experiences and consequently there seems to be a continuity from sensory to religious 
experience (see the paragraph quoted in §3.2.1). Further, in Kant enterprise, the 
substantiation of freedom in the practical field seems to justify indirectly the certainty 
of the God. Comparatively, in Hick’s system, with the greatest freedom of human 
cognition, it is possible for human beings to experience the Real an sich and then 
produce various kinds of holy image in terms of religious categories. Hick’s contends 
that: 
 
We have an even greater degree of cognitive freedom in religion….On the one 
hand, there is an aspect or dimension of our nature that is inherently capable of 
responding. This is in Christian terms the image of God within us, “that of God 
in everyone”…; or in Hindu terms, the atman which we all are in the depths of 
our being; and in Buddhist terms the universal Buddha nature. But, one the 
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other hand, the Transcendent is only apprehended through an uncompelled 
exercise of this capacity. For the Ultimate exists at an epistemic distance from 
us which makes possible the (limited) human autonomy in virtue of which we 
exist as responsible individual persons.73 
 
In this paragraph, it seems that Hick has unwittingly accepted Kant’s idea of freedom 
and intellectual intuition, which can not be found on human beings. He has 
subsequently amalgamated his idea of freedom with the special dimension of human 
nature that is expressed differently among religions. At this point, it can be said that 
Hick is going further than Kant. In dealing with the rationality and the boundary of 
religious experience, Hick has tried to argue the possibility to “access” the Real an 
sich, regardless of the extent in which it can be apprehended by human beings through 
various religious categories.  
However, when this notion of freedom is connected to Hick’s argument of the 
Real an sich/Real as perceived distinction, that of the three levels of human 
experiences and that of his usage of categories, other questions arise.  
In the first place, if there is a basic and common structure of different human 
experiences, how can it be possible to “experience” the Real an sich that is 
transcategorial by means of the two types of categories (i.e. the basic and seemingly 
universal categories of personal Deity and non-personal Absolute and the 
culture-relative categories) learned by human beings? Hick may answer that its 
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possibility lies in the greatest freedom of human cognition in cooperation with the 
special dimension of human nature. However, this may get Hick to the trap of what 
Kant called the “transcendental illusion,” namely, applying the obtained categories of 
human cognition beyond the possible experience of human beings inevitably leads to 
some illusory ideas of the Transcendent. This is even so in the case that the Real an 
sich is a postulate and its existence is yet unproved.  
Alongside the foregoing question is a potential problem coming from the tension 
between Hick’s metaphysics and epistemology. In Hick’s metaphysics, there are two 
entities, the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe. The former is transcendent and 
transcategorial and thus invisible while the latter is ambiguous but tangible. When this 
system is related to Hick’s epistemology, questions may be raised about how human 
cognition can grasp the ambiguous but tangible universe and the transcendent and 
transcategorial Real an sich in terms of the same epistemological structure and why 
human response at the level of religious experience is to the Real an sich while at the 
levels of physical and moral experiences is to the surrounding environment. Certain 
resources within Kant’s philosophy seem to facilitate in appeasing these difficulties of 
Hick’s hypothesis.  
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3.3 Returning to Kant, and Beyond?  
Kant and Hick maintain similar ideas of ethics and theology. This is perhaps due 
to the common tradition of Protestant Christianity shared by the two. Firstly, both 
Kant and Hick assume the immortality of the soul and give similar reasons to 
conceive the moral agent and religious believers. For Kant, the assumption of 
immortality is the needed for the actualisation of the Highest Good while for Hick it is 
to settle questions of evil in its broad sense and eschatology.74 What follows is that 
both Hick and Kant stress the idea of the moral improvement of human beings or the 
transformation of personality in the endless duration. Hick even entitles this 
transformation according to his own Irenaean theology of soteriological 
transformation and introduces the notions of reincarnation and rebirth to conceptualise 
this scenario.75 Moreover, both take the moral idea, i.e., the moral transformation of 
personality, as the main criterion for so-called true religion. Simply put, for Kant there 
is only one religion but there can be several kinds of faith. The faith could be Jewish, 
Mohammedan, Christian, Catholic, or Lutheran.76 The aim of true religion is to make 
a better human being. Different faiths may be closer to or farther from the true 
religion according to the degree of morality performed within each.77 Equivalently, 
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Hick suggests the idea of love, compassion and forgiveness that are common to the 
great traditions as the ethical principle for true religion.78 Interestingly, in Kant’s 
philosophy, while each faith may approach religion in some way or another, none of 
them can claim in this world that it is the only one and true religion. The answer to the 
riddle will be given by the Supreme Being someday in the future. This situation is 
very similar to playing a game. Although the players engage themselves in conformity 
with its rule, none of them will know in advance that he or she will definitely be the 
winner of that game.79 Similarly, the believers of each faith or religious tradition in 
this world are like the players of the game. None of them can contend that the 
tradition that he or she has committed to is the only one and true religion. Each of 
them is at most a manifestation of the idea of religion but not the only truth.  
As presented before, there are also some differences between Hick and Kant. 
These might result from Hick’s loose usage of Kant’s insights in his hypothesis. The 
reason that Hick adopts such an approach is that Kant’s concern is the possibility of 
objective knowledge constructed by human cognition while he focuses on the 
rationality of religious experience. However, even though Hick might save himself 
from the accusation of misinterpreting Kant by maintaining that he is using Kant 
analogously in his hypothesis, there are still some difficulties in Hick’s application. 
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Nonetheless, these difficulties might be disentangled with recourse to some other 
insight into Kant. 
 
3.3.1 Re-visiting “Categories” 
Hick’s employment of Kant’s categories is analogous. To some extent, Hick’s 
analogy is an enlargement. In explaining the formation of religious experience, there 
are two types of “categories” in his quasi-Kantian theory: the basic two categories of 
personal God and non-personal Absolute that are complementary to each other and the 
categories as the culture-relative concepts, terms and so on. Hick’s purpose to suggest 
these two types of categories is to deal with the issue of the diversity of religions. It is 
clear that in Hick’s hypothesis the culture-relative categories as religious concepts and 
words vary from one religion to another. But whether the two basic categories are 
universal or are particular is vague in Hick’s discourse.  
What is worth noting is that when Hick analyses human experience at the 
religious level, there are two groups of pictures. Both have their inner and outer 
exhibitions. One is composed of the personal dimension of the Real an sich, with its 
manifestations such as the Hindu Krishna and the Jahweh of Israel and the 
corresponding capacity to experience the Real, such as the atman. The other is the 
series of the non-personal dimensions of the Real an sich, such as Brahman and 
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Nirvana, also with its corresponding capacity to experience the Real, such as the 
universal Buddha nature. What can be inferred from this is that there should be at 
least two elements of human mind functioning in the formation of religious 
experience: one is the capacity within human mind to experience the Real and the 
other is some pure and innate concept for conceptualising such experience. The 
particular capacity is manifested differently with these innate and pure concepts as the 
image of God, the atman, the universal Buddha nature and so on. In Hick’s system, 
these innate concepts could be the categories of the personal God and the 
non-personal Absolute. As Hick has claimed, they are complementary to each other 
and both are a priori concepts within the human mind. The capacity to experience the 
Real can be understood as an intuition that is more fundamental than its 
manifestations. 
Interestingly, when it is compared to Kant’s analysis of human cognition, there 
seems to be an equivalent to Hick’s notion of the two basic categories, that is, the 
transcendental idea. Along with this is that the particular capacity to experience the 
Real is another parallel to Kant’s intellectual intuition. In this regard, translating the 
notion of the two categories of the personal God and the non-personal Absolute in 
terms of Kant’s “transcendental ideas” and reconsidering the particular capacity in 
light of his intellectual intuition might shed some light on easing the difficulty with 
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Hick’s application of categories. The issue of the two basic categories will be 
considered in this section while particular capacity will be the subject of the next 
section. 
As stated before, in Kant’s philosophy, the transcendental idea is the idea that 
transcends human experience and can not be proved by argumentation and human 
concepts. Within the limits of possible human experience or the realm of human 
understanding, there is no object (Gegenstand) as the object of the transcendental 
idea.  
Kant’s notion of the Idea inherited Plato’s understanding. He used the notion of 
Idea as the concept of Pure Reason.80 Concerning the transcendental ideas, Kant said:  
 
I understand by idea, a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding 
object can be given in sense-experience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now 
under consideration, are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure reason, 
in that they view all knowledge gained in experience as being determined 
through an absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented; 
they are imposed by the very nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in 
necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding. Finally, they are 
transcendent and overstep the limits of all experience; no object adequate to the 
transcendental idea can ever be found within experience.81 
 
In the speculative aspect of Kant’s critical philosophy, there are three kinds of 
transcendental ideas. All are concerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all 
conditions in general. They contain (1) the absolute unity of the thinking subject (the 
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soul), (2) the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance (the world) and 
(3) the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general (God). They 
are accordingly the object for the transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia 
rationalis), that for the transcendental science of world (cosmologia rationalis), and 
that for the transcendental knowledge of God (theologia transzendentalis).82 These 
three fields of studies, which caused the absurdities of metaphysics, are what Kant 
wanted to attack.  
For Kant, these ideas are pure concepts of human reason. When analysing the 
condition of human knowledge, Kant’s consideration is confined to the realm of 
human empirical experience where there is no object of the transcendental idea 
because there are no human concepts that can be applied in the formation of it. 
Besides, any argument that is offered to prove its existence or certainty will lead to 
“transcendental illusion.” But the Kantian position implies that there can be objects of 
them that are beyond human empirical experience. Kant’s examination in empirical 
experience might still leave the space for different experiences. Therefore, if it can be 
applied into accounting for the formation of religious experience, assumed by Hick to 
be beyond or different from human physical and moral experiences, the vision can be 
different. Besides, this approach is implicitly in line with Kant since although in his 
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argument, within the possible human experience, there are no real objects of the 
transcendental idea, the possibility of the reality of its object can be indirectly proved 
by virtue of freedom. 
It therefore suggests that Hick’s two basic categories to be translated into or 
understood in terms of Kant’s transcendental idea. There are certain reasons for this 
alternative. One is that, when looking back to the development of the image of God of 
Christian history, though its characteristics are different from time to time, it has 
always been understood and worshiped as the Transcendental in the personal form. 
What make the characteristics of the image of God might be those religious concepts 
or terms, described by Hick as categories, that are changing in accordance with 
human dwelling and handling. Consequently there might be some deeper, more 
fundamental concept and consequently might be universal within the human mind that 
serve as the archetype or something with regulative power in forming those 
characteristics. In this regard, it could be the transcendental idea in Kant’s philosophy.  
Further, in the same cultural tradition, the personal and non-personal images of 
the Transcendent can co-exist synchronically, no matter whether they are 
complementary or contradictory to each other. The Krishna, Shiva and Brahman in 
Hindu tradition can be each be one of these cases. They are all deities in this tradition 
but the first two are personal while the last is impersonal. Even the image of Brahman 
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might sometimes be depicted as personal. In this regard, it can be said that, no matter 
how controversial, confused or diverse these holy images are, there are two types of 
very basic concepts that serve as the modes for the conceptualisation of them.  
Still further, when considering ancient Chinese thinking of the transcendent, it is 
interesting to notice that, diachronically, their image of the transcendent was under a 
transformation or a transmutation from personal characteristics to non-personal traits, 
that is, a transition from Di 帝 to Tian 天 (Heaven) and to Dao 道(see chapter 6).83 
Even later in Chinese cultural tradition, both images of the Transcendent were 
confused when Chinese people spoke about or dealt with religious affairs. Again, in 
this context, there are two basic concepts that are not changing or changed with time. 
Hence, it is reasonable to suggest that the two basic categories in Hick’s hypothesis 
can be translated into or understood in terms of Kant’s transcendental idea. 
When translating Hick’s two basic concepts of God and the Absolute into Kant’s 
transcendental ideas, it suggests that they are different from those categories that are 
learned or culture-relative. They are innate and a prior concepts of human mind and 
are thus supposed to be universal. Conversely, re-understanding Hick’s concepts of 
God and the Absolute in terms of Kant’s transcendental idea implies a breakthrough 
of theology in the West because it shows an awareness of the mode of the 
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non-personal Supreme existing outside Christianity and even the monotheist traditions. 
Also, as Hick has developed the key notions from Kant who has been taken as one of 
the representative of Enlightenment in the West, Hick’s work is to some extent an 
attempt to go beyond the influence of the Enlightenment tradition. This is also what 
Hick wants to do when He tries to conduct his extension of the Kantian model of a 
noumenal reality.84 
These two transcendental ideas can, on the one hand, count for the formation of 
such notions as the image of God within human nature or the universal Buddha nature 
and atman and, on the other hand, for the concept of God, Allah, Dao and Nirvana. 
Then, how is this process possible? In Kant’s system, it lies in the intellectual intuition 
while in Hick’s hypothesis the notion of greatest freedom of human cognition is the 
mainstay.  
 
3.3.2 Redefining the Special Capacity within Human Nature 
As analysed before, Hick has recognised that there is a “capacity” within human 
nature for human beings to experience the Real an sich. People in different traditions 
express this “capacity” in various ways. It can be conceptualised as the image of God 
or as the universal Buddha nature. While it functions in knowing the Real an sich, 
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different people will term it differently against their cultural backgrounds. Thus there 
is the notion of God, Allah and the Dao. It can be inferred from this phenomenon that 
this capacity is, on the one hand, a capacity that is distinct from the sensory intuition 
for people to know or to experience things in a different way and, on the other hand, 
that it is universal among human beings.  
    It seems that this suggestion does not violate the spirit of Kant’s argument for the 
establishment of human knowledge and it might be in consonance with Kant’s 
argument for the validity of the practical use of human reason. Although Kant did not 
think that there is any possible knowledge of the things-in-themselves in the realm of 
human empirical experience, he still mentioned that through intellectual intuition, it is 
possible to constitute the knowledge of them. In addition, the possibility of freedom, 
originally understood as one of the transcendental ideas in the theoretical use of 
reason, can be proven in the field of practical use of reason. In this regard, when it 
comes to religious experience, it is reasonable to assume that there is a kind of 
intuition to experience things-in-themselves. Comparably, in Hick’s hypothesis, this 
intuition will be the capacity to experience the Real an sich. What can not be sure of 
might be the quantity and the root of this capacity or particular intuition. To 
demonstrate its certainty will not be the concern of the present research.  
Actually, there have been some philosophers of religion and theologians arguing 
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for this capacity in the process of religious experience. A similar idea has also been 
considered in the development of the studies of religion.85 Interestingly, some of 
them developed their arguments or ideas on the basis of Kant’s philosophy. Rudolf 
Otto (1869-1937), for example, argued for the numinous consciousness, which is 
deeper than the theoretical and practical use of reason, as the source for the formation 
of religious ideas and feelings. Besides the faculty within human cognition to cognise 
and recognise the Holy is the faculty that he termed “divination.”86 Hick’s approach 
can be said to be within this philosophical or theological tradition. 
As indicated earlier, it seems that Hick has unwittingly amalgamated Kant’s 
freedom and intellectual intuition into his greatest freedom with the particular 
dimension of human nature when discussing human religious experience. What make 
Hick different from Kant are two things. One is that in his hypothesis there is a 
particular dimension to experience the Real an sich while for Kant the intellectual 
intuition to grasp things-in-themselves can not be found in human beings. The other is 
that for Hick the greatest freedom is only possible at the level of human religious 
experience for humans to freely respond to the Real an sich while for Kant freedom is 
                                                 
85
 The founding father of the studies of comparative religion (this is Eric J. Sharpe’s opinion, given in 
chapter 2 of his Comparative Religion: A History, 2nd ed. [London: Duckworth, 1986]), Friedrich Max 
Müller(1823-1900), for example, argued that there is a faculty as the potential energy of faith that 
enables man to apprehend the infinite. See the lecture 1 of Müller’s Lectures on the Origin and Growth 
of Religion As Illustrated by the Religions of India (originally printed in 1882 by Longmans, Green, 
and Co., London)(Reprint: Adamant Media Corporation, 2005).  
86
 For the details, see Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the 
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. by John W. Harvey, 2nd edition (Oxford 
University Press, 1950), chapters XIV & XVII. To some extent, Otto, although discussed their ideas 
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the keystone for the practical use of human reason. Despite these differences, it might 
be helpful in considering Hick’s capacity in terms of Kant’s intellectual intuition since 
this intuition is not restricted within the empirical experience but can still produce the 
religious experience or be expressed with the aid of ordinary concepts and terms. Also, 
it might be because of the intellectual intuition that makes the greatest freedom of 
human cognition possible. 
This suggestion might also be helpful in considering some questions that have 
been mentioned in the previous chapters. In his structure of three-level human 
experience, Hick seems to leave an unsolved or ambiguous difficulty: how can the 
physical, moral and religious experiences occur in virtue of the same human cognition 
(§2.2.2). If the same structure of human cognition can function in these three different 
experiences, then there could be something particular at the core of the mind that 
makes it possible. Based on the above analysis, it can be said that it is the capacity, 
understood in terms of intellectual intuition, within the human mind that allows the 
differences of these experiences. At this point, the greatest freedom of human 
cognition at the religious level might be possible only with the exercise of this 
capacity. This suggestion is still in agreement with the purpose of the strategy Hick 
uses in the establishment of the rationality of religious experience by means of the 
common structure shared with sensory experience (§2.1.2.3.2).  
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If the above discussion is tenable, then following the spirit of Hick’s project, the 
formation of the religious experience can be illustrated as the product of the operation 
of the intellectual intuition, i.e., the capacity to experience the Real an sich, with 
either of the two basic categories as the transcendental ideas and by means of various 
culture-relative categories.  
 
3.3.3 Reconsidering the Noumenal Ground 
Kant’s notion of noumenon, in its negative sense, works as a regulative idea for 
defining the boundary of the theoretical use of human reason and God in the postulate 
of moral life. Similarly, in Hick’s hypothesis, the Real an sich is epistemologically 
postulated for religious experience and religious life and is the source and the 
noumenal ground of its characteristics that are manifested in human religious 
consciousness.  
Hick’s concern is the validity of the religious experience. The purpose of his 
postulation of the Real an sich is to secure religious experience from being or 
becoming an illusion of or a subjective projection from human consciousness. Hick 
thus tries to argue for the certainty of the Real an sich by means of different 
theoretical resources, such as Richard Swinburne’s principle of credulity. Besides, it 
seems that the possibility of Real an sich is inferred from the characteristics that are 
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supposed to come from human consciousness. When it is considered together with 
Hick’s notion of ambiguous universe and his epistemology of religion, some other 
questions might be raised. 
According to Hick, there is a common structure among human experiences and 
there is a continuity from the sensory experience to the religious one. The 
commonality of them is the interpretive element. Due to this element, all human 
experiencing is experiencing-as. What makes them different from each other is the 
freedom of human cognition with various concepts. Therefore, in the religious field, it 
can be said that the religious experience is the product of the freedom of human 
cognition with religious concepts when humans respond to their environment. In 
Hick’s hypothesis, the environment is the ambiguous universe. It is the ambiguity of 
the universe that makes the various experiences possible. In this case, it can be said 
that there is also a distinction between the noumenon and phenomenon in grasping the 
ambiguous universe. The ambiguous universe is noumenon in the sense that it is 
something there but can never be exhausted in virtue of human cognition while it is 
phenomenon in the sense that it can be experienced differently. However, when 
considering the religious experience, Hick introduces the Real to secure its certainty 
and suggests the discrimination between the Real an sich and the Real as perceived. 
At this point, there seems to be two different entities as the objects of the same human 
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cognition: one is tangible and knowable while the other is unknowable. However, in 
discussing the human religious responses to the Real, Hick argues that its singularity 
is the simplest to accounting for the diversity of religion.87 Then, even the question of 
the possibility of ultimate realities that are raised by other theologians or philosophers 
of religion can be seemingly tackled by Hick88, there seems to be problem within 
Hick’s hypothesis: how can one be sure that those characteristics can be traced back to 
one and same Transcendent epistemologically postulated rather than to the ambiguous 
universe? Further, if the ambiguous universe is merely the phenomenon of something 
else rather than existence in itself, then all human experience of it becomes an illusion 
or delusion.  
    If the Real an sich can be identified with the ambiguous universe, then the vision 
might be different. Some questions or doubts against Hick’s hypothesis might also be 
appeased. 
    First of all, the issue of the quantity of the ultimate could be settled at least 
within Hick’s hypothesis. In line with Hick, the Real an sich is one and it is identified 
with the ambiguous universe. This modification still echoes Hick’s argument that the 
ultimate is one rather than many.  
Moreover, with the Kantian insight of the discrimination between the noumenon 
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 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 248-249. 
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and phenomenon, the Real an sich in Hick’s hypothesis has been understood as the 
noumenal ground for its manifestations while at the same time epistemologically 
transcends and is beyond the comprehension of human beings. If the ambiguous 
universe can be taken as the Real an sich, then the ambiguous universe itself is the 
noumenal ground for the variety of human experiences. If this understanding is 
appropriate, then how the noumenal causality has effects on the phenomena will not 
be the issue here. It is human consciousness that actively forms in the sphere of the 
phenomenon of appearance, i.e., those manifestations of the noumenon. At this point, 
one might raise the question as if the ambiguous universe is taken to be the 
Transcendent Real, then to what extent can it be transcendent? The tentative answer to 
this question is that it is the ambiguity of the universe that makes it transcendent. It is 
the Transcendent in that it is not only beyond the reach of human linguistic systems 
and human understanding but also “above” human beings – “above” in the sense that 
human beings are dwelling in it and surrounded by it.   
Following the above discussion, with the aid of Kant’s idea within the 
perspective of Hick’s hypothesis, the picture of the relation between the Real an sich 
and human consciousness and the formation of human religious experience will be: 
the Real an sich is not merely a postulation for religious experience and religious life. 
It is the ambiguous universe that human beings are dwelling and handling with. Its 
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ambiguity allows human beings experience and responds to it variously. With the 
exercise of the particular capacity, the intellectual intuition, that leads to the greatest 
freedom of human cognition at different levels, it is possible for human beings to have 
the insight into the universe in itself. From another angle, it can also be said that, at 
this level, the greatest freedom means that, with the exercise of the capacity to 
experience the Real an sich, human beings can free themselves from the sensible, 
cultural-relative concepts or any bias to “know” more about the universe. However, 
when being expressed, such experiences are inevitably conceptualised in terms of 
human linguistic system and thus coloured by any particular tradition. 
What remains is the question of how the pluralisation of human religious 
experience is possible. Hick himself has suggestedenlarging Wittgenstein’s idea of 
seeing-as into “all experiencing is experiencing-as.” But, as it has been mentioned 
previously (§1.2), it seems that Hick’s application of Wittgenstein’s “seeing-as” does 
not go far enough. This implies that there is also something more to be uncovered 
within Wittgenstein’s later philosophy for the reflection of Hick’s hypothesis. This 
will be the main task of the coming chapter. 
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Summary 
    This chapter has attempted to present Kant’s heritage that could be used to 
improve Hick’s hypothesis. The result of conducting a review of Kant’s philosophy 
and an investigation on Hick’s employment of Kant’s insight has suggested: (1) the 
equation of the Real an sich with the ambiguous universe might ease the tension 
between Hick’s dualistic metaphysics and monistic epistemology; (2) the separation 
of the two categories of the personal God and the non-personal Absolute from those 
culturally-related ones and the interpretation of them in terms of Kant’s transcendental 
idea might quell the question towards the nature of those categories; (3) the 
understanding of “spiritual aspect” of human nature in light of the “intellectual 
intuition” in Kant’s philosophy might on the one hand provide the answer to the 
question of the possibility of noumenal causality and on the other hand serve as the 
immediate experience in the formation of religious experience. In this manner, the 
combination of the exercise of intellectual intuition and the transcendental ideas can 
be analytically taken as the first step of the formation of religious experience. This 
can be regarded as the stage before the production of the holy images and sacred 
concepts such as God and Dao of various religious traditions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
WITTGENSTEIN’S EDIFICATION 
    The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the theoretical resources of 
Wittgenstein in Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. It will first introduce the root and the 
import of Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as. It will then evaluate Hick’s development 
of it. What follows will be a discussion on the implications of the triad of seeing-as, 
language-game and family resemblance of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy for 
improving Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. It will argue that Hick’s proposition that all 
experiencing is experiencing-as is merely an equivalent to Wittgenstein’s notion of 
seeing-as. When he applies Wittgenstein’s theory into his hypothesis, Hick neglects 
the implication of “seeing” as an immediate experience. In this regard, Hick’s idea of 
the particular capacity to experience the Transcendent can be taken as that kind of 
experience. Since the notions of seeing-as, language-game and family resemblance 
are interrelated in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, it will be worth reconsidering 
Hick’s proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as. 
 
4.0 Prolegomena 
The main ideas of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy have been widely applied in 
various fields of studies. For example, the idea of language game has been applied 
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into the study of social anthropology.1 Likewise, Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing-as” 
has been expanded and applied in various subjects and disciplines over and above 
philosophy. In philosophical discussion, Paul Ricœur (1913-2005), a French 
philosopher of Hermeneutics, once mentioned and used the concept of “seeing-as” to 
discuss theories of metaphor and the productive imagination of metaphor; Antonio S. 
Cua 柯雄文(1932-2007), a famous scholar of Chinese philosophy, analysed the 
import of the moral knowledge by comparing it with “seeing as.” In science, there 
was even a debate between Michael E. Malone and N. R. Hanson for the feasibility of 
the exercise of seeing-as to explain the discoveries and the phenomena of science.2 
There are also some philosophers of religion who apply Wittgenstein’s ideas into 
religious studies. Some of them apply the idea of language-game to argue for the 
internal criterion of truth within religion itself, described as “Wittgensteinian 
Fideism.”3 D. Z. Phillips can be regarded as one of the representatives in this 
approach. Meanwhile, some criticisms have been launched by Wittgenstein’s faithful 
followers towards those applications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy into religious 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Roger Trigg, “Wittgenstein and Social Science,” in Wittgenstein: Centenary Essays, ed. Phillips 
Griffiths (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 209-222. 
2
 For the details, see Paul Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi- disciplinary studies of the creation of 
meaning in language, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen Mclaughlin and John Costello, sj. (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 197- 209. A. S. Cua, The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in 
Wang Yang-ming’s Moral Psychology (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii. 1982), 10-11; 
Michael E. Malone, “Is Scientific Observation “Seeing-as”,” Philosophical Investigations 1(1978), 
23-38.  
3
 These philosophers of religion are dubbed “Wittgensteinian Fideism,” a term coined by Kai Nielsen. 
For the detail, see Kai Nielsen, “Wittgenstein Fideism,” Philosophy 42, no.161 (July 1967), 191-209. 
Hick is put into this camp by Jerry H. Gill. See Jerry H. Gill, “John Hick and Religious Knowledge”, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2, no. 3 (Fall 1971), 144-147. 
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studies.4 However, as Wittgenstein himself maintained, the value of his work lies in 
inspiring its readers.5 Therefore, to restrict the spreading of Wittgenstein’s thought 
into other fields may betray one of his original intentions. Hick, although he claims 
that he has been greatly influenced by Kant, is also employing Wittgenstein’s notions 
to elucidate his theory. Among those notions, the one that Hick discusses and explores 
most is that of seeing-as. 
Hick recalls that he was first introduced to the notion of seeing-as in a lecture 
that was given by Wittgenstein’s Cambridge disciple John Wisdom in Oxford around 
1949; Hick would subsequently attempt to apply it into philosophy of religion.6 Such 
an influence was then being presented in the first edition of Faith and Knowledge 
when Hick first analysed and discussed the nature of religious experience.7 Hick’s 
expanding of “seeing-as,” which is later illustrated in his articles and books, further 
constitutes one of the key elements of his religious pluralism. The essay “Religious 
Faith as Experiencing-as,”8 is his most precise and solid work that demonstrates his 
development of Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing-as.” The article “Seeing-as and 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Brian R. Clark, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999), chapter 4 (especially §4.1). 
5
 In the preface of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein said, “I should not like my writing to 
spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his 
own.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), Xe. 
6
 Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (London: Macmillan, 1985), 18. 
7
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8
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York: St Martin’s Press, 1969); Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of 
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1990).  
                                    
156 
 
Religious Experience,” published later in 1984,9 could be seen as a further discussion 
of the exercise of the idea in explaining the diversity of religions. It can also be taken 
as a preparation for part three of his masterpiece An Interpretation of Religion (1989). 
Wittgenstein’s examination of the notion of “seeing-as” could be traced back to 
his early work in which he briefly discussed some puzzle pictures. Wittgenstein 
mentioned this question in his earlier philosophy in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(1921), the only book published by himself. In section 5.5423 of that book, 
Wittgenstein described two possible ways of see a figure  as a cube.10 Similar 
treatments of this topic can be found throughout his manuscripts or typescripts, such 
as those later edited and entitled as Brown Book11 and Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology, dated from 1935 onwards.  
Between 1947 and 1949, partly under the influence of Wolfgang Köhler’s Gestalt 
psychology, Wittgenstein paid more attention to the discussion of this notion12 as 
found in part II section xi13 of his Philosophical Investigations.14 
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 According to Hick, this essay, which is reprinted as chapter 2 of Hick’s Problems of Religious 
Pluralism, is originally incorporated into the Proceedings of the English International Wittgenstein 
Symposium (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1984).  
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 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness with 
an introduction by Bertrand Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 65. 
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 As the information of The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969) 
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 Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher Inc., 1996), 37. 
Joachim Schulte even suggests that Köhler’s book was the most important single influence on 
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Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
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 In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein discussed the two uses of the 
word “see” (i.e., “I see this” and “I see a likeness between these two faces”) with 
some ambiguous drawings and pointed out that when we see (as a visual experience) 
these figures, we also interpret them.15 For Wittgenstein, to report something as seen 
is to report our perception. For example, when we say we see a rabbit over there, we 
may in fact say that we see some object over there as a rabbit. For Hick, however, the 
other senses should be put into this process. “For as well as seeing a bird as a bird, we 
may hear it as a bird- hear the bird’s song as a bird’s song, hear the rustle of its wings 
as a bird in flight […] and so on.”16 Besides, to identify or to recognise the same 
thing could be limited or subject to one’s own particular linguistic, cultural and 
religious environment.17 Thus Hick suggests that the notion of “seeing-as” should be 
enlarged into “experiencing-as.” Hick defends the term he coins and responds to 
possible objections and doubts, and develops his religious pluralism by combining the 
notion of “experiencing-as” with Immanuel Kant’s distinction between thing-in-itself 
(noumenon) and appearance (phenomenon). 
Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as has its own root and breeding ground. The 
question of seeing-as comes from the debate between Meaning-theory and Wolfgang 
Köhler’s branch of Gestalt psychology. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein’s discussion of the 
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notion of seeing-as may be controversial by itself.18  
For example, it seems that Wittgenstein probed the notion of “seeing-as” by 
using different types of pictures without considering their differences. In addition, the 
boundary or the innate relation between seeing and seeing-as seems to need 
clarification.19 Hick also claims that there should be further distinctions between 
primary and secondary seeing-as. For instance, in the case of seeing a cloud as a 
unicorn, we should see a cloud first as a cloud and then see it as a unicorn.20 However, 
in relation to the notion of seeing-as, it seems that there is a slight difference between 
Wittgenstein and Hick. For Wittgenstein, “seeing-as” is reporting our perception. 
Thus in the case of the cloud and unicorn, Wittgenstein’s concern will still reason how 
we see the cloud as a unicorn or as something else. Comparatively, for Hick, even in 
the event of seeing a cloud the “seeing” is already a “seeing-as.” In a word, for 
Wittgenstein, seeing seems not to be the same as seeing-as whereas for Hick seeing is 
seeing-as. Then, in this case, is Hick’s understanding and criticism of Wittgenstein 
appropriate? If yes, to what extent can Hick’s enlargement of Wittgenstein’s notion be 
taken as an advance? If not, what has Hick missed? Can these missed moments 
                                                 
18
 See T. E. Wilkerson, “Seeing-As,” Mind (new series) 82, no. 328 (October 1973), 481-496. 
19
 Schulte even points out that “Wittgenstein nowhere reaches clear conclusions that might serve to 
settle his questions. He asks certain questions again and again[…] It repeatedly happens that 
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wanted to explore lateral paths, leaving the main complex to one side, in order to reach it, not through 
the main entrance, as it were, but by the way of some side-gate.” For more details, see Schulte, 
Experience and Expression, 57-58.  
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facilitate Hick’s hypothesis?   
 
4.1 Wittgenstein’s Notion of “Seeing-As” 
4.1.1 The Root 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing-as was primarily aimed at solving the 
difficulties in the debate between the Meaning-theory21 and the Gestalt-theory over 
the topic of meaning. Wittgenstein was not satisfied with the definition of meaning 
suggested by the psychological theory of meaning. Wittgenstein’s reflection on this 
issue can be connected to his discussion on the concept of seeing-as.22  
Briefly speaking, the aim of both Meaning-theory and Gestalt-theory is to 
explain the nature of perception; both attempt to solve the problem of “seeing-as” by 
making the concept “seeing” more exact.23 However, from the viewpoint of 
Gestalt-theory, the problem with Meaning-theory was its claim that there shall be 
simple and neutral sense data at the core of sensation and that it is impossible for us to 
have a pure sensory impression since we are under the influence of habits and 
                                                 
21
 It seems that the Meaning-theory, the supporters of which were Helmholtz, Wundt and William 
James, was named as the mosaic theory since it has the similar characteristics and was also taken as the 
opponent of Gestalt theory. See Joachim Schulte, Experience and Expression, 80-81, for the details. 
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 Michel ter Hark, Beyond the Inner and the Outer: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology 
(Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 160-166; Malcolm Budd, 
“Wittgenstein on Seeing-Aspects,” Mind (new series) 96, no. 381 (January 1987), 1. Budd’s article was 
later incorporated into his own book Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989) as chapter 4. 
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associations.24 From the perspective of Gestalt theory, that which changes is distinct 
from the objects of our vision. It could be something we perceive immediately when 
seeing an object. According to Köhler, they are circumscribed and organised units, 
such as material objects or groups of objects. For example, we do not see three dots, 
but see them as a triangle; we do not hear a chaotic array of sounds, but detect a 
melody.25 Köhler generalised his idea in Gestalt Psychology that: 
 
[…] in most visual fields the content of particular areas ‘belong together’ as 
circumscribed units from which their surrounding are excluded.26 
 
Köhler termed this visual field as Gestalt and claimed that it is formed elements 
as a “sensory fact.” It is often continuous and sometime discontinuous. For instance, 
we may perceive the stars as forming constellations, or a set of six patches.27 Köhler 
further introduced the idea of “organisation” to name the sensory fact of visual field.28 
Additionally, Köhler concretised Gestalt into a private mental entity and claimed that 
in aspect-perception we see one and the same thing as two different “visual objects” 
or “visual realities.”29  
Wittgenstein was basically in agreement with Köhler’s view. Meanwhile, the 
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main point Wittgenstein was dissatisfied with in Meaning-theory is that it ascribed the 
changes of the same visual experience to different interpretations that are coloured by 
habits and other associations. For Wittgenstein, different visual experiences and 
different understandings of A as X or Y are not just interpretations, but they include 
seeing, thinking and imagining. Besides, the interpretation is not an indirect 
description but the primary expression of the aspect-experience in the case of 
seeing-as, which functions within a complex language-game.30 In sum, Wittgenstein 
thought: (1) there is no simple and neutral sense data at the core of sensation, (2) it is 
possible for us to have a pure sensory impression and (3) interpretation is the primary 
expression of our aspect-experience. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
Wittgenstein was not in full agreement with Gestalt-theory. 
Köhler’s treatment of the visual field as a sensory fact, or as a private mental 
entity, is an analogy of that idea between colour and shape, for colour and shape are 
also sensory facts.31 What has changed when we perceive is the change in 
organisation or in our private mental entity. That is to say, it is the organisation of the 
visual impression that changes.32 It is at this point that Wittgenstein disagreed with 
Köhler. Wittgenstein argued that: 
 
The concept of the ‘inner picture’ is misleading, for this concept uses the ‘outer 
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picture’ as a model. […] If you put the ‘organization’ of a visual impression on 
a level with colours and shapes, you are proceeding from the idea of the visual 
impression as an inner object. Of course this makes this object into a chimera; a 
queerly shifting construction.33 
 
As some scholars have elucidated, the change of organisation here is not the 
change of the organisation of a cube; there is something, say, a shape, that may have 
been altered in the latter case while there is nothing that can really be done in the 
former situation.34  
Wittgenstein called the perceptual phenomena that some objects can be seen 
under more than one aspect “aspect-dawning” or “change of aspect”; the related 
perceptual phenomenon could be denoted as “aspect-perception.”35 Like Köhler, 
Wittgenstein argued that what we perceive is not just simple or pure sense data but a 
group of separate objects.36 The problem with Köhler was that he claimed that what 
changes in aspect-perception is the organisation of these “visual objects.” This visual 
object is something analogous to the real picture in our daily life. From this point of 
view, when we perceive the puzzle picture, the organisation must differ because we 
may at one moment see the picture as X and then as Y. But the picture itself, that is, its 
shape and colour, has not actually changed. Thus, to say that there is another kind of 
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visual object that occurs within us could be another puzzle of its own.37 
 
4.1.2 Its Import 
Wittgenstein began his investigation of the visual experience by discussing the 
two uses of the word “see,” “I see this” and “I see a likeness between these two faces” 
with some ambiguous figures. He pointed out that the time when we see these figures, 
as a visual experience, we also interpret them.38 One of the figures that Wittgenstein 
used to elucidate his idea was the duck-rabbit, derived from Jastrow’s Fact and Fable 
in Psychology. It is now shown as follows: 
 
 
Duck- rabbit39 
 
This figure can simultaneously be seen as a rabbit and as a duck. Wittgenstein 
called this experience “noticing an aspect”40 or aspect-perception. He further 
indicated that we only “see the duck and rabbit aspects” if we are already conversant 
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with the shapes of those two animals.41 That is to say, when we see this ambiguous 
picture, some other factors make us immediately see it as a rabbit or duck. Thus, there 
should be a difference between seeing something and seeing something as X. Seeing 
is a kind of experience or perception while “seeing-as” is not. In the words of 
Wittgenstein, “‘Seeing-as….’ is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like 
seeing and again not like.”42 Moreover, when one seeing this picture is asked to 
answer the question of what s/ he sees, the response will be a report of his or her 
perception,43 i.e., he or she reports what has been seen. Further, whereas Wittgenstein 
held that when we see something we also interpret it44, “seeing-as” could therefore be 
regarded as an interpretation, “an interpretation of what has been seen”45 and is “the 
primary expression of the experience,”46 as well.  
 In brief, for Wittgenstein, aspect-perception is, at minimum, composed of our 
seeing and our interpretation. This is the point that distinguishes Wittgenstein from 
Köhler. What changes in the aspect-perception would be the result of our 
interpretation, instead of the organisation of the “visual object” or of any other 
“mental entity.” Wittgenstein said:47 
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“What I really see must surely be what is produced in me by the influence of 
the object”- Then what is produced in me is a sort of copy, something that in its 
turn can be looked at, can be before one; almost something like a 
materialization. 
And this materialisation is something spatial and it must be possible to describe 
it in spatial terms. For instance (if it is a face) it can smile; the concept of 
friendliness, however, has no place in an account of it, but is foreign to such an 
account (even though it may subserve it). 
 
Another phenomenon in Wittgenstein’s seeing-as or aspect-noticing used to 
refute the idea of Gestalt psychology is aspect-blindness. According to Wittgenstein, 
this is the lack of the capacity to see something as something. People who are 
aspect-blind are supposed to not see the change of aspects of any puzzle-picture. They 
may only see the colour and shape of the picture.48  
What is worthy of attention is that one may not always see something and 
meanwhile see it as X. Indeed, Wittgenstein mentions that, in this situation, a viewer 
is unwilling to say that he or she is seeing cutlery as cutlery49 or seeing a 
conventional picture of a lion as a lion.50 That is to say, for Wittgenstein, not all cases 
of visual experience can be reduced to cases of seeing-as.  
 
4.2 Hick’s Development of Wittgenstein’s Notion of “Seeing-As” 
As mentioned above, Hick’s chief elucidation of his development of 
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Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing-as” was demonstrated in his “Religious Faith as 
Experiencing-as.” The discussion of this essay can basically be divided into two parts: 
one is on Wittgenstein’s “seeing-as” with Hick’s own reason to develop this notion 
into “experiencing-as” and the other is on the implications and test of the application 
of “experiencing-as” in certain religious situations (e.g. the nature of the miraculous 
and sacraments). Hick discusses the relevant theoretical background in the first part of 
“Seeing-as and Religious Experience” and further dealt with in part three of his An 
Interpretation of Religion.  
 
4.2.1 From Visual Perception to All Sensory Perceptions 
Hick clarifies his opinion of religious belief as the beginning of the discussion on 
the expanding of the notion of “seeing-as” into that of “experiencing-as.” He firstly 
mentions the distinction between cognition in presence, or acquaintance, and the 
cognition in absence, or holding beliefs-about. In the religious sphere, religious 
literature like the Bible records the events of prophets and disciples’ cognition of and 
personal dealings with God by acquaintance. This is the subject of “cognition in 
presence” whereas doctrines, or propositional beliefs, under the influence of the 
dominant systems of Christian theology, shall be ascribed to the “cognition in 
absence.” Hick points out that what he wants to elaborate is the ordinary believer’s 
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awareness of God in our present earthly life. He then claims that religious belief, as a 
form of cognition by acquaintance, is more like sense perception and the awareness of 
God himself is faith in its primary sense.51  
In order to justify his exercise of Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as, Hick 
reminds us of the complexity of the process of our visual experience. He indicates that 
“seeing is not a simple straightforward matter of physical objects registering 
themselves on our retinas and thence in our conscious visual field.”52 In chapter 8 of 
An Interpretation of Religion, Hick pushes his idea further. He mentions the 
phenomenon that the three-dimensions of the physical world are projected onto the 
two dimensions of the more or less plane surface of the retina53 and relates it to 
Wittgenstein’s reflection on seeing-as in his Philosophical Investigations.  
Hick introduces Wittgenstein’s idea of “seeing-as” by a very brief presentation of 
the Necker-cube, Jastrow’s duck-rabbit and so on, as used in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations. While there may be some difference among those cases, 
Hick merely concentrates his discussion on those figures and wants to excavate the 
insight of Wittgenstein’s analysis. He summarises Wittgenstein’s idea by noting that, 
in these two-dimensional examples, we find the mind switching back and forth 
between the alternative ways of seeing-as. Hick thus suggests that we can enlarge the 
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notion of seeing-as in three dimensions.54 The first step is to argue that all the sensory 
perceptions are the elements of experiencing-as, since there are similar phenomena 
among the senses of seeing, hearing, smell, touch, etc. and that we perceive and 
recognise the object in the avenues of the cooperation of all the relevant senses as a 
single complex means of perception. For example, a carpenter may not only see the 
wood as mahogany but also feels it as mahogany; moreover, we may taste wine as 
Burgundy and smell the cheese as Gorgonzola.55 
 
4.2.2 From Puzzle Pictures to Human Events and Histories 
The second step of Hick’s attempt is to explore the principle of seeing-as from its 
exercise on those puzzle pictures to its exercise on the events of our lives and human 
histories. He uses this to explain the phenomenon that, whether in the past or at the 
present time, religious people could experience their earthly lives as the act or 
presence of God while non-religious people could not.56 Further, considering the 
complexity of the process of our experiencing and the risk of the inclination of pure 
subjectivity of the experience in his theory, Hick introduces the thesis that “all 
experiencing is experiencing-as.”  
Hick argues that a Stone-Age savage is unable to recognise a fork as a fork but as 
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a marvellously shining object full of mana.57 For Hick, this justifies the idea that 
every time we experience something we always recognise it by means of some 
concepts that are coloured by our own social and cultural traditions. According to 
Hick, it is in this sense that experiencing-as can be equated with recognising. 
Therefore, even when we recognise something that is utterly familiar and 
unmistakable, it will not be absurd to say that we are experiencing it as x or as y. To 
recognise something is to experience it as A or B by means of our social 
conditioning – the life of which is to be found within a particular linguistic 
environment. Additionally, by learning to recognise things (i.e., learning how to use 
such concepts as “rabbit” and “act of God”) we can recognise the object present in 
front of us despite mysterious nature of this recognising process. Therefore, by 
identifying the recognising with experiencing-as, we can hold that all experiencing is 
experiencing-as.58 It is at this point that Hick’s idea of experiencing-as has departed 
from Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as. For Wittgenstein, seeing and seeing-as seems 
to be different things while for Hick seeing is to be equated with seeing-as. Moreover, 
Hick further claims that all experiencing is experiencing-as.  
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4.2.3 From Physical Experience to All Levels of Human Experience: All 
Experiencing is Experiencing-as 
In Hick’s discourse, he expands Wittgenstein’s seeing-as into a thesis of all 
experiencing as experiencing as. Moreover, he affirms that the range of objects of 
experiencing-as imply that there is a common epistemological character among 
sensory, ethical and religious experiences. Any group of objects may form a situation 
that can evoke human beings’ appropriate dispositional response to it, which he calls 
“significance.”59  
The idea of the levels of sensory, ethical and religious experiences can be 
understood as another dimension of Hick’s enlarging of Wittgenstein’s notion of 
seeing-as since it has gone beyond Wittgenstein’s concern. In addition to the physical 
significance, Hick mainly focuses his attention on the analysis of the moral/ethical 
and religious experiences.60 Hick uses an example of a person who is in a dangerous 
situation (e.g., being caught at the foot of a steep cliff by an incoming tide) to 
elucidate the relation between the ethical significance of a human situation and its 
purely natural or physical significance. Such a situation can either be experienced as a 
physical event or as a moral/ethical event and can respectively evoke our appropriate 
dispositional response to it. If it is experienced as a moral event, one may call the 
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police or other pertinent authorities to rescue that person. In this case, to experience a 
situation as a moral/ethical event presupposes that the situation should be firstly 
experienced with physical significance. Besides, tautologically, human beings are 
moral beings that are aware of the ethical/moral significance of situations and 
accordingly build the relevant moral terms. Hick reminds us that there are two 
possibilities that we may not be aware of in the moral/ethical significance of a 
situation: one is that we might not be equipped with any moral sense at all and the 
other is that the situation, like the puzzle pictures, is ambiguous.61  
In Hick’ framework, religious experience is a much higher level of human 
experience. Meanwhile, the relationship between religious and moral significances is 
more complex than that between physical and moral significances. Although the 
religious significance contains and transcends the moral significance, it does not 
imply that religious significance should be superimposed upon certain instances of 
moral obligation. Normally, it is one’s awareness of the presence of or encounter with 
God that carries with it the moral demand. According to Hick, such consciousness is 
even relatively independent of external circumstance. It can occur in prayer, 
meditation and so on. The encounter of God can also make us deepen the good 
relations with our fellow neighbours. That is to say, the awareness of God can lead us 
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back to the service of God in the world.62  
As it has been indicated in the previous chapter (§2.1.2.3.2), in order to justify 
the rationality of religious experience and religious faiths, Hick demonstrates the 
shared epistemological structure of these three levels of experiences. The common 
function of recognising or identifying generates the respectively appropriate 
dispositional response to the situation. Since all these experiences share the same or 
similar epistemological structure, and if the reality of religious experience is denied 
and taken as an illusion of human consciousness, then our sphere of experience will 
be shaken. We might all actually live in an unreal world. Our sensory perception is no 
longer reliable. 
 
4.2.4 From the Phenomenon of Religion to the Diversity of Religions 
With the development of his theory and his understanding of the diversity of 
religions, the thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as comes to the mature stage 
of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. In his later essay “Seeing-as and Religious 
experience,” Hick suggests that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy highlights the idea 
that we think, behave and experience our environment in terms of the system of 
concepts or language which is carried from one generation to another, resulting in a 
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relativity of language or system of concepts. In Wittgenstein’s words, it is called 
“language-game,” which, for Hick, can be analogised to culture. This idea can 
facilitate us in explaining the phenomenon of the diversity of religions. The 
differences in each religion is found in the religious concepts used by their followers 
or believers to experience the divine.63 This is Hick’s further development of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as.  
 
4.2.5 Some Observations 
To sum up, Hick’s development of Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as can be 
divided into four parts. Hick firstly expands laterally the range of senses from visual 
to all sensory perception. Secondly, Hick argues that the objects of our sensory 
perception shall include the events of our lives and human histories. Next, Hick 
argues for the rationality of exercising the thesis of experiencing-as at the level of 
moral and religious consciousness. That is to say, to expand the principle vertically 
into all levels of human consciousness. At this stage, Hick explains why there are 
theists and atheists. For theists, the universe is experienced as religious while, for 
atheists, it is not. Finally, after affirming the structure and common elements of 
human cognition, Hick further uses his thesis to explain the plurality of religious 
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phenomena in this world. Various religions result from the experience of the same 
divine by religious people in different religious and cultural traditions. 
Obviously, Hick firstly narrows down Wittgenstein’s idea and gives his own 
interpretation of it. He might at the same time simplify the complication of 
Wittgenstein’s proposition. For example, as presented above, through discussion on 
different types of figures, Wittgenstein did not think that every seeing can be 
considered as a case of “seeing-as.” Also, Wittgenstein does not seem to clearly 
illustrate the relationship between seeing and seeing-as. The only hint of their 
connection could be that seeing-as is the combination of interpreting and seeing. In 
contrast, unlike Wittgenstein, Hick makes his suggestion by concentrating only on the 
puzzle drawings, employs his understanding of “seeing-as” in his analysis of the 
ambiguity of universe and experiencing-as and argues that all experiencing is 
experiencing-as.  
As it has been shown in the section above, the original purpose of Wittgenstein’s 
investigation of the notion of seeing-as, with the introduction of the idea of 
aspect-blindness, is to respond to Köhler’s idea. Generally speaking, Wittgenstein 
used various puzzle pictures to expose the absurdity of Köhler’s idea that there is 
some thing as the real picture with its organisation in our visual experience. For 
Wittgenstein, we see the object and we report what we see. What we report is our own 
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interpretation of what we have seen. Thus, in seeing the puzzle pictures such as the 
duck-rabbit, at first sight we do see an image. To see it as a rabbit or as a duck is our 
interpretation with any of the familiar concepts that immediately follow. That is to say, 
there is a certain immediate visual experience that can only be expressed later by 
means of the concepts in our ordinary language. Following Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of seeing-as, “seeing” can be taken as this immediate visual experience. It is also this 
immediate visual experience that causes Köhler to think that there is something as 
vivid as a real one that one can possess. For Wittgenstein, this is the problem with 
Köhler’s position. Wittgenstein named this illusion “visual room” or “visual space” 
and indicated that it would be unreasonable to declare that it is one’s own possession 
since even the owner can do nothing in it.  
    In an endnote of chapter 8 of An Interpretation of Religion, Hick himself makes a 
response to try to defend his development of Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as. Hick 
is aware of the criticisms of Keeling, Morelli and Malone64 on his expansion of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as into a much wider concept. One of the concerns of 
these critics is the relationship and the distinction between seeing and seeing-as since, 
in their understanding, Wittgenstein claimed that not all seeing is seeing-as. To 
reiterate his own understanding, Hick further questions Wittgenstein’s theory and, in 
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reference to R. W. Perrett’s idea, points out that there should be a further distinction 
between primary and secondary seeing-as. For Hick, when we see a cloud as a 
unicorn, we should see, for example, a cloud first as a cloud and then as a unicorn.65 
However, based on the preceding analysis, it seems that this is not the case. According 
to Wittgenstein, “seeing-as” is reporting our perception. Consequently, in the case of 
the cloud and unicorn, Wittgenstein’s will still be concerned with how we see the 
cloud as a unicorn or as something else. However, Hick is arguing that even seeing a 
cloud the “seeing” is already a “seeing-as.” In a word, for Wittgenstein, seeing is 
different from seeing-as whereas for Hick seeing is seeing-as. 
     If the above understanding of Wittgenstein’s idea is correct, then the debate 
between Hick and his critics could be misleading. Further, in comparison with 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between seeing and seeing-as, Hick’s thesis of “all 
experiencing is experiencing-as” is merely an equivalent to Wittgenstein’s notion of 
seeing-as. The notions of seeing-as and experiencing-as are both acts of interpretation. 
The difference between them is the scope of their application. Besides, Wittgenstein 
did not think that all our visual experience can be subject to seeing-as while Hick 
contends that all experiencing is experiencing-as. At this point, Hick may miss a 
significant element, the notion of seeing, of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, which 
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could help him integrate other Wittgensteinian elements inbuilt in his own hypothesis.  
 
4.3 How Can Wittgenstein Help? 
It has been mentioned in the previous chapter (§1.2) that Hick’s application of 
Wittgenstein’s “seeing-as” does not go far enough and that a more thorough analysis 
of the second part of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations might offer a 
possibility of overcoming the limitations of traditional epistemological approaches 
that Hick has followed.66  
In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the notion of seeing-as is connected with the 
language-game and family resemblance and supposed to be understood in that context. 
Broadly speaking, the possibility of seeing X as A or as B lies in our interpretation in 
terms of some concepts or terms that we have already been familiar with. Such 
concepts or terms are the products of a particular framework in which can gain their 
meaning.67 In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, this framework refers to 
language-game, the implication of which is embodied by various concrete language 
games with the “family resemblance” among them.  
Interestingly, in addition to the notion of seeing-as, Hick has also used 
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language-game and family resemblance occasionally to elucidate his conception of 
religion and religious diversity. In “Seeing-as and Religious experience,” Hick 
emphasises the significance of the concept of language-game when discussing the 
plurality of religions. Later, in the introduction of An Interpretation of Religion, Hick 
suggests using Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance” to understand the 
implication of “religion.”68 Generally speaking, the idea of “religion” should be 
grasped to investigate the different types of religious tradition. It could be that only 
when the principal idea of religion is manifested, any discourse of religious pluralism 
could be fairly close to the reality of religions.  
One of the differences between them is that in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, 
the three ideas are interrelated whereas Hick seems to never consider them together. 
What’s more, the concern of Wittgenstein is the complicated relationship between 
language and reality while Hick applies himself to the religious language and the 
religious Reality. Then, considering the Wittgensteinian factors of Hick’s hypothesis 
in terms of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy might shed some light on Hick’s theory.  
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4.3.1 Seeing: the Immediate Experience  
As it has been shown above, for Wittgenstein, Köhler’s idea of “visual field” is 
something analogous to the real picture and is a chimera. As been discussed, this has 
primarily been seen in section xi of part two of Philosophical Investigations. In §400 
of part one, Wittgenstein discusses the idea of a “visual room” as a substitution of 
Köhler’s “visual field.”  In §398 of the same book, Wittgenstein rebuts the idea of 
“visual room” by asking the question of whether someone can enter and walk about 
the visual room if s/he claims that s/he owns it. If yes, can a neighbour or anyone else 
also do the same? If not, then the visual room should have no owner. Wittgenstein 
discusses this in his Philosophical Remarks, a manuscript dated between 1929 and 
1930. In §71, Wittgenstein said:  
 
Visual space has essentially no owner. 
Let’s assume that, with all the others, I can always see one particular object in 
visual space—viz my nose—. Someone else naturally doesn’t see this object in 
the same way. Doesn’t that mean, then, that the visual space I’m talking about 
belongs to me? And so is subjective? No. It has only been construed 
subjectively here, and an objective space opposed to it, which is, however, only 
a construction with visual space as its basis. In the –secondary—language of 
‘objective’—physical—space, visual space is called subjective, or rather, 
whatever in this language corresponds directly with visual spaces is called 
subjective. In the same way that one might say that in the language of real 
numbers whatever in their domain corresponds directly with the cardinal 
numbers is called the ‘positive integers.’69  
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  In this paragraph, there are some ideas that have been clearly presented. First of 
all, it has been said that what we talk about when seeing an object is called visual 
space without any owner. Secondly, the language we use is a secondary language, 
construing our visual space as subjective. Moreover, there is a relationship between 
the visual room and our ordinary language.  
For the second point, the idea of secondary language can be traced back to 
Wittgenstein’s early distinction between phenomenological and physical languages. 
The purpose of the phenomenological language as the primary language is to describe 
directly the immediate experience, or the phenomenon that slips away immediately 
from us; the physical language as the secondary language is to describe indirectly 
everything that is around us. However, Wittgenstein gave up this distinction soon 
around 1929. This intention can be seen in his Philosophical Remarks and the 
conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann, entitled “Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
the Vienna Circle.” Perhaps because he was aware of the impossibility to search for 
phenomenological language, Wittgenstein would abandon this distinction.70 
Nonetheless, for Wittgenstein, like a picture presented on a screen by a continuous 
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film strip,71 an immediate experience or phenomenon can be described in the 
secondary language – one’s ordinary language. To use terms from his own simile of 
the projection of the figures of ellipses and rectangles of one plane to another,72 the 
immediate experience is projected in our ordinary language with some degree of 
distortion.73 Thus, the visual space as our immediate visual experience can be 
subjectively expressed by means of our ordinary language. In Wittgenstein’s words, 
“we can also see the illusion not as one thing now as another—So we interpret it, and 
see it as we interpret it.”74 Following Wittgenstein’s reasoning, seeing can be taken as 
the immediate experience while seeing-as is the projection of experience of seeing in 
to our daily language.   
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see his “Philosophy in the Big Typescript,” Synthese, 87, no. 2 (May 1991), 255-272. 
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In terms of the above idea, religious experience might be regarded as the product 
of the immediate experience with religious language and the records of religious texts 
as our ordinary physical language. That is to say, the immediate experience is 
projected in religious language; the religious language and relevant ideas to some 
extent represent the immediate. The so-called religious experience is formed in the 
cooperation of these two parts. In Hick’s theory, the immediate experience of the 
manifestation of the Real an sich can be described indirectly in the religious language 
of human beings. Meanwhile, Hick’s defence for the analogies and metaphors in 
religious language and for the “transcategorial” or “ineffable” of the Real an sich can 
be reconsidered in this way. Further, St. Thomas Aquinas’ thesis of “Things known 
are in the knower according to the mode of the knower” can be deciphered as “the 
immediate experience of the Real an sich is projected into human physical language.” 
Then, is there any element in Hick’s hypothesis that can be regarded as the immediate 
experience? According to the analysis in chapter 3, the equivalent can be the spiritual 
capacity of human nature to experience the Real an sich, which some have suggested 
can be translated in terms of “intellectual intuition.” 
    If the above investigation and interpretation are appropriate, then there are at 
least two main stages of the formation of religious experience. The first stage is the 
operation of the particular capacity, the intellectual intuition, together with either the 
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transcendental idea as personal God or as non-personal Absolute. What comes soon 
after this stage are their schematisation with variant religious concepts and ideas. At 
this stage, various holy images, God, Allah, Dao and so on, are generated. From 
Wittgenstein’s perspective, the intellectual intuition is the immediate experience of the 
Real an sich projected into diverse religious languages. This interpretation is still in 
agreement with Hick’s argument of all experiencing is experiencing-as. What differs 
from Hick is that, following Wittgenstein’s concern, it attempts to make a connection 
between the special capacity within human nature with Hick’s proposition of all 
experiencing is experiencing-as. Meanwhile, it is an emphasis on the “intellectual 
intuition,” the immediate experience, or the special capacity within human nature that 
makes the Kantian and Wittgensteinian elements within Hick’s hypothesis related to 
one another.  
In Hick’s hypothesis, it is the concepts and terms of a particular framework that 
make human beings experience X as A or B. Those notions are external to the 
structure of human cognition and are obtained by human beings through educating. 
Similarly, in Wittgenstein’s discussion, the interpretive element of seeing-as results 
from the concepts learnt within a cultural framework, which refers to a 
language-game. Since the religious notions come into existence within a particular 
surrounding, they, with the practices of world religions, can also be understood by 
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means of the idea of language-game.  
 
4.3.2 Language Game and Family Resemblance: Anti-Essentialist Approach  
    As it has already been pointed out, Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing-as is 
connected to his thinking of language.75 In the part II of Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein thought: 
 
The importance of this concept [aspect-blindness] lies in the connexion 
between the concepts of ‘seeing an aspect’ and ‘experiencing the meaning of a 
word’. For we want to ask ‘what would you be missing if you did not 
experience the meaning of a word?’ 
What would you be missing, for instance, if you did not understand the request 
to pronounce the word ‘till’ and to mean it as a verb,─ or if you did not feel 
that a word lost its meaning and became a mere sound it if was repeated ten 
times over?76 
 
    The meaning of a word in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy lies in the use of the 
word in a language. If we know how to use the word in a language, then we would 
naturally understand its meaning. This is the basic idea of Wittgenstein’s theory of 
language-game (Sprachspiel).  
    Wittgenstein’s language-game theory can be taken as a reflection on and an 
objection against his own early idea of the picture-theory in Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. There, Wittgenstein was in search for the essence of language 
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and the structure of the world by means of the analysis of the notions such as the 
names, the elementary propositions and the states of affairs (Sachverhalten). In his 
later philosophy, perhaps because this task ended in vain,77 after his return to 
philosophy in 1929, Wittgenstein began rethinking the question of the essence of 
language.78 The achievement of this period was presented in the first part of 
Philosophical Investigations and various manuscripts and typescripts, like The Blue 
and Brown Books. 
In the beginning of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein discussed the idea 
of language in Augustine’s Confessions (e.g. §§1-2) and in some following paragraphs 
(e.g. §23) reflected on his own idea in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to oppose the 
idea that there is an essence of language. Wittgenstein then introduced the notion of 
language-game by analogising the language to game and combining these two terms 
together to coin a new one.79 Furthermore, Wittgenstein illustrated the idea of 
language-game by using different examples (e.g. the builder and his assistant, chess in 
a board game and the case of a shopkeeper).80 Significantly, as presented in 
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Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein employed a method to illustrate the idea of 
a game and that of a language-game to make a list of the real cases. But there is no 
essence or criterion a priori for us to draw the boundary of any particular idea or 
notion: there is no fixed definition in them. This position of Wittgenstein has been 
regarded as anti-essentialism.81 
The main idea of language-game is that just as the meaning of chess is 
determined in the proceeding of a board game, the meaning of a word lies in how it is 
being used in a language. Besides, since there may be a number of concrete types of 
games that form the idea of “game,” there are a number of languages that make the 
idea of “language.” Further, as the idea of game is concretised by examples of real 
games, the idea of language also comes into flesh by means of numerating various 
languages. There should be some similarities amongst these games or languages that 
make the substantiation of the idea of game or language possible. Wittgenstein called 
the similarities “family resemblance (Familienähnlichkeit).”82 That is to say, even 
though there are plenty of languages in the world, it is their family resemblance that 
places them under the idea of “language.” The family resemblance is not something 
common to all the members of an idea but means that there is something 
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criss-crossing and overlapping with overall similarities.83 To Wittgenstein, the 
“something” here shall mean the procedures84 of conducting games or using 
languages since what he used to illustrate his idea is the way that a game (such as 
tennis) is being played.85 We understand and interpret new languages by observing 
how a word or a sentence corresponds to our mother tongue, with some common 
human behaviours.86 Wittgenstein further opined that “to imagine a language means 
to imagine a life- form”87 and that “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or 
of a life-form.”88  
    What can be derived from the discussions above is the interrelation of the notion 
of seeing-as, language-game and family resemblance. To be specific, if we understand 
the meaning of a word through our understanding of its use in a language, then a word 
may have many aspects of meanings. In some sentences it is used in one meaning 
while in another sentence it may be understood with another meaning. In 
Wittgenstein’s words, this is a sample of the phenomena of “aspect-dawning” or 
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“change of aspect.” Wittgenstein offered some examples to illustrate his idea. One of 
them is the case that the name “Schubert” in different contexts can either refer to 
Schubert’s works or to Schubert’s face.89  
Similarly, just as there could be some case of aspect-blindness in the situation of 
visual experience, there is also a certain degree of aspect-blindness which occurs in 
understanding the meaning of a word. To be specific, someone may be unable to or 
may not be equipped with the knowledge to tell different meanings of a word due to 
our lack of familiarity with the word or our lack of relevant background, simply 
recognising the word as a sound or a noise.90 Similar situations can also be found in 
different types of languages. For example, in addition to the case in Wittgenstein’s 
book, in the Japanese language, the word はし(hashi) in different contexts may mean 
different things: bridge or chopsticks. This can also be ascribed to the family of 
“aspect-dawning.” This implies that a word is animated by what it points to, that is, 
“something” in our mental process.91 Without “something” as its content, a word will 
be empty and the whole language-game would become mechanical. Human action in 
any social condition would be treated in a form of behaviourism. 
    If the foregoing understanding and interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy are appropriate, then some concerns against Hick’s hypothesis could be 
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eased. Further, there could be some elements that are heuristic for the issue of 
religious diversity.  
It has been pointed out that there might be some misunderstanding in Hick’s 
treatment of the ideas, such as that of the Karma, of other religions. From an opposite 
point of view, it has also been argued that it is impossible for the communication 
between any two concepts that come from different traditions.92 When considering 
Wittgenstein’s idea of language-game, although each religion and its plurality of 
relevant holy images functions in its own language-game, there is a family 
resemblance amongst them as the basis for their mutual-understanding. Further, 
although those religions may play their own language-game respectively in their own 
cultures, Wittgenstein’s theory suggests, “The common behaviour of mankind is the 
system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.”93 Certain 
forms of communication and mutual-understandings amongst them are possible on the 
basis of the commonality of their religious behaviours and practices. For instance, the 
idea of sacrifice was or has been a significant element of human religious behaviour. 
Its aim could be to change a person’s status in a different sphere, even though its role 
and meaning for every religious tradition is different.94 
Further, in the context of the language-game, no religion can be seen as the only 
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true religion in the world. Any truth-claim from a particular religious tradition should 
be re-examined. Some might naturally think that football is the best game in the world 
with no comparable competitors. This is also true of fans and members of other kinds 
of games. From the viewpoint and criteria of one game, it would be unreasonable to 
judge whether the performance of another game is good or bad. We can not take one 
method of scoring points in one game and apply it to the rest. All of them are variant 
concrete samples of the concept of game. All are the manifestations of the abstract 
concept of game. Further, the members of different kinds of games can learn to play 
another game by becoming acquainted with its rules, by first studying them, then by 
practicing them in a real playground. Thus a person may have the skill to play more 
than one game and the team of a particular game might be composed of members 
from different backgrounds and nationalities. 
Analogously, different religions are like different games. It is natural for the 
believers of a particular religion to claim that their religion is the most authoritative 
and supreme, existing as the truest religion of the world. There are various practices, 
rites, performance, etc. in different religious traditions. The ways that their members 
adopt to realise their ultimate concern, say, the salvation and the enlightenment, or in 
Hick’s word, the soteriological transformation, are different. Therefore, 
synchronically, it is unsound to assess the nature of one religion with the doctrines of 
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another. Just as the team members of one game may come from different backgrounds, 
believers of a religious tradition may also come from different backgrounds. 
Additionally, and more radically, as the members of a game may learn the skills of 
different particular games, it could be acceptable for the believers of a particular 
religion to have another faith at the same time, as long as it is helpful for the 
realisation of their ultimate concern. Moreover, Wittgenstein has pointed out that, in 
the notion of language-game, there are a countless number of games. New games will 
come into existence and others may become obsolete and become forgotten.95 This 
too is the situation of different religions. Consequently, and diachronically, there 
could only be the degrees of the maturity and the extent of complicity among the 
ideas, doctrines, organisations, institutions and so on of ancient and modern religions. 
They all embody the idea of religion or the religious/spiritual dimension of human 
beings at the different stages of human history. Using Wittgenstein’s imagery of 
“family resemblance, Hick, in his masterpiece An Interpretation of Religion, argues 
that there exists such a similarity amongst various religions. 
    Hick is right when he uses the notion of Religion with the background of the idea 
of family resemblance to cover a range of religious phenomena. However, it seems 
that he neglects the connotation of the concept of family resemblance, that is, the 
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anti-essentialism. This neglect is reflected in Hick’s suggestion that the soteriological 
transformation is the criterion of the authenticity of all world religions. As exhibited 
above, this suggestion has contradicted Hick’s original intention of pluralism. 
From the anti-essentialist point of view, there is no precise definition of religion. 
There are no fixed elements that constitute the notion of Religion. It is the real 
samples of religion that manifest the meaning of religion. Religion A may have 
something, say, concept or the way of its practice, similar to religion B while religion 
B may have another aspect that overlaps Religion C. Through the observation on each 
religion, one can grasp the idea of religion. This is quite different from using a fixed 
definition of religion in a particular religious or theological perspective as a criterion 
to examine the value of other world religions. This is an alternative for Hick to 
develop his religious pluralism since all religions could be treated differently as well 
as equally under the umbrella of family resemblance. There will be a more realistic 
discourse for the explanation of the phenomenon of the diversity of religions. Besides, 
the content of the notion of religion could be richer and more inclusive in the light of 
this approach.  
Additionally, when it is reconsidered in light of the main idea of Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy, the danger of homogenisation and distortion in understanding and 
interpreting different religions in Hick’s theory might also be avoided. All religions 
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can not be evaluated by a single criterion to be “true” religions. There is no need to 
take the idea of the Trinity in Christianity and that of the trikāya in Buddhism as the 
similar ideas being developed in different religions. It is their function in their 
religious and theological context that matters. Actually, this is also what Hick has 
mentioned in his works, as seen in chapter 15 of An Interpretation of Religion.96 The 
function of a word in a language-game is also what Wittgenstein stressed. Once the 
tendency of homogenisation is being eluded, the risk of the distortion of other 
religions might also be avoided since it is not the meaning of the holy ideas but their 
functions in their religious traditions that should be attended to. 
Hick’s assumption implies that there is still something essential and particular 
characteristics can be used to evaluate different religions. This approach may work 
well when it is being adopted to discuss dualistic religions, such as the discontinuity 
between the Real and human beings in Christianity, but it may fail to explain the 
monistic religions which may stress the continuity between the Real and human 
beings. Pantheism could also be discussed in the light of language-game since it can 
be seen as a form of religious language-game. Moreover atheism, in the context of 
language-game, can be explained as well by the idea of aspect-blindness. According 
to Wittgenstein (see §§4.1.2 & 4.2.5, for the details), the situation of aspect-blindness 
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is the lack of the capacity to see something as something. People who are aspect-blind 
are supposed not to see the change of aspects of any puzzle-picture. S/he may only see 
the colour and shape of the picture.97 Analogously, in Hick’s words, s/he who might 
fail to experience the ambiguous universe as being religious and can also be 
considered aspect-blindness in the religious dimension. Briefly speaking, although all 
human beings are presumably born with the spiritual aspect or intellectual intuition, 
not all of them can properly understand the implication of religious ideas and relevant 
concepts and exercise them in their life. Some might even dismiss these notions. In 
this regard, those who do not or can not use the religious language could also be taken 
as people who do not get themselves involved in the religious affairs and religious 
communities. Meanwhile, this implication might also echo the so-called post-modern 
society in which religion is merely treated as one of the communities as options for 
people to choose from and then commit to. 
 
4.3.3 Towards A Refined Model? 
    Although it is Wittgenstein’s idea of “we see it as we interpret it” that makes 
Hick depart himself from Kant’s epistemological position, it is also Hick’s own 
incomplete appropriation of Kant’s idea that makes his theory slide between Kant and 
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Wittgenstein and miss the opportunity to propose a more sound system of explaining 
the plurality of religions. One of the reasons for Hick to appeal to Kant’s distinction 
between noumenon and phenomenon might be that he wants to ensure that the 
Transcendent Real is not an empty blank, an illusion or a projection from the human 
mind. However, this theoretical framework and the relevant theory of knowledge 
weaken the effects of Hick’s theory when describing and explaining the diversity of 
religions. Hick’s theory might work as a procrustean bed. All religions are placed on it 
to be “re-shaped” or refracted and to be performed and understood in accordance with 
some specifications, such as the two-level picture as the common structure among the 
great world religions. Therefore, Hick’s model is not a thorough religious pluralism. 
To become a complete religious pluralism, the key notions of Wittgenstein later 
philosophy would be a treasure stored in Hick’s theory. 
 Further, it might be that, for Hick, the purpose of his employment of various 
theoretical resources is merely to help him express what he intends to discuss. 
Interestingly, as it has been presented above, various philosophical elements can 
actually be reduced or grouped to be either Kantian or Wittgensteinian. Hick’s loose 
appropriation of these theories creates his own model and also invites the relevant 
criticisms and attacks. As it has shown in previous and present chapters, to use some 
theoretical resources of both two theories more thoroughly may be helpful in 
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reconsidering those criticisms. Then what if these elements are integrated 
appropriately within the framework of Hick’s hypothesis after some clarifications are 
made, can its refined model be more feasible? The work that will be conducted in the 
next chapter is a tentative answer to this question. 
 
Summary 
    This chapter has tried to present that the pluralistic position of Hick’s hypothesis 
as illuminated in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. With a brief survey on the root and 
the development of Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as and the context where it is used,  
it has indicated that Hick’s proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as is 
merely an equivalent to Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as. “Seeing” is not 
“seeing-as” which includes our interpretation, but an immediate experience. At this 
point, Hick’s idea of the particular capacity to experience the Transcendent might also 
be taken as this kind of experience. When this experience is expressed or articulated 
with various linguistic systems, it leads to the phenomenon of “experiencing-as.” 
Kant and Wittgenstein thus meet: with the interpretation of the particular capacity of 
human nature in light of the notion of the intellectual intuition, the thesis of all 
experiencing is experiencing-as can be reinterpreted as all religious experiencing is 
the product of the combination of immediate experience of the Real an sich and the 
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employment of human religious concepts and terms in this ambiguous universe. If it is 
so, parallel the triad of the seeing-as, language-game and family resemblance of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, then various religions can be understood as various 
forms of the religious language-game with some family resemblance among them.  
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CHAPTER 5 
UNSOLVED QUESTIONS 
    This chapter attempts to see how the difficulties within Hick’s theory could be 
solved with ideas from Kant and Wittgenstein. It will moreover identify the remaining 
concerns that exist within Hick’s hypothesis. In this attempt, (1) the Real an sich is 
suggested to be understood as the ambiguous universe in which humans are dwelling; 
(2) the two categories of the personal God and the non-personal Absolute are 
suggested to be understood as two transcendental ideas; (3) the faculty for human 
beings to perceive the Real an sich with its greatest freedom is suggested to be 
understood in light of Kant’s intellectual intuition. It thus can be said that human 
beings can comprehend the religious implication of the ambiguous universe first with 
the transcendental ideas (i.e. the personal God and the non-personal Absolute) and 
later with the various linguistic and cultural systems of different traditions that 
characterise this experience. Hick’s criteriological aspect reveals that the purpose of 
the soteriological transformation is one of religious doctrines developed to respond to 
the human search for the meaning of life. All these reflections will call for a refined 
model in considering the phenomenon of the diversity of religions and the issue of 
religious pluralism. 
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5.0 Prolegomena 
In the preceding chapters, this research has revisited Hick’s religious pluralistic 
hypothesis and its relevant criticisms. It has shown the reasons for Hick’s vacillation 
between Wittgenstein and Kant. It also unpacked the theoretical resources that might 
help in answering his critics and in improving his theory.  
Chapter 2 launched a critical review of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. It 
demonstrated the metaphysical, epistemological and criteriological dimensions of 
Hick’s hypothesis. In the metaphysical aspect, it exhibited that the Real an sich and 
the ambiguous universe are two entities and Hick’s discussion implies that the former 
creates the latter (§2.1.3.2; see also §1.1.1). Epistemologically, it has discussed the 
proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as and its application to the 
explanation of religious diversity. It has indicated that, when considering Hick’s 
theory of knowledge, the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe should be the one 
and the same entity. Thus, there is a tension between Hick’s metaphysics and 
epistemology. Concerning the criteriological aspect (§2.1.3), it was demonstrated that 
Hick’s soteriological transformation is a variant from Kant’s categorical imperative 
(§2.1.3.1). Although this idea can be seen expressed widely in world religions, it does 
not follow that the practices of all religious persons should eventually converge at the 
end of their journeys of faiths. Consequently, it might not be used as the criterion for 
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the judgement of the authenticity of religions. Otherwise, it may contradict Hick’s 
pluralistic position. It has also suggested that the more basic reason for setting this 
doctrine could be that human beings’ search for the meaning of life in this ambiguous 
universe (§§2.1.3.2- 2.1.3.3). Meanwhile, it has indicated some further questions that 
might be answered with the modification of Hick’s framework by means of the 
theoretical resources of Kantian and Wittgensteinian parts of Hick’s hypothesis 
(§§2.2.2-2.2.3). 
Reconsidering the perspective of Kantian noumenon/phenomenon distinction, it 
was indicated in chapter 3 that the Real an sich in Hick’s theory can be interpreted as 
the ambiguous universe. It still works as the noumenal ground of its manifestations 
and epistemologically its ambiguity shows that it transcends and is beyond human 
understanding. In this regard, the potential tension between metaphysic dualism and 
epistemological monism within Hick’s hypothesis could be eased. Chapter 3 has also 
suggested that the greatest freedom of human consciousness can be understood in 
light of the notion of intellectual intuition and that the two basic categories of the 
Deity and Absolute can be reinterpreted in the sense of Kantian transcendental idea. 
Basically, the task of this part is to cope with the initial stage of the formation of 
religious experience in the activity of human cognition.  
In chapter 4, it mainly examined Hick’s expanding of Wittgenstein’s idea of 
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seeing-as. Generally speaking, it was demonstrated that Hick’s proposition of all 
experiencing is experiencing-as is merely equal to Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as. 
The experience of seeing, when it is referred to in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, is an 
immediate experience. At this point, the idea of “spiritual aspect” in Hick’s 
philosophy can be considered the sense of immediate experience. Such experience is 
later expressed differently via variant human conceptual systems. Following Hick’s 
argument, it can be articulated as the immediate experience of the Real an sich as 
conceptualised in various holy images through different religious concepts. It was also 
argued that by connecting the proposition of all experiencing is experiencing as back 
to the ideas of language-game and family resemblance of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy would be helpful in developing further the discourse of religious 
pluralism. 
As presented previously, it seems that exploring the ideas of Kant and 
Wittgenstein within Hick’s hypothesis further might help to appease certain 
difficulties encountered. Moreover, based on the above investigation, an alternative 
model of Hick’s hypothesis can be proposed to meet certain criticisms discussed in 
previous chapters. Then, in what sense and to what extent can this refined model serve 
as an alternative for Hickian pluralism?  
    In order to consider this question, in this chapter, an overall review that is based 
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on the foregoing understanding and interpretation of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis will 
first be conducted (§5.1). Then, this chapter will reiterate certain difficulties in Hick’s 
theory that have been discussed in earlier parts of this research. Based on this 
reflection, the beginnings of a refined model will be presented (§5.2). Further, since 
Hick’s hypothesis is developed on his understanding of the religious traditions from 
the Indo-European language group, traditions from without this group will be 
introduced to reconsider the universality of his theory (§5.3).   
  
5.1 The Main Idea of Hick’s Hypothesis 
Hick’s hypothesis is formed through three parts. Metaphysically, it postulates the 
Real an sich and suggests that the universe human beings dwell in is ambiguous. 
Epistemologically, it argues that all human experiencing is experiencing-as for 
accounting for the religious plurality. As for the appraisal of the authenticity of 
religion, it suggests the soteriological transformation from self-centredness to 
Real-centredness as the criterion.  
 
5.1.1 Metaphysical Aspect 
The transcendental Real and the ambiguous universe are the two entities in 
Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. The transcendental Real is the Real an sich and the 
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images of God, Allah and so on that are worshipped by human beings from different 
religious traditions in the ambiguous universe should be understood as various 
manifestations of the Real an sich or the Real as perceived. The Real an sich is the 
focus and centre for human beings to respond to while the ambiguous universe is the 
field for them to practice their various responses.  
In Hick’s system, the Real an sich is ineffable or transcategorial1 or 
“suprasensory.”2 Since the Real an sich is transcategorial, all human language for 
comprehending it and for describing the communication between it and the human 
mind should be understood in terms of metaphor.3 That is to say, any holy images 
such as God and Dao that can be grasped and presented by human language are not 
the Real an sich but the Real as humanly perceived. It is at this point that Hick 
contends that he is analogously applying Kant’s phenomenon/noumenon distinction to 
elucidate his own dual concept of the Real. Broadly speaking, the Real an sich 
corresponds to the idea of the noumenon while the Real is humanly perceived as the 
phenomenon. Just as the noumenon in Kant’s epistemology is the ground of the 
phenomenon, the Real an sich is the “noumenal ground” of the Real being humanly 
perceived.4 Further, it is the transcendental Real that “sets” the ambiguity of the 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, An Interpretation of Religion, xx-xi.  
2
 John Hick, Between Faith and Doubt: Dialogues on Religion and Reason (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 5. 
3
 An Interpretation of Religion, p. xxix.; Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 72. 
4
 Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 67. 
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universe and thus simultaneously makes the epistemic distance or “spiritual distance” 
for human beings inhabiting in the ambiguous universe to respond to it either 
religiously or naturalistically – so that both options are objectively possible and both 
alike incur the risk of being profoundly mistaken.5 Moreover, as everyone grows up 
and has been educated in different cultural backgrounds, it is reasonable that they may 
have variant experiences of the same environment. Put it another way, the same 
environment may have various significances for them in terms of the concepts and 
ideas of their traditions.  
    Hick recapitulates and clarifies his ideas by responding to the challenges 
thematically in the Introduction of the second edition of An Interpretation of Religion.  
This can be taken as a summary of his dialogue with his rivals in the first part of his 
Dialogue in the Philosophy of Religion.  
    Concerning the issue of the dual concept of the Real, Hick responds to his critics 
by arguing again that the Real an sich is the necessary postulate for the global 
religious life of humanity if human religious experience is not purely an imaginative 
projection.6 For Hick, there is only one ultimate reality. It is because it is a most 
natural, economical hypothesis and a best explanation.7 However, although the Real 
an sich is something single, it is transcategorial and ineffable. Any properties that are 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 82. 
6
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, xxxii-xxxiii. 
7
 Ibid., xxvi- xxvii. 
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attributed to it should be taken as being purely formal ones and should be religiously 
relevant.8 What follows from this is that the Real an sich can not be speculatively 
inferred from any notions or propositions but can be experienced by human beings as 
a loving God – being loving in the religious perceiver’s perspective.9 Besides, since 
the Real an sich is being experienced by human beings as variant images, the 
distinctions such as being personal or non-personal is trivial truth,10 and the 
manifestations of the Real an sich in different religious traditions can not be 
understood as a form of polytheism but just the poly aspect of it.11  
 
5.1.2 Epistemological Aspect 
Hick characterises his epistemology of religion as critical realism. Meanwhile, 
Hick justifies the rationality of religious experience by exploring Wittgenstein’s idea 
of seeing-as into the proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as and then 
applies this proposition into explaining religious plurality.  
In Hick’s epistemology, there are at least three levels of significance produced in 
the process of human experience: physical/natural, moral/ethical and religious. 
Physical and natural significance for people basically means it can evoke human 
beings to respond appropriately to the natural world, i.e., the situation, to survive or to 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., xix-xxii. 
9
 Ibid., xxii-xxvi. 
10
 Ibid., xxix-xxx; pp. xxxiii- xxxvi. 
11
 Ibid., xxvii-xxviii. 
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avoid the mortal danger.12 Moral and ethical significance refers to a person’s 
experience to exercise the concept of person.13 This is the foundation of human 
society and community. Religious significance denotes that to exercise the religious 
concepts is to experience the world as the field of the presence of the Transcendent.14 
Hick argues that “These are successively higher-level recognitions in the sense that 
each later member of the list presupposes and goes beyond the previous one.”15 
The way that Hick tries to justify the similarity between ordinary and religious 
experiences is to demonstrate the common structure among them. For Hick, the 
commonality is the action of interpreting human consciousness. Hick, by using the 
example of some natural phenomena, such as the way of experiencing water as a 
cloud of electrons in rapid swirling motion or as the continuous shiny substances,16 
argues that, even at the level of our daily sense perception we are always engaging in 
interpreting the information we are receiving. In this manner, horizontally, it is 
reasonable for people to contend that they are experiencing the same and the identical 
environment differently since they are always interpreting it in accordance with their 
own conceptual systems. Vertically, it is also reasonable for people to argue that they 
are experiencing the same and identical environment physically, morally and 
                                                 
12
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 139. 
13
 An Interpretation of Religion, 147-148. 
14
 Ibid.,chapter 10. 
15
 Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, rev. ed. (London: Collins Fount Paperbacks, 1977), 45. 
16
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 135. 
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religiously. Hick, by enlarging Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as, coins the term 
experiencing-as and claims that all experiencing is experiencing-as to conceptualise 
his theory of knowledge.  
According to Hick’s analysis, religious experience is formed with two kinds of 
Kantian “categories.” In order to stress the influence of the cultural elements in the 
process of perceiving the Real an sich, Hick contends that there are culturally-relative 
and traditionally-coloured categories that have been contained within human 
experience. Hick names them the “mode of the knower.” Furthermore, Hick proposes 
that there are two basic categories, the personal God and the non-personal Absolute, 
that are universal among human traditions and contends that in the process of the 
formation of religious experience human beings’ mind will impose these two basic 
categories on it.17  
With the combination of the basic categories, the God and the Absoluteness, and 
the culturally-relative ones, human beings in different traditions respond to the Real 
an sich variously and thus produce different holy images of it. In other words, the 
great world religions are made or “cumulated”18 in the process of their respective 
responses to the Real an sich. 
    Then, the implication of the proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as is 
                                                 
17
 A Christian Theology of Religions, 29.  
18
 This is Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s idea, cited by Hick in his publications, such as Between Faith and 
Doubt, 122.  
                                    
208 
 
that all religions in this universe are the fruits of various human responses with their 
cultural and linguistic systems to the Transcendent Real. Thus, for example, 
Christians experience the Transcendental Real as the God while the adherents of 
Daoism might experience It as the Dao. Neither of them can argue that their holy 
image is the only true picture of the Real an sich and thus argues that the relevant 
teachings and doctrines are the only truth claim. The Real an sich is one but the sages 
name it variously.  
Hick’s proposition of all experiencing is experiencing-as distinguishes the 
religious experience from other experiences since we human beings can experience 
the environment as being of this or of that significance. In Hick’s own words, we can 
experience the ambiguous universe either in a religious way or in a naturalistic 
approach. The idea can also be applied into the explanation the diversity of religions 
since their differences are based on the primordial experience of their founders with 
exercise of their own cultural and linguistic systems. The difference between these 
religions is the result that their followers or believers use different sets of religious 
concepts to “grasp” the Divine. We think and behave, in terms of the system of 
concepts or language, which is carried from one generation to generation. There is 
consequently a relativity of language or system of concepts. Hick points out that 
actually this idea can be elucidated in light of the notion of language-game of 
                                    
209 
 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.19 Hick also suggests that the notion of Religion can 
be understood in the context of the idea of family resemblance.20 
Then, how is it possible for human beings to grasp the Real an sich and even to 
learn its existence? In the Introduction to the second edition of An Interpretation of 
Religion, Hick restates that although human beings can not experience the Real an 
sich directly, its presence is mediated in human beings’ limited conceptual and 
linguistic systems.21 In addition, the way that the Real an sich can act up lies in that 
there is a “spiritual” aspect of human nature – the imago dei, as the capacity to receive 
divine revelation. Hick even argues that it is this aspect that his adapted use of Kant’s 
noumenal and phenomenal distinction can avoid the problem of the noumenal 
causality.22 Further, the soteriological transformation that is taking place worldwide 
in the great religious traditions can serve as the evidence for the influence of the Real 
an sich. From this point of view, it again justifies the thesis that all the world religions 
are the products of their own continuous responses to the Real an sich and none of 
them is morally and spiritually superior to the rest of the human race. All human 
beings, both male and female, are in the process of this transformation.23 As a 
consequence, this transformation can be taken as the criterion for assessing religion.24 
                                                 
19
 Problems of Religious Pluralism, 26. 
20
 An Interpretation of Religion, 3-4. 
21
 Ibid., xxii. 
22
 Ibid., xxviii-xxix. 
23
 Ibid., xxxviii-xxxix. 
24
 Ibid., xxvi. 
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5.1.3 Criteriological Aspect 
The criteriological aspect of Hick’s hypothesis is the soteriological 
transformation. Generally speaking, it is a transformation of human existence from 
self-centredness to Real-centredness. According to Hick, this transformation comes 
from a very basic ethical requirement, the Golden Rule, which can be found in the 
world religions. Therefore, it can serve as the criterion for the assessment of the 
authenticity of religions and religious activities. Meanwhile, this transformation is an 
evidence of the “impact” of the Real an sich on human beings,25 viz., it is an 
evidence for the existence of the Real an sich. 
Hick points out that there is a striking similarity of this phenomenon within all 
the world religions. For example, in the Buddhist tradition it can be referred to as 
“enlightenment”; in Hinduism, it manifests as “liberation”; in Islam it is the total 
surrender of the self to the God.26 The concrete example or the evidence of such 
transformation can be found in the life of the saints in different traditions. Those 
saints have embodied or are embodying the transformation in diverse ways. They all 
exhibit some qualities such as charity and purity. Some may achieve the 
transformation through individual meditation while others may return themselves to 
                                                 
25
 See, for example, Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, chapter 17, or A Christian Theology of 
Religions, 69. 
26
 For the details, see Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, chapter 3. 
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the harmony with the Real an sich by political practice.27 
As those saints who were/are aware of the Real an sich in different traditions 
experience(d) the transformation of their life from the ego-centredness to the 
Real-centredness, this change has been taken by Hick as the criterion and significant 
characteristic of so-called true religion. Namely, it is person-making rather than 
person-destroying28 that makes a religion a true religion. However, because it may 
not be possible for everyone to complete this transformation, or precisely in his or her 
present life, for Hick, it is reasonable to assume life after death and the possibility of 
rebirth or reincarnation in another stage of a series of human life. 
What can be inferred from the above is that theoretically, Hick appears to justify 
indirectly the existence of the Real an sich. Practically and empirically, Hick 
substantiates it via rare but concrete instances of the change of the life of saints and 
sages in the past and present of human history. Once the credibility of the Real an sich 
is affirmed, Hick thinks that his interpretation of religion becomes “religious.” This is 
what Hick has been concerned about and what he has done to differentiate himself 
from other explanations of religion, both psychologically and sociologically. This also 
reflects the position of Hick that religious belief should rely on the religious 
experience but not any philosophical arguments or propositional doctrines.29 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., 303 & 307. 
28
 Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, chapter 13. 
29
 This is the approach that Hick has adopted from his first publication, Faith and Knowledge, to the 
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As for those people who adhere to no religious tradition, in Hick’s model, they 
are still responding to the Real an sich without using any religious concepts. They 
may still commit themselves to seek justice, create peace and so on.30 In order to 
justify that his enterprise is not just a post-Enlightenment Western imposition, Hick 
has also quoted some paragraphs that have their own implication for religious 
pluralism to support his idea. For example, Hick mentions a pluralistic teaching of 
Rumi, a Muslim Sufi, which reads, “The lamps are different, but the Light is the same: 
it comes from Beyond.” Hick thus maintains that his hypothesis is a comprehensive 
model.31  
Hick’s hypothesis is still instructive in that it has suggested a platform for 
considering the diversity of religions by mainly using the dual concept of the Real, the 
thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as and the criterion of soteriological 
transformation. Hick’s thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as gives a reasonable 
explanation of the diversity of religions. The Real an sich is postulated as the centre to 
which human beings respond. This strategy can avoid the accusation of the pluralism 
sliding into relativism and the Real an sich can serve as a potential common element 
for the communication and mutual understanding among all religions. Again, the 
soteriological criterion can work as the last line of defence of a genuine religion. The 
                                                                                                                                            
newly issued one, Between Faith and Doubt. 
30
 Ibid., xli. 
31
 Ibid., xxxix-xli. 
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duality of one and many in this set could be powerful in investigating particular 
religious traditions. However, there are still certain difficulties of Hick’s hypothesis. 
Besides, it seems that if the tone it plays wants to be more euphonious, then some 
elements of the set may need modification. 
 
5.2 Difficulties Unsolved 
5.2.1 Problems with Metaphysical Aspect 
Recall the analysis that has been done earlier, it can be said that Hick tries to 
justify indirectly the reality of the postulate of the Real an sich in two ways. 
Epistemologically, Hick suggests the idea of all experiencing is experiencing-as and 
argues for its rationality. The argument is established by demonstrating the common 
feature of all human experiences, that is, the interpreting machinery of the human 
mind. Despite the fact that all our experiencing is experiencing-as, at the 
physical/natural level, our experience of the surroundings is of most certainty. With 
the same epistemological structure, at the religious level, with the greatest freedom of 
human cognition, it is reasonable to trust that our religious experience is true. 
Conversely, if religious experience is a delusion, then it is possible that even our 
sensory experience is also a delusion. Further, Hick also argues that there is a spiritual 
aspect within human nature to experience the Real an sich. This capacity can eschew 
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the question of noumenal causality. It is the key for the authentic communication 
between the Real an sich and human beings. This communication might lead to a long 
soteriological transformation of one’s personality and life, which happens among the 
religious traditions. One may also have some peak experiences such as being in a state 
of ecstasy, however they may be evoked by some temporary measures such as a 
dosage of drug and hypnotism. Nonetheless, normally these may not motivate people 
to try to transform their life and personality move towards a better state or change 
their outlook on world. Therefore, if these can be taken as an evidence for the 
certainty of religious experience, then what stimulates this experience should be 
something that really exists there.  
Then, what does the “something” refer to? As indicated before, in Hick’s 
metaphysical system, there are two entities, the Real an sich and the ambiguous 
universe. It seems that whether the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe is one 
and identical or not is the question that Hick never makes clear. Rather, he simply 
claims that what he means by transcendent is “beyond all human concepts.”  In this 
regard, both the ambiguity of the ambiguous universe and the “trans-categoriality” of 
the Real an sich are “beyond all human concepts.” It is clear that, in Hick’s system, 
“beyond all human concepts” is used to characterise the Real an sich. But what is the 
place and the significance of the ambiguous universe? Meanwhile, from the 
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perspective of Hick’s epistemology, there should be only one entity. Thus, as 
suggested previously, if the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe can be taken as 
one and identical, then this potential tension can be mollified. In this manner, the Real 
an sich as the ambiguous universe can be experienced by human beings physically, 
morally or religiously. It is still rational to argue that we human beings experience the 
Real an sich, the ambiguous universe, as God, Allah, Dao or Brahman according to 
our cultural backgrounds. There is doubt in the implicitly inclusivist or even 
exclusivist position of Hick hypothesis. This results from his claim that non-religious 
persons can respond to the same Real an sich without using any religious concepts. 
However, since the Real an sich is the ambiguous universe, this concern may be 
dispelled. 
 
5.2.2 Questions about Epistemological Aspect 
As analysed in chapters 3 and 4, Hick’s position of epistemology of religion 
swings between the philosophies of Kant and Wittgenstein. This is reflected in Hick’s 
argument of the role of “categories” when he explains the formation of religious 
experience and the phenomenon of religious diversity. There are two types of 
categories. The first is Kantian and identifies two basic categories, namely the 
personal Deity and the non-personal Absolute. The other is connected to 
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Wittgenstein’s language-game and is a set of religious categories that change and vary 
from time to time and are different from one tradition to another. 
    Regarding the first set of the categories, it has been suggested that they can be 
understood in light of Kant’s transcendental idea, the concept a priori of human 
reason. In this case, they are supposed to be universal. These two transcendental ideas 
are schematised with various religious concepts into either the images of God, Allah 
or that of Dao and Nirvana. As for the second set, they are still the concepts in the 
context of cultural and linguistic systems and are a posteriori learnt by human beings. 
The culturally-coloured concepts and terms are what Hick terms as being relative and 
variant. In this manner, the question of Hick’s analogy of Kant’s categories can be 
avoided. 
    In regard to the possibility of the communication between the Real an sich and 
human beings, it lies in the spiritual aspect, the special capacity, of human cognition 
or a faculty as Kantian “intellectual intuition.” The spiritual aspect within human 
nature that allows the greatest freedom of human cognition to comprehend it might be 
regarded as the principal element for human religious activities. Once the Real an sich, 
which is suggested to be identified with the ambiguous universe and is intuited 
intellectually with either of the two transcendental ideas of human reason, the 
personal God and the non-personal Absolute, it can be first experienced as God or as 
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Dao. Further, following Hick, there is still a wide range of cultural-relative categories 
within human understanding. These are the elements that make human beings’ 
experience the Real an sich as the ambiguous universe differently. And it is at this 
point that Hick’s thesis of “all experiencing is experiencing-as” could work less 
controversially. Further, along with the reinterpretation of the spiritual aspect within 
human nature, this thesis can be understood and connected more closely to 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language-game and family resemblance.   
    In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the idea of seeing seems to be different from 
that of seeing-as. Seeing is an immediate experience while the experience of seeing-as 
is the result of employing certain concepts or ideas from a linguistic system or cultural 
background. These linguistic or cultural frameworks can be understood as various 
forms of language-game with some “family resemblance” among them. By the same 
token, the particular capacity with human nature can be understood as an immediate 
experience while experiencing-as at the religious level is the outcome of applying 
various religious concepts from different religious traditions. These traditions can be 
understood as religious language-game where there is also some “family 
resemblance” among them. Some of them may share some overlapping features while 
others have similarities with each other. All of them are embodying the ideal of 
Religion but none of them should be taken as the one and only criterion for the 
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assessment of the others. Moreover, since the particular capacity as intellectual 
intuition is an immediate experience, unlike the non-realistic approach of religious 
pluralism, the religious language-game will not only be games of language and empty 
concepts but they are the tools by which such experience can be conceptualised and 
expressed. On the other side, since it can be expressed publicly and be understood by 
certain groups of people, this immediate experience can not be seen as merely 
subjective projection from human consciousness. The reality of such immediate 
experience and its strength is left to be scientifically tested via inter-disciplinary 
studies.   
    This Wittgensteinian framework of understanding religion might also suggest an 
approach in accounting for the atheists. In his investigation on the notion of seeing-as, 
Wittgenstein mentioned the cases of aspect-blindness, which denotes that some people 
lack the capacity to have the experience of aspect-seeing. Analogously, there can also 
be some cases of aspect-blindness of Hick’s theory of “all experiencing is 
experiencing-as.” Those who do not experience the ambiguous universe morally and 
religiously can be seen as morally and religiously aspect-blind. This idea might 
account for the existence of those non-religious groups in the same cultural 
background. For although human beings have the spiritual aspect for knowing the 
Real an sich, it does not follow that each one can always experience the Real an sich 
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or know that what s/he has experienced is the Real an sich. The knowledge of the 
Real an sich has been recorded and cumulated within different cultural traditions and 
thus makes the different images of the Real an sich. Those who claim that s/he is an 
atheist can be understood in this context that since s/he has not yet become familiar 
with the religious language, even though s/he might have experienced the presence of 
the Real an sich, s/he is still religiously aspect-blind.  
    Based on the above analyses, the challenge towards the quantity of the 
Transcendental Real might be met. Within Hick’s model, seeing that the Real an sich 
is ineffable or transcategorial, it is impossible to refer to the Real an sich directly or 
literally as to be one or many, person or thing, conscious or unconscious, purposive or 
non-purposive, substance or process, good or evil, loving or hating.32 If the Real an 
sich is taken as the ambiguous universe, then what can be certain is that the 
Transcendental Real is one but the ways to express and conceptualise it are various. 
This approach can be taken as an alternative response to the question of polytheism of 
the Real,33 of the Real and Unreal (e.g. George I. Mavrodes)34 and of “several 
‘ultimates’” (e.g. John Cobb, Jr,).35 The term “poly” and the usage of the “Real” and 
the “Unreal” can be seen as the products of the combination of the exercise of the 
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 An Interpretation of Religion, 350. 
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 Ibid., xxvii. 
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 Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 74. 
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 For the idea of “many ‘ultimate,’’ this research temporarily relies on Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s 
introduction. See Schmidt-Leukel, “Pluralisms,” in Christian Approaches to Other Faiths, eds. Alan 
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intellectual intuition with the transcendental ideas and various religious notions, or in 
Hick’s own words, are upaya, “skilful means” to be applied to characterise the 
“ultimate Reality.” (This term is also another “upaya.”) Any of them should be taken 
as indicating a “Penultimate” as one of the manifestations of the Real an sich as 
ambiguous universe.  
 
5.2.3 Predicament of Criteriological Aspect 
    From Hick’s perspective, the Real an sich is the common object of various 
human responses and there is a striking familiarity of the phenomenon of 
soteriological transformation within world religion. This preconception is reflected in 
many places of Hick’s hypothesis. Diachronically, Hick proposes a unilinear thinking 
of the development of religion from the pre-axial through the axial to post-axial 
ages.36 Synchronically, Hick argues that the betterment of human life in an endless 
process of lives and a form of soteriological character is the criterion and the ultimate 
target of any true religion.37 Both reflect the Post-Enlightenment western imposition 
of Hick’s hypothesis. 
    In the first place, concerning the transition of religions from the pre-axial, 
through the axial, and post-axial age, basically, it can be taken as a long process of the 
                                                 
36
 See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, chap. 2. 
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growth of the awareness of the idea of salvation or of soteriology. Briefly speaking, 
the main characteristic of pre-axial religions is the concern about keeping fragile 
human life from disorder and chaos. The hope for a radically new, different and better 
status can not be found in those religions. When it moved on to the axial period, 
approximately from 800 BCE- 200BCE, things changed. There were significant 
figures appearing in different traditions – Confucius (孔子 Kongzi), Gautama the 
Buddha, Mahavira the founder of Jainism and Zoroaster in Persia. Meanwhile, all the 
major religious approaches to conceiving the ultimate were identified and established. 
The concern of the axial religions focus more on the individual’s understanding as 
being capable of salvation and thus being in a better status, rather than on the stability 
of a society or of an organisation. The soteriological structure is therefore a mark of 
axial religions. Hick thus opined that this soteriological pattern become the main 
concern among the religions that are in what he calls post-axial age. This concern can 
also be found in the Indian religions of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, in the 
Semitic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and even Marxism. Further, in 
one way or another, the possibility of the transformation of the individuals of all these 
religions lies in the Real.38 This is a position that is very similar to those that had 
been held by some positivists such as Auguste Comte’s (1798-1857) idea of social 
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revolution from the theological through the metaphysical to a positive stage.39 And 
basically, this perspective implies that there is a trend in the development of human 
history from an enchanted dark, irrational and chaotic status towards a stage of 
disenchantment, of light, of reason and of order. The histories of all human beings 
from different traditions will eventually converge towards the same end. This is the 
spirit of western Enlightenment since eighteenth century. In this regard, Hick’s 
argument of the universality of the soteriological pattern is still within an aura of 
Enlightenment.40  
    This factor might further lead Hick’s position to a “superficial pluralism,”41 not 
a genuine pluralism seeing that it maintains that the end of all religious traditions is 
the one and same and there is only one way to this end. The Real an sich is the centre 
for varied religious groups, the ways they respond to the Real an sich at the initial 
stage or primitive era might be highly relevant to their living situation so that they 
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 The reflection here on Hick’s enterprise was inspired by LIU Xiaofeng’s 劉小楓 discussion on 
Karl Jaspers notion of the axial age. See Liu, Discipuli Confucii et eorum civitas (儒教與民族國家, 
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41
 Mark Heim argues that those who claim to be a meta-theory as pluralism of religion is real but 
superficial since they assume a same religious end. According Heim, Hick is one of the representatives 
of this camp. See the Introduction and chapter 1 of Mark Heim’s Salvations: Truth and Difference in 
Religion (New York: Orbis Books, 1995), for the details. Similar idea can be seen in Paul Knitter’s 
criticism of Arnold Toynbee, W. C. Smith and Fritjof Schuon, whose pluralist projects implies that 
there is some essence common to all religions. In Knitter’s view, this is not a truly pluralism. See Paul 
F. Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions (New 
York: Orbis Books, 1985), chapter 3. David Griffin, when discussing the development and the typology 
of religious pluralism, gives a brief review of this idea and compare it to Cobb’s model. See Griffin’s 
“Religious Pluralism: Generic, Identist, Deep,” in Deep Religious Pluralism, ed. David Griffin 
(Lousiville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 3-38.  
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find out their ways of living, or their attitudes that are most appropriate toward their 
surroundings. However, their surroundings differ from one to another, therefore the 
concern or the end of the response, whether on great or small scales, might vary from 
tradition to tradition.42 Due to the different historical and geographical backgrounds, 
the way of actualising the concern of Buddhism is different from that of Christianity 
and thus the criterion to consider their achievement should be different. In this regard, 
the setting of soteriological transformation might only be considered one of the 
approaches to offer the explanation of those questions. Taking it as the criteriology of 
true religion might contradict Hick’s pluralistic position.  
    Further, based on the same preconception, it is natural for Hick to think that there 
are many variations of pluralist position and to argue with this seemingly universal 
phenomenon that his model is therefore comprehensive, rather than a product with 
post-Enlightenment imposition. However, a close examination will show that their 
implications and the relevant cultural and philosophical backgrounds might be 
different. Still, the idea of religious pluralism as a theory or a theoretical framework 
might be an invention from the West and the Christian world since it is their encounter 
                                                 
42
 Similar idea has been made by some scholars of religious studies. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, for 
example ever reminded us that there are two things needed to be considered when doing comparative 
study of religious history of human beings. One of them is the recognition that various religious 
traditions are different both in details and their basic orientation. Each is unique. To imagine that all the 
traditions are of a given form and are varieties on a single theme is an illusion. They are asking 
different questions and thus they are suggesting different answers. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The 
Meaning and End of Religion: A Revolutionary Approach to the Great Religious Traditions (London: 
SPCK, 1978), 84- 85.    
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with other traditions that triggers these traditions to consider similar perspectives on 
pluralism and develop relevant discourses to understand and explain the phenomenon 
of religious plurality. There could be an abundance of similar expressions of the 
pluralistic idea in different human traditions. But originally these ideas might not be 
suggested and developed as the ideas for analysing the diversity of religions. Thus the 
speculation about the universality of his hypothesis could be Hick’s own wishful 
thinking.  
 
5.3 A Detour to the East 
    It is obvious that Hick often mentions the main ideas of those great traditions, 
viz., Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, to support his argument. 
Even the secular Marxism is also taken by Hick as the offspring of those Semitic 
religions. Scholars like Hans Küng categorise Judaism, Islam and Christianity as 
prophetic religions and the latter two, Hinduism and Buddhism, as mystical religions. 
“Prophetic religions” are systems with a common and distinguishing trait of “piety of 
belief” and with prophets such as Muhammad as its central figures. “Mystical 
religions” denote systems with an emphasis on mystical experience and thus the 
doctrine of unity between humans and the Transcendent. It is said that these two 
religious systems are under a common background of Indo-European language group, 
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thus they might share some words, ideas, myths and so on.43 Consequently, it would 
be fairly easy for Hick to apply his theory in analysing similar notions and doctrines 
of these traditions. However, when he steps out from these two groups into those 
religious or spiritual traditions, is this theory still applicable among them? This does 
not mean that Hick does not try to apply his hypothesis to those traditions outside the 
Indo-European group. As it can be seen in the relevant chapters of An Interpretation 
of Religion, there are certain misunderstandings of those religions (ex. the case of 
taking the Heaven of Confucianism as a Transcendent that is similar to the idea of 
personal God44) that are however used by Hick as the support of the universality of 
his hypothesis.  
    These two systems might have shared certain ideas due to the similar linguistic 
background. The Semitic and prophetic religions originated from the Near East and 
later spread mainly into the West (Europe and Americas) and the North Asia. The 
Mystical religions, however, emerged from the Indian continent and then influenced 
Asia, especially through Buddhism. However, it may be worth making a detour to 
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 Cf., Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions (London: SCM Press, 
1993[originally published in 1989 by Doubleday and Collins Publishers]), xi-xix. Some examples can 
be offered here. Etymologically, the word “yoga” in Hindu tradition comes from the same root as the 
English word “yoke”, which bears two-fold meaning: to unite (yoke together) and to place under 
disciplinged training. The Sanskrit word samadhi is composed of two parts: sam and adhi. “Sam” 
parallels the Greek prefix “syn,” which denoting “together with.” “Adhi” is usually translated Lord, 
paralleling to Hebrew word in the Old Testament, “Adon” or “Adnoai.” Thus, “Samadhi” means the 
state of the absorbing of human mind in God. These two cases are mentioned by Huston Smith. See 
Smith, The World’s Religions (New York: HarperCollins,1991), 27; 49. 
44
 Cf. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 256-257. 
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those traditions that originated in East Asian that remain influential.45  
    It is said that there are three main religious traditions in East Asia: Confucianism, 
Daoism and Mahayana Buddhism. The first two are local religions in China while the 
last one was introduced from India and the Near East and thus was originally a 
foreign religion to Chinese people. A brief review of their main ideas might show the 
distinguishing characteristics that differentiate them from the Semitic and Mystic 
religions. 
    Although it has been influential to the daily lives of people in East Asia, the 
doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism is actually a product of the accommodation of 
Buddhist doctrine into Chinese culture. Consequently, there are Indian and Chinese 
aspects (e.g., the Buddhist idea of this side of Nirvana and the Chinese idea of filial 
piety) and some mixtures (e.g, the transformation of bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara from 
a male figure to a “goddess of mercy” as a symbol of “giver of children”) of these two 
aspects in it. Its syncretism to some extent reflects that there are still certain 
significant and distinguishing factors in Chinese tradition. The four most well-known 
schools of Chinese Buddhism are Tian-tai 天臺, Hua-yan, Chan (Zen)禪 and Pure 
Land (淨土 Jing-tu). The theme of each of them can be summarised as the 
                                                 
45
 This observation is based Hans Küng’s theory. Küng contends that, in addition to the prophetic and 
mystical religions, there is a quite different type of religious tradition in Asia. Küng names this type the 
religion of wisdom with sage as its central figure. He indicates that, generally speaking, there are 
Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism and Chinese folk religion under the umbrella of the religion of 
wisdom. Concerning the details of the discussion, see Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and 
Chinese Religions, xi-xvi. 
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acknowledgement of the presence of the Absolute in the relative, of nirvana in 
samsāra, the sacred in the profane and the emphasis on the importance and value of 
daily life. Believers can achieve enlightenment or liberation by means of variety of 
practices in ordinary life.46 
    Concerning Daoism, it is said that it can be treated both as philosophy and as 
religion. As a school of philosophy, it works both as a complement to and a critic of 
Confucianism. Daoist philosophy (道家 Dao-jia) and Confucianism have the same 
root in the ancient Chinese world, sharing the concept of the Dao and respectively 
represent the moment of passivity and activity in Chinese thought. As a religion, in 
addition to its philosophical resources of the idea of Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 莊子, it 
contains certain shamanistic elements and the cult of immortality (including spiritual 
and physical immortality, by means of alchemy and Daoist yoga) from ancient 
Chinese religion. There is also a doctrine of the trinity – the supreme deity (a direct 
emanation of the Dao itself), the Lord Dao (the Dao personified) and the Lord Lao 
(Laozi deified) – that could properly has its theoretical root in Lao-zi-dao-de-jing and 
also probably be influenced by the Nestorian Christianity.47 Further, it may be called 
a religion of salvation since it envisages an original state of bliss, eternal happiness 
and wholeness of life, to reach the “True Self” by guiding its believers to go beyond 
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 Cf., ibid, 212-215. 
47
 Although this is mentioned by Küng and Ching. See ibid., 151; 161-163. It could still be a 
controversial issue, which is not the concern of the present research. 
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this transitory life. The way to achieve the “True self” or to become the immortal is to 
observe the circulation of body and nature, i.e. the Dao, by mediation, alchemy, 
abstinence and so on. The Classic of the Great Peace (太平經 Tai-ping-jing) from the 
Four Supplements (四輔 Si-fu) of the Daoist Canon (道藏 Dao-zang) is even taken 
as a utopian and messianic text, with teaching that believers should wait for the 
coming of an ideal government led by a ruler of high virtue at the age of Great Peace. 
This messianic idea might inspire certain reforms and political protests in Chinese 
History. Still further, Daoist religion (道教 Dao-jiao) has also developed a theological 
system that parallels Christianity, especially its Catholic branch. It has the belief in a 
supreme being ruling a universe of deities and immortals, which resembles the 
Catholic picture of a religious world that consists of God, the Virgin Mary and the 
saints.48  
    Confucianism can be taken as the most influential tradition and its role in East 
Asian society is the counterpart of Christianity in the West. Its ethics has been 
“practiced by ordinary people in their everyday life.”49 However, compared with 
Mahayana Buddhism and Daoist religion, Confucianism appears to give us another 
vision – a vision that seems to be less “characteristically religious” or of less 
                                                 
48
 Cf., Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions, part III Taoist Naturalism: 
Philosophy and Religion, especially 131-155. 
49
 Peter L. Berger first uses “post-Confucianism” and later coined the term “vulgar Confucianism” to 
describe this phenomenon when he discusses “An East Asian development model.” For the details, see 
Peter L. Berger and Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao 蕭新煌, eds., In Search of An East Asian Development 
Model (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988), 7-11; 19-20. 
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religiosity. But this question itself might be presupposed from a Western or Christian 
framework of defining “Religion,”50 which needs to be addressed briefly here. 
The question of whether Confucianism can be taken as a “religion” could have 
its root in Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 CE) of Chinese history when the Jesuit 
missionaries came to China to commence their introduction and spreading of the 
teaching of Christianity. The renowned missionary, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), had 
pointed out that the Literati, which might be identified as Confucians by him, as one 
of the three religious “sects” (the other two are Sciequia, denoting Chinese Buddhism, 
and Laucu, referring to Daoism) in China. The Literati “deny that they belong to a 
sect and claim that their class or society is rather an academy instituted for the proper 
government and general good of the kingdom.”51 Predicated on his own Christian 
background and his understanding of the meaning of “Religion,” Ricci also indicated 
that those Literati seemed not to worship the supreme deity although they recognise it 
and thought it as one in a continuous body together with heaven, earth and myriad 
things (denoting all living and non-living beings) in this universe. Thus there were no 
priests or ministers for the direction of worship.52 This issue has then become a more 
complicated and controversial issue both in Chinese and Western (especially North 
                                                 
50
 Some reflections have been made in the West. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of 
Religion, chapter 3, especially notes 22, 37, 42 and 43. 
51
 Matteo Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci 1583-1610, trans. by 
Louis J. Gallagher (New York: Random House, 1953), 98.  
52
 Ibid., 94-95. For a brief discussion on Matteo Ricci’s work in China, reader can see Paul S. Chung, 
“Inculturation and the Recognition of the Other: Matteo Ricci’s Legacy in the Christian-Confucian 
Context,” Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 20, no.1 (2010), 79-97. 
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America) academic circles since the encounter between China and the West by the 
end of 19th century and at the beginning of 20th century.  
In China, there has been a series of discussions on the topic of Confucianism as a 
religion within Chinese academic circles since the 1970s.53 As for the debates over 
this topic in the West, it can be seen as one of the results of the encounter of a form of 
“Confucian mission” into Christian and Western culture as it has been introduced and 
spread in North America. By “Confucian mission” it refers to the effort of 
disseminating Confucian thought made by those Confucian scholars, some of them 
are identified as the representatives of so-called Contemporary Neo-Confucianism (當
代新儒家 Dang-dai xin-ru-jia) or, in broad sense, of New-Confucianism (新儒家 
Xin-ru-jia)54, and the Western students of Confucianism in the North America.  
One of the reasons for those scholars, both in the West and from the Chinese 
                                                 
53
 Those articles that are incorporated into A Collection of the Debates on “the Problematique of 
Confucianism as a Religion”(「儒教問題」爭論集 Ru-jiao wen-ti zheng-lun-ji)(in Chinese)(Beijing: 
Religion and Culture Press, 2000), ed. REN Jiyu 任繼愈, can serve as a window on the entire 
discourse on this issue in Modern China. 
54
 Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as revivification of Confucian doctrine could be traced back to the 
beginning of twentieth century. However, the systematic reinterpretation and philosophical 
reconstruction was launched in the second half of last century. Besides, the delivering of “A Manifesto 
on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to 
World Cultural Outlook(為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言－我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界
文化前途之共同認識 Wei Zhong-guo-wen-hua jin-gao shi-jie ren-shi xuan-yan wo-men dui 
zhong-guo-xue-shu-yan-jiu-ji-zhong-guo-wen-hua-yu-shi-jie-wen-hua-qian-tu-zhi-gong-tong-ren-shi)” 
by Carsun CHANG 張君勱, HSU Foo-kwan 徐復觀, MOU Tsung-san 牟宗三 and TANG Chün-i 唐
君毅 in 1958 has been regarded as the making of the so-called “Contemporary Neo-Confucianism.” 
Most of the members of this school organise a society which is known as 鵝湖 Oe-hu (Er-hu). 
However, the issue of the representatives of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is still a controversial 
one. Also, how to define their relationship with the so-called New-Confucian movement is another 
dispute. But both are not the main concern of this present study. For these topics, readers can consult, 
for example, Umberto Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement (Taipei: 
Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies, 2001); LIU Shu-hsien 劉述先, Essentials of Contemporary 
Neo- Confucian Philosophy (London: Greenwood, 2003). 
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world, who oppose the idea of Confucianism as a religion is that there are no ideas 
that correspond to the concept of transcendence or immanence that can be found in 
early Chinese tradition.55 For those who regard Confucianism as a religion or argue 
for its religiousness or religiosity, there are some religious and spiritual elements and 
the religious dimension of Confucianism that need to be unveiled by means of 
interpretation and reinterpretation of its classics in modern context.56  
An observation of such a situation, from a Chinese perspective, could be fair for 
the discussion on the role and characteristic of Confucianism. It is said that there was 
no obvious distinction between the religion and philosophy in Confucian tradition 
before the recent Western influence on Chinese culture. For Chinese people living in 
the imperial era, Confucianism and its competitors, Daoism and Buddhism, are “ways 
of life.” All their ideas are scattered and sometimes mixed together in the various 
aspects of everyday life. Among these aspects, some are categorised as philosophy 
and some as religion in modern academic sense. In other words, there are certain 
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 See Roger Ames and David Hall, Thinking Through from the Han: Self, Truth and Transcendence in 
Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), chapter 9, for 
example. 
56
 Tu Wei-ming 杜維明, touted as a missionary of Confucian teaching in the West, explores the 
religiousness of Confucianism by reinterpreting the text of one of Confucian Classics, the Doctrine of 
the Mean (中庸 Chung-yung). For the details, see Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay 
on Confucian Religiousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), especially chapters 3- 
5. Robert Cummings Neville and John H. Berthrong also argue the spiritual and religious dimension of 
Confucianism. See Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), chapters 4 and 8; John Berthrong, All under 
Heaven, chapter 3. Liu Shu-hsien, “The Religious Import of Confucian Philosophy,” in his The 
Contemporary Significance and Religious Import of Confucianism (Singapore: The Institute of East 
Asian Philosophies, 1986), 10-18. A more comprehensive review of this question can be found in John 
Makeham’s article, “Rujiao as Religion,” the chapter 13 of his Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in 
Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse (Cambridge [Mass.] & London: Harvard-Yenching 
Institute, 2008). 
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religious and philosophical elements in Confucianism, although their characteristics 
may be different from the meaning of those disciplines in the West.57 Meanwhile, 
such a plight of Confucianism had also led to another debate on the topic of whether 
Confucianism can be treated as a philosophy.58   
There are certain significant elements of Confucianism that could be treated as 
the reflection of its religiosity.59 One is Dao (道) and the other is the process of 
                                                 
57
 Cf. Robert C. Neville, Boston Confucianism, 57-59. As for the comment on the three religions as 
ways of life, some observations can be offered here. Rev. William Edward Soothill (1861-1935) 
mentioned in his lectures delivered at Oxford that “There is much truth, then, in the Chinese saying that 
the three religions are one, and this view enables the people, as a whole, to frequent whatever shrine 
they individually please. No sense of antagonism or inappropriateness exists in the mind of a man who 
on the same day, and for the same purpose, visits the shrines of each of the three cults, any more than a 
sense of antagonism or inappropriateness would occur to him in consulting three different doctors, say, 
by way of illustration, an allopathist, a homoeopathist, and a herbalist, one immediately after the other, 
for the same complaint, and- perhaps wisely- using his own judgement as to whose medicine he 
swallowed.” Julia Ching suggested another picture: “For example, a man could be a Confucian in his 
active life, responding to multiple social responsibilities; a philosophical Taoist [Daoist] in his leisure 
hours, reading poetry and enjoying nature and wine, practicing some health regimen associated with 
religious Taoism [Daoism]; and both he and his wife- or, at least, she- would frequent the Buddhist 
temple to offer prayers for special intentions. The coexistence of all three religious traditions, and the 
possibility for the same persons to be involved in all of them, testifies to a certain pluralism within the 
Chinese- and the East Asian- civilizations, a pluralism that was not known by Europe and the Middle 
East.” See W. E. Soothill, The Three Religions of China: Lectures Delivered at Oxford (1913), 3rd 
edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), 13-14; Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and 
Chinese Religions, 225.  
58
 Another similar comment made by YAO Xinzhong 姚新中 can be mentioned here: “Whether 
Confucianism is religious or not is directly related to the question of how to define the Confucian 
tradition. Under the influence of a Christian definition of religion, earlier generations of western 
scholars judged it on the basis of the Christian doctrine, so that Confucianism swings between religious 
and agnostic or between good and evil….. In general, contemporary western scholars have extended 
their concept of religion, but this has not yet reached an agreement about the religious elements of the 
Confucian tradition.” See Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 39. 
59
 An interesting and perhaps relevant observation made by Melford E. Spiro, an anthropologist, in his 
article “Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation,” can be offered here: “Although the belief 
in the existence of superhuman beings is the core religious variable, it does not follow- as some 
scholars have argued- that religious, in contrast to magical, behavior is necessarily other-worldly in 
orientation, or that, if it is other-worldly, its orientation is ‘spiritual.’ The beliefs in superhuman beings, 
other-worldliness, and spiritual values vary independently. Thus, ancient Judaism, despite its obsession 
with God’s will, was essentially this-worldly in orientation. Catholicism, with all its other-worldly 
orientation is, with certain kinds of Hinduism, the most ‘materialistic’ of the higher religions. 
Confucianism, intensely this-worldly, is yet concerned almost exclusively with such ‘spiritual’ values 
as filial piety, etc. In short, superhuman beings may be conceived as primary means or as ends. Where 
values are worldly, these beings may be viewed as important agents for the attainment and/ or 
frustration of worldly goals, either ‘material’ or ‘spiritual’. Where values are materialistic, superhuman 
bengs may be viewed as important agents for the attainment of material goals, either in this or in an 
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human pursuit the Dao. In Confucian tradition, if one decides to become a saint, or to 
transform one’s own life as a saint, it is a life-long process rather than a series of life. 
In order to become a saint, what one has to do is to commit oneself to the Dao, not 
zhen in Hick’s understanding,60 and to do one’s best to follow the teaching or the way 
of self-cultivation of his or her precedent Junzi (君子).61 Dao can be seen as an ideal 
theme while its many manifestations are seen in the ways individuals embody this 
theme in themselves.62 Dao is being incarnated in its authentic adherents.  
The idea above can be easily seen in Confucian Analects (論語 Lun-yu) where, 
for example, one of Confucius’ significant disciples, Zengzi 曾子, said that “An 
educated man (士 Shi) must be strong and resolute, for his burden is heavy and the 
road is long. He takes the realisation of Ren (Confucian Dao) as his burden. Is that not 
heavy? Only with death does the road come to an end. Is that not long?”63 However, 
                                                                                                                                            
after life. Where valuses are other-worldly, mystical union with superhuman beings may be viewed as 
an all-concuming goal; and so on.” See Michael Banton, ed., Anthropological Approaches to the Study 
of Religion (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), 94- 95. 
60
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 11. 
61
 “Junzi” is a very complex notion of Confucian tradition. Originally and literally, it referred to “son 
of ruler,” and thus to the governor. Later, it was transferred by Confucius as a notion concerning the 
character of a man. However, in the Analects, both ideas of “Junzi” were used and discussed in 
different context. Cf. Wing-tsit CHAN 陳榮捷, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), 15. Due to the complexity of its implication, it is difficult to suggest 
a precise English translation of “Junzi.” Some scholars and sinologists have tried to offer various 
translations. There is a list of the translation: superior man (ex. James Legge), gentleman (ex. A. 
Waley), noble man or person (Lionel Giles), profound person (ex. Tu Wei-ming), paradigmatic 
individual (ex. Cua) and so on. But which translation is the best one remain an open question. For an 
overview of this issue, see Antonio S. Cua, Virtue of Junzi and the Arts of Dealing with Human Conflict 
(unpublished typescript, 2006), chapter 1. Since the debate is not the concern of this research, I will not 
try to tackle it and will leave the term of Junzi as it is without any tentative translation. 
62
 The idea of taking the Dao as a theme comes from Cua, Dimensions of Moral Creativity: Paradigms, 
Principles and Ideals (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979), chapter 8. 
63
 See The Analects, 8: 7. The translation is taken from D. C. Lau’s 劉殿爵 work, with my own 
amendment that is based on my understanding of Confucianism. See D.C. Lau, Confucius The Analects 
(London: Penguin Books, 1979), 93, for its original version. 
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in the Confucian vision, there is no need to assume life or lives after the death since 
one has once committed him or herself to the task of realising the implication of Dao 
in the whole life, no matter how the Dao is unfolded, his or her life will be recognised 
as a variation of the theme of Dao. In Wittgensteinian language, the Dao can be 
experienced by the individuals as showing the respect to the elder or as being of filial 
piety toward their parents.64 Anyone who has once committed oneself to the 
Confucian Dao will spend one’s whole life to understand and follow it. S/he will 
expect that his or her descendents inherit this idea. People around him or her will 
learn, practice and spread this idea. In this regard, the meaning of his or her life may 
lie in having more influence on others to realise this ideal. The day that all his or her 
fellows embody the Confucian Dao comes in the day that the world Commonwealth 
(大同世界 Da-tong-shi-jie),65 as a Confucian ideal, is realised. 
In light of Hick’s hypothesis, it seems that there are also phenomena of 
                                                 
64
 Similar idea has been explored in A. S. Cua’s The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang 
Yang-ming’s Moral Psychology (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1982), 7-11, where he 
discussed the psychological implication of knowing (知 Zhi) of the philosophy of WANG Yang-ming’s 
(王陽明, 1472-1529, a Neo-Confucian in Ming Dynasty)by using Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing-as.  
65
 This idea can be clearly seen in Li-ji 禮記, The Book of Rites. It said, “When the Grand course, a 
public and common spirit ruled all under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their 
words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their parents only, 
nor treat as children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their 
death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up to the young. They showed 
kindness and compassion to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, 
so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper work, and females had their homes. 
(They accumulated) articles (of values), disliking that they should be thrown away upon the ground, 
but not wishing to keep them for their own gratification. (They laboured) with their strength, disliking 
that it should not be exerted, but not exerting it (only) with a view to their own advantage. In this way 
(selfish) schemings were repressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors 
did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not shut. This was (the 
period of) what we call the Grand Union.” Cited from James Legge, trans., The LI KI, in Sacred Books 
of the East, Vol. XXVII, ed. F. Max Müller (London: Lowe & Brydone, 1885), 364-366. 
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soteriological transformation and the re-orientation from the self to the Real in 
Mahayana Buddhism, Daoist religion and Confucianism. For Mahayana Buddhism, it 
is a transformation of a person’s life from the attachment of the transitory of world to 
liberation or to enlightenment – the status of nirvana. It is a re-direction of a human 
being’s life from the illusion of samsāra to the stage of nirvana. For Daoist religion, it 
seems to be a transformation of a person from his or her imperfect condition to 
spiritual liberation to be the immortal. It is a process conducted which follows the 
Dao towards the status of one’s “True self.” As for Confucianism, it is a 
transformation from the morally imperfect personality towards the ideal of sage or 
saint and a re-centring from oneself to his or her commitment to Dao. However, 
except for the doctrine of rebirth in Mahayana Buddhism, which has an Indian origin, 
there is no theory of a series of lives in Daoist religion and Confucianism for the 
accomplishment of such transformation and the coming for the ideal world. Rather, 
for Confucianism, it is like a relay race. It is realised by the accumulation of the effort 
of each generation while for Daoist religion the True self or the Immortal could be 
achieved by various methods done in this life.  
The followers of these three religions are to some extent focusing on and 
responding to the Real an sich. However, it seems that their understanding of the Real 
is different from Hick’s. Their idea of the Real seems to be something transcendent as 
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well as immanent, which has been reflected in the doctrines of these three religions. In 
Mahayana Buddhism the Nirvana is in samsāra and the sacred in the profane. In 
Daoist religion, the way to achieve the “True self” or to become the immortal is to 
observe the circulation of body and the nature, that is, the Dao. In Confucianism, their 
way of achieving the ideal personality is also to follow the way of Tian (Heaven), 
which can be apprehended in the myriad things and various human relationships 
around us. The idea of Nirvana of Mahayana Buddhism, sinicised Buddhism, has its 
Indian root but to some extent reflects the influence of Chinese metaphysical thinking 
on it. Both Daoism and Confucianism originated from the ancient Chinese religion 
and share the idea of Dao. All these imply that they are under the same metaphysical 
background, in which the Transcendent is at the same time something immanent.       
In Chinese thinking, the Dao, on the one hand, can be understood literally as the 
way, the method, or the rule and metaphysically taken as a realm formed by the 
communication, interaction, correlation and the interdependence between Heaven, 
Earth, humans and myriad things, on the other. In this context, the relationship 
between Heaven, Earth, Humans and myriad things is also the manifestation of the 
Dao.66 Dao is not a Transcendent Reality but it is transcendent in the sense that it can 
                                                 
66
 Such understanding of Chinese way of thinking is pointed out by TU Wei-ming in his “The 
Continuity of Being: Chinese Vision of Nature,” an classic article published in 1985 in his Confucian 
Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985) and incorporated later in 
many books such as Chinese Aesthetics and Literature: A Reader (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), ed. by 
Corinne H. Dale, and Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), eds. by J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames. Tu’s idea has been further 
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not be exhausted by human beings. Ideally, it is incarnated or realised in the way, 
method or rule of human daily life. Through their daily experiences, humans can 
comprehend the implication of the Dao. On the other hand, the daily practices of 
human beings, especially those who have been recognised as sages, saints, “True 
self,” and so on, reflect or embody the idea of the Dao. In terms of personal 
self-cultivation, the Dao is one but it is being incarnated and in different types of life 
of its followers.  
In ancient Chinese thought, the Dao is metaphysically interchangeable with Li 
理67 and the idea above is further conceptualised in the proposition of “the Li is one 
                                                                                                                                            
developed by some scholars of Chinese philosophy such as LIN An-wu 林安梧, to whom I am 
indebted my understanding of the implication of Dao and its Confucian and Daoist interpretation. Lin’s 
main idea can be presented in one of his article “On ‘Dao’ and ‘Virtue’: A Philosophical Interpretation 
of the Thesis That Confucianism and Daoism Develop from the Same Root And Are Complementary to 
Each Other: An Investigation on the Implications of “I Set My Heart on the Dao and Based Myself on 
Virtue” of Confucian Analects and of “Dao Bears Myriad Things While Virtue Nourishes Them” of 
Laozi Daodejing,” originally published in Chinese and later presented in English (my translation) at the 
Conference on the understanding and interpretation of Confucian Analects at King’s College, London, 
21st to 25th October, 2010. 
67
 Cf. CH’EN Ch’un 陳淳(1159-1223, a Confucian scholar in Southern Song Dynasty[1127-1279 
CE]), Neo-Confucian Terms Explained (北溪字義 The Pei-his tuz-i), trans, ed. and with an Introduction 
by Wing-tist Chan (New York: Columba University Press, 1986): (1) Tao is the way. Originally the 
meaning of the word was a path, and path means a common road for people to walk on. If it is meant 
for only one person, it cannot be called a road. The general principle of Tao (道理 Dao-li, my addition) 
is the principle (理 Li) people should follow in their daily affairs and human relations. Only what is 
followed by all people can be called Tao. Generally speaking, we can see intimately the idea of what is 
commonly followed only in daily human affairs. If we trace its origin, it is not that in human affairs 
there is plainly a principle like this. Its source must be traced to Heaven….Heaven is principle….In 
reality, the name Tao is derived from that which all people go through. It is called Tao because it is the 
principle according to which daily human affairs should be conducted and the road on which people 
past and present all travel. (p.105-106); (2) Generally speaking, the Way (Dao, my addition) and 
principle are the same thing. But since they are distinguished by two different words, there must be a 
difference between them. The “Way” derives its meaning from that on which people travel. Compared 
with “principle,” the “Way” is broader while “principle” is more concrete. “Principle” has the idea of 
being definitely unchanging. Hence, the Way is that which can be followed forever, and principle is 
that which is forever unchanging. How can principle, which is without physical form or shape, be seen? 
It is simply the specific principle (tse) of what a thing should be (tang-jan). A specific principle means 
a standard. As such it has the sense of being definitely unchanging. What a thing should be is simply its 
being proper, that is, not being excessive or deficient. That is specific principle. For instance, “As a 
ruler, he abides in humanity.” Abiding in humanity is the specific principle what the ruler should 
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but its manifestations are many(理一分殊 Li-yi-fen-shu),” which was suggested by 
Confucians in 11th century. If this proposition can be treated as a Chinese version of 
pluralism, then the picture implied in it is different from that of Hick’s model at least 
in that its reorientation toward the Real is to the Real that is this world itself rather 
than something that is higher and above human beings. At this point, it might serve as 
a counterexample to Hick’s claim of the universality of his hypothesis.  
    There are various manifestations of something more fundamental within human 
nature as seen through the pursuit of the Dao, the actualising of the Commonwealth in 
Confucianism, the chasing after the ideal of immortals and the bringing out the status 
of Great peace in Daoism, the reaching the status of Nirvana in Mahayana Buddhism, 
or the soteriological transformation in Hick’s hypothesis. This may be due to the fact 
that some expect something better in the future or even something to be realised in 
some phase of the series of lives. In this life, there may be certain problems that one 
can not overcome or certain questions that could not be satisfactorily answered in the 
present life. Some might even struggle with certain sufferings and difficulties where 
the cause and the answer are unknown. Some may simply contemplate their life but 
find that the solution of these questions is beyond the reach of human understanding. 
While being situated in the ambiguous universe, the basic question for human beings 
                                                                                                                                            
be….In investigating things and probing principle to the utmost, the ancients wanted to investigate the 
specific principles of what things should be. This means investigating to the point of what is 
appropriate and nothing more. (p. 112-113). 
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could be its place and the significance in it. 
Put differently, it is about the meaning of life in the universe. It is a spiritual 
quest that triggers people to develop the doctrine of soteriological transformation, of 
the commitment of oneself to the Dao and so on. It can be expressed as a “drive for 
transcendence” to decipher the mystery of life of human beings in a given situation. 
Some of them, especially those who were regarded as saints and prophets, were using 
the language they were familiar with to grasp, express and conceptualise such 
impulses. Thus, to deal with this quest or drive, in Semitic or prophetic religions, 
certain prophetic persons who claimed that they had received revelation from the 
Transcendent will indicate ways or directions for people to follow when dealing with 
those seemingly unsolvable questions of life. Due to this quest or inner drive, in 
mystical religions, certain enlightened persons such as Siddhārtha Gautama devoted 
themselves to reflect and meditate on various affairs happening around them and 
found the truth and proposed some doctrines for their followers to face the given 
situation. In Daoist religion and Confucianism, with the quest or drive, those wise 
persons, like Laozi and Confucius, who, with a gradual process of understanding the 
Dao, applied themselves to responding to their mundane world would deliver various 
teachings for their disciples and people to tackle the problems of life. All approaches 
of those prophets, enlightened persons and wise men to communicate with, to 
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apprehend and to understand “the Transcendent” can be understood as different ways 
of experiencing the Transcendent. Their articulations might circulate from one 
generation to another and consequently form various traditions. Likewise, the ideas, 
doctrines, symbols, rituals and so on that developed from their articulations will serve 
as means to stimulate their adherents’ similar experiences, model their behaviours and 
guide their ways of life.  
From another angle, it could be said that although their ways of responding to the 
given situation, or to this world itself might be different, all the traditions are sharing 
some basic elements that on the one hand makes them religious and on the other hand 
differentiate them from other human activities, like their spiritual quest for the 
meaning of life with handling this world itself. The spiritual quest might be satisfied 
in terms of various methods in different fields of human activities, but at the centre of 
those activities that can be characterised as “religion,” human quest for the meaning 
of life might be answered by those Transcendent (ex. God), Truth or Absolute (ex. 
Nirvana) that are culturally postulated, “experienced” or “found” by the prophets, 
wise men and enlightened persons in this world with the operation of the spiritual 
capacity of human nature.68  
Like the pattern and arrangement of genes that distinguish human beings from 
                                                 
68
 This formulation is inspired by Spiro’s discussion on his definition of “religion.” See Michael 
Banton, ed., Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, 96-98. For Spiro, “religion” is “an 
institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings.”  
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other living beings, so the relations or the interaction between the spiritual quest of 
human beings and the postulated, experienced and found Transcendent or Truth 
differentiate the religion from other human activities. Again, just as the difference 
among certain chromosomes result in various ethnic groups and familial units of 
human beings, so as the difference that is culturally determined among human 
understanding of this world that leads to the diversity of religions.69 As ethnic groups 
and familial units of human beings, there are certain resemblances among them. 
Similarly, although the characteristics of those religious traditions are different due to 
their cultural background, they nevertheless to some extent resemble one another. 
When it is considered in light of Wittgenstein’s notion of language-game, all religious 
traditions could be treated as forms of the religious language-game. Each of them 
could be taken as an embodiment or a manifestation of the ideal of Religion. A 
genuine religious pluralism might also be developed in this understanding. 
    But what makes them become the members of a “religious” family and 
differentiates them from other human activities? Such “genetically” distinguishing 
traits have been tentatively suggested above, viz. the pattern of spiritual quest of the 
meaning of life of human beings in this ambiguous universe that might be “answered” 
by the Transcendent or the Absolute that that is perceived, culturally experienced, 
                                                 
69
 The analogy between “gene” and “religion” comes from Clifford Geertz’s analogy of gene in 
discussing the cultural pattern in his article, entitled “Religion as a Cultural System.” See Michael 
Banton, ed., Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, 6-7.   
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postulated and articulated by the prophets, wise men and enlightened persons and the 
relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, etc. That is to say, this pattern might 
serve as an alternative approach to considering the idea or the description of religion. 
At the same time, it might work as a principle when treating the issue of the diversity 
of religions. Briefly speaking, various religious traditions and activities in one way or 
another exhibit this pattern. The pattern thus at the same time characterises “religions” 
and thus sketches their resemblance. In this regard, the Confucian proposition of “the 
Li is one but its manifestations are many” mentioned above might help in illustrating 
the idea of the pattern and thus of the refined model.70 But how? This question will 
be tentatively answered in the following chapters.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has conducted a review of the adventure that has been taken to the 
present. It has shown that elements of Kant and Wittgenstein in Hick’s hypothesis do 
help to overcome some problems with the metaphysical and epistemological aspects 
of Hick’s hypothesis. Nonetheless, the question of its criteriological aspect seems to 
                                                 
70
 The idea in this paragraph is inspired by Liu Shu-hsien’s very brief comparison between the “family 
resemblance” and the proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many.” But Liu’s aim is to 
bring out some implications of the Li proposition to the issue of global ethics. He suggests Confucian 
concept of Ren 仁 (humanity) as the regulative principle. But as it will be shown in the following 
chapters, with the same Confucian insight, this research will focus on the “pattern” suggested here. For 
Liu’s idea, see his Global Ethic and Interreligious Dialogue (全球倫理與宗教對話 Quan-qiu-lun-li 
yu zong-jiao-dui-hua) (In Chinese)(Xindian: New Century [立緒文化 Li-xu-wen-hua], 2001), 214- 215.  
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remain. In addition, when it is applied into the religions outside the traditions that 
Hick has been familiar with, some other questions might occur. With the insight of 
Hans Küng’s hypothesis of three river systems of religious faiths, an investigation on 
the religious traditions from the East Asia and China has further reflected the 
deficiency of Hick’s hypothesis. However, this investigation has at the same time led 
to a suggestion of an approach of understanding the ideal of Religion, which can be 
expressed as the pattern of the spiritual quest of the meaning of life of human beings 
in this ambiguous universe that might be “answered” by the Transcendent or the 
Absolute that is perceived, culturally experienced and articulated by the prophets, 
wise men and enlightened persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, 
rituals, etc. This pattern is supposed to be found among all religions in the past and 
present. It is thus proposed to be regarded as an alternative approach for considering 
the ideal of Religion and the issue of diversity of religions. In addition, the detour to 
East Asia has also encountered the pluralistic insight from the Chinese religious 
tradition that might shed some light on the suggestion made in previous chapters that 
the religions can be taken as different forms of religious language-game and that they 
share some family resemblance. At this point, the Confucian proposition of “the Li is 
one but its manifestations are many” can help in illustrating those ideas. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONFUCIAN INSIGHT 
    In order to answer the question raised by the end of last chapter, this chapter 
aims to unpack the pluralistic insight of Confucian proposition of “the Li is one but its 
manifestations are many.” It will begin with a review of Chinese cosmology as a 
background for the understanding of Confucian insight. After this, an introduction of 
the origin and the development of this proposition will follow. Next, it will turn to an 
interpretation of the Li as “functional unity” and “regulative principle” and its 
application in the realm of religious issues in the discourse of modern era. It will then 
propose that the ideal of Religion can be considered in terms of the idea of functional 
unity and be taken as the regulative principle and that the alternative model suggested 
in the last chapter can be regarded as a constituent principle when considering the 
diversity of religions.  
 
6.0 Prolegomena 
As stated in the last chapter, Hick is right when he claims that there are many 
variations of the pluralistic position, but he seems to fail to notice that their 
implications and the relevant cultural and philosophical backgrounds are different. 
This may lead Hick to misunderstandings about the pluralistic idea and to the doubt of 
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the comprehensiveness of his theory in the explanation of religious diversity. A detour 
to the religions emerged from East Asia has revealed this predicament. Nevertheless, 
it is perhaps because of this metaphysical difference that any pluralistic insight from 
this tradition may shed some light on the issue of religious pluralism.  
A brief discussion on Mahayana Buddhism, Daoist religion and Confucianism in 
the last chapter has shown that all the ideas of Transcendent, Truth or Absolute of the 
three traditions reflect the influence of the idea of Dao of ancient Chinese thinking. In 
Mahayana Buddhism the Nirvana is in samsāra and the sacred in the profane. In 
Daoist religion, the way to achieve the “True self” or to become the immortal is to 
observe the circulation of body and nature, that is, the Dao. In Confucianism, their 
way of achieving the ideal personality is also to follow the Dao or the way of Heaven. 
Dao is transcendent as well as immanent. It is transcendent in the sense that it can not 
be exhausted by human beings whereas it is immanent in the sense that its implication 
can be comprehended by humans in their daily experience. In this regard, the daily 
practices of human beings, especially those who have been recognised as sages, saints, 
“True self,” and so on reflect or embody the idea of the Dao. This thought can also be 
conceptualised in the proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many(理
一分殊 Li-yi-fen-shu)” by Confucian intellectuals.  
The end of the last chapter suggested the possibility of illustrating a refined 
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model in revisiting the ideal of Religion and the issue of religious diversity in light of 
this proposition. But how is this possible?  
In order to answer this question, this chapter will open its discussion with an 
introduction of a basic Chinese vision of the nature as the background for the 
understanding of the proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many” (§6. 
1). Later, it will offer a brief review of the origin and the development of this 
proposition in the Confucian tradition (§6.2). Then it will turn to a modern 
interpretation of this proposition (§6.3) and apply its insight to rethinking the idea of 
Religion as well as the diversity of religions (§6.4). 
 
6.1 Cosmology in Ancient China 
    An investigation into the Chinese classics that have been preserved until now do 
not appear to have any explicit creation story that involves a Creator-God comparable 
to that found in the biblical book of Genesis.1 However, Chinese people do have the 
                                                 
1
 This does not mean that there were no any myths, stories or theories on the creation of the world. 
Actually there are plenty of books, such as The Book of Mountains and Seas (山海經 Shan-hai-jing),  
that are transmitted to this day show that there were abundant resources of primitive people’s 
imagination of the creation of the world. However, these elements and relevant ideas later merely 
became part of the materials and subjects of Chinese Literature and were not taken as a very important 
fountain-head for the making of philosophical, theological and religious thinking in Chinese tradition. 
The famous and most circulated two are the legend of Pan-gu’s 盤古 creating of the world within a 
cosmic egg, appeared in Record of Cycle in Threes and Fives (三五歷記 San-wu-li-ji) by XU Zheng 
徐整 in the Three Kingdoms Period(三國時代 San-guo-shi-dai) (184[?]-280 CE), and that of Nü-kua’s 
(女媧 NV-wa) creation of human beings, appeared in various materials such as the chapter 6 of 
Huai-nan-zi 淮南子 by LIU An 劉安 in Western Han Dynasty (西漢 Xi-han) (202BCE-9CE). A 
relevant discussion on this can be found in Derk Bodde, “Myths of Ancient China,” in Mythologies of 
the Ancient World, ed. Samuel Noah Kramer (New York, Anchor Books, 1961), 367- 408. In this article, 
Bodde discussed the examples that can be taken as cosmogonic myths. He exhibited five cases, 
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concept of Di 帝, an ideogram that is often translated into English as “God,” that 
played a similar role in ancient China, especially in the period of Shang (商) Dynasty 
(ca. 1600-1040 BCE.).  
During Shang Dynasty, Di is often understood as the Dominator of the Nature, 
controlling such things as rainfall and the time of harvest. Nonetheless, the definite 
nature and function of Di at that time are still a controversial topic among scholars. 
The concept of Di was then gradually replaced by that of Tian 天, in Western Zhou 
Dynasty (西周 Xi Zhou) (ca. 1000- 770 BCE), often translated as “Heaven.” During 
this era, Tian (Heaven), with some characteristic overlapping with the notion of Di, 
acted as Dominator, Revealer, Judge, Creator and Sustainer of the world. These five 
roles represented the different faces of Tian (Heaven). It is worth noting that the 
concepts of Revealer, Judge and Creator in Tian are much different from the 
Judeo-Christian understanding of God. Tian is Revealer in the sense of giving a 
direction via divinations and oracles to the ruler to govern his empire and for the 
                                                                                                                                            
including the P’ang-ku (Pan-gu) Creation Myth, the Fashioning Deity Nü-kua (Nv-wa), The Separation 
of Heaven and Earth, Sun Myths and Flood Myths. Bodde contended that, although the similar stories 
can be found at India and ancient Sumer, the only one that could be treated as the creation myth in 
Ancient China is the case of P’ang-ku since it did reflect the primal idea of earlier Chinese idea of the 
origin and the development of world. The instance of Nü-kua, who was said to be the Deity as the 
Creator of human beings, is debateable. Interestingly, Frederick W. Mote argued that even the case of 
P’ang-ku can not be taken seriously as an evidence for the claim that there was a creation myth and 
thus a idea of Creator in ancient Chinese thinking since their world of view and their idea of cosmology 
are different from the West who think that there is a Transcendent Being who created this world. For 
the details, see Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1971), chapter 2. Additionally, POO Mu-chou 蒲慕州 indicates that some stories and myths of The 
Book of Mountains and Seas also reflected the daily religion of people in Warring States Period(戰國時
代 Zhan-guo-shi-dai) (476[?]-221 BCE). See Poo, Mu-chou, In Search of Personal Welfare: A View of 
Ancient Chinese Religion (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), chapter 4. 
                                    
248 
 
common person to lead a proper way of life. As Judge, Tian does not judge in the last 
days as in the context of the Holy Bible, but in the sense of rewarding and punishing 
the ruler and the commoner according to his or her adherence to the revelations and 
the individual’s behaviour in this world. Finally, Tian is Creator in the sense that it is 
both the root of one’s inner virtue and the biological structure of human beings and 
the myriad of things.  
While the reason and the details of this transition from the notion of Di to that of 
Tian in ancient China is another complicated issue in the realm of the history of 
ancient China are not the concern of this research, generally speaking, after the 
transition from Di to Tian, a trend developed in Chinese thinking whereby Tian was 
understood primarily as Dominator, and the notions of Revealer and Judge were 
overshadowed by Tian as Creator and Sustainer of the cosmos.2  
From the above paragraphs, one may observe that the ancient Chinese perceived 
Tian in a fairly natural and physical sense. Each individual is supposed to observe and 
respond to the unique “way of Tian (天道, Tian-dao),” that is revealed to him or her. 
That is to say, the “way of Tian,” in Western philosophical terminology, i.e. the 
                                                 
2
 Concerning the main idea of the above two paragraphs, see FU Pei-jung 傅佩榮, 儒道天論發微
(Ru-dao-tian-lun-fa-wei, Chinese version of The Concept of T’ian in Ancient China: with Special 
Emphasis on Confucianism【New Haven: Yale University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1985】) (Taipei: Student 
Book, 1985), 1-70. A brief sketch of the transition from the notion of Di to that of Dao presented above 
will inevitably oversimplify the complicated evolution of ancient Chinese thought of the universe and 
will neglect the deeper meaning and implication of the related Chinese ideograms and their relations 
with each other. However, again there is no space for the further investigation on this topic and by so 
doing will lead astray the present study from its main concern. Julia Ching’s brief discussion on the 
idea of God and spirits of the religion of antiquity of ancient China to some extent reflect this 
complexity. See Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions, 16-17. 
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“isness,” implies the way that people should live their daily lives, i.e., the 
“oughtness.” Any abnormalities in this world should be taken as a warning from Tian 
for one’s own wrongdoings. Consequently, as a competent leader of those people, one 
should be capable of transforming and perfecting the world by contemplating “the 
way of Tian” to learn the changes of the universe and using it to evaluate the pattern 
of human affairs.3 Since “the way of Tian” is the “way of humans” (人道 Ren-dao, 
denoting the ways and the attitudes that human being should adopt when tackling 
mundane affairs) and humans are born of Tian, humans and Tian are supposed to 
possess certain identical or correlative qualities between them. According to Chinese 
thinking, it is the human mind-heart (心 Xin) that makes the correlation possible since 
humans receive the highest excellence and, thus, are most intelligent among all other 
beings.4 In this context, the highest excellence inherited from Tian could be 
understood as virtue (德 De). To be human would be to follow the way of Tian. On 
                                                 
3
 The idea can be seen in one of the paragraphs of the Book of Changes, which reads in English as 
“One looks to the pattern of Heaven in order to examine the flux of the seasons, and one looks to the 
pattern of man in order to transform and bring the world to perfection” quoted from Richard John Lynn, 
trans,. The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 274. Here I have given it an interpretation based on my knowledge 
of Chinese philosophy. 
4
 This is a rephrasing of the idea of a Neo- Confucian ZHOU Dun-yi’s 周敦頤 (1017-1073) An 
Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太極圖說, Tai-ji-tu-shuo), for its English 
translation, see Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), 463. Since this was a prevailing idea in ancient China, Zhou’s idea can be 
taken as a sample. Due to that here Zhou’s articulation is used as an example of expressing this idea, 
some reader may raise a question that this could be an understanding of Chinese thinking from a 
Neo-Confucian perspective. However, this vision of the correlation between the Heaven and human 
beings and the role of human mind as the medium in this correlation are shared among ancient Chinese 
thinking. It is the variant understandings of the human mind of those philosophical schools that make 
their theories of the relation between the Heaven and humans different. Readers can consider this issue 
by consulting YANG Hui-chieh 楊慧傑, On the Relationship between Heaven and Man (天人關係論 
Tian-ren-guan-xi-lun) (Taipei: The Buffalo Book Co., 1994), chapters 1-2, 7 & 11. 
                                    
250 
 
the other side, the key to grasp the way of Heaven is the human mind-heart.  
    Since the “isness” implies the “oughtness,” to be human would not merely mean 
to care for one’s own physical body but also to develop one’s own human nature by 
following the way that Tian has revealed to him or her. The caring for one’s body was 
then developed into a doctrine of self-discipline in Daoist religion. However, the 
dimension of the “oughtness” became the main theoretical source of the Confucian 
teaching of self-cultivation and the realisation of humanity. It is at this point that the 
way of Tian was further considered as Dao. Originally and literally meaning the way 
and the path for people to walk on, the ideogram for Dao is composed of two parts: 
辶(辵 Chuo), which is relevant to walking, following the way and so forth, and 首 
(Shou), which traces out the contour and image of the human head.5 It was properly 
in this manner that those ideas and theories about the creation of Di or Tian became 
less important for Chinese people. The main concern for them was how to apprehend 
the way of Tian or Tian-dao , or Dao in short, and then to follow it to lead an 
appropriate way of life in a world after the Western Zhou Dynasty. The Confucian 
saying that “I set my heart on the Dao and based myself on my inner virtue (志於
                                                 
5
 This idea is based on Xu shen’s 許慎 (ca. 58-147 BCE, Chinese philologist) Shuo-wen-jie-zi(說文
解字), no. 1204. Available from http://ctext.org/shuo-wen-jie-zi/zh?searchu=%E9%81%93. Accessed 
on 9 December 2011; and Ch’en Ch’un, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained (北溪字義 The Pei-his tuz-i), 
trans, ed. and with an Introduction by Wing-tist Chan (New York: Columba University Press, 1986), 
105. Rev. Soothill also offered a very precise description of this idea, “It consists of a ‘head’ and ‘to 
proceed’, and its ordinary meaning is a way, a path or road. In the philosophic sense it may be defined 
as the eternal order of the universe.” See W. E. Soothill, The Three Religions of China: Lectures 
Delivered at Oxford (1913), 16. 
                                    
251 
 
道，據於德, zhi-yu-dao, ju-yu-de)”6 reflects this thought. Dao was not understood as 
something that transcends this world. Though it can not be fully grasped by means of 
human linguistic and conceptual systems (“Dao that can be grasped in terms of 
human language is not the Dao itself,” Laozi Dao-de-jing 17), Dao is still taken as 
something that is transcendent. Thus, it seems that, for Chinese people, the universe is 
a realm without the interference of the Transcendent and is a spontaneously 
self-generating life process with an endless vital force circulating in it.8 Although it 
can not be fully embodied by anyone who commits oneself to it, a lifestyle that 
follows Dao can still be regarded as a manifestation of Dao. Though there was a 
transition from Di through Tian to Dao, all these three notions were at times 
interchangeable or appeared together in the ancient texts. For example, Di and Tian 
were almost synonymous at the beginning of Western Zhou dynasty9 while Tian and 
Dao would sometime appeared together as Tian-dao 天道, which literally means the 
way of Heaven, in some classics such as the Book of Mencius (孟子 Mengzi) and 
DONG Zhongshu’s 董仲舒 (ca.179-ca.104 BCE) Luxuriant Gems of The Spring and 
                                                 
6
 The Analects, 7: 6. Cited from Confucius: The Analects, translated with an introduction by D. C. Lau 
(London: Penguin Books, 1979), 86, with my amendment. 
7
 This is the idea presented in the opening sentence of the chapter 1 of the Book of Laozi. For English 
translation, reader can consult Wing-tsit Chan’s A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (p.139) and 
Edmund Ryden’s translation of Laozi Daodejing(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) (p.5) for 
example. 
8
 The phrase “How Heaven and Earth are like a bellows! While vacuous, it is never exhausted. When 
active, it produces even more” of chapter 5 of Laozi Daodejing could be seen as a reflection of this idea. 
Cited from Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 141-142. 
9
 Fu Pei-jung, 儒道天論發微, 27. 
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Autumn Annals (春秋繁露 Chun-qiu-fan-lu).10  
Everything in the universe originated from Tian and inherits some elements from 
Heaven as part of their inner nature. Thus, everything will ideally follow its nature as 
a way that corresponds to the way of heaven. Besides, they will not conflict with but 
correlate with one another. This picture of the coexistence of these things is called the 
“Great Harmonisation(太和 Tai-he)” and was assumed by Chinese people as the 
original, pure and simple status of the universe. Compared to the reality, this original, 
pure and simple picture of the universe is thus assumed as an ideal vision to return to.  
The above picture of Chinese cosmology is similar to a performance of an 
orchestra. Every musical instrument in the orchestra has its own tonality and its own 
way of playing. Nonetheless, the various ways of an instrument’s tonality and playing 
ideally reflects or exhibits the “principle” of music in one way or another. When a 
piece of musical composition is performed, the tonalities and ways of playing of all 
the instruments should correlate and be in harmony with one another, otherwise its 
performance might violate the principle of music and thus destroy the piece. The 
“principle” of music is “transcendent” since it can merely be exhibited but not 
                                                 
10
 Mencius said, “[…] The way benevolence pertains to the relation between father and son, duty to the 
relation between prince and subject, the rites to the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the 
good and wise man, the sage to the way of Heaven, is the Decree, but therein also lies human nature. 
This is why the gentleman does not describe it as Decree.” (Mencius, 14: 24), cited from Mencius, 
translated with introduction by D. C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 198-199. Dong Zhongshu 
contended that “Heaven has its dual operation of yin and ynag (passive and active cosmic forces), and 
the person also has his dual nature of humanity and greed…. [The way of man] and the Way of Heaven 
are the same….” For the complete paragraph, see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 274.  
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exhausted by any orchestra or any musical instrument. Such “principle” is also 
“immanent” since only through the performance of an orchestra or any instrument can 
it be grasped and experienced by people. Similarly, in the presentation of the idea of a 
musical composition, every orchestra and conductor may have its own unique way of 
performing a particular piece. The principal idea of a musical piece can be seen as its 
theme while the way an orchestra or a musician performs can be taken as a variation. 
For example, there are various versions of performing Frédéric-François Chopin’s 
“Nocturn.” The spirit and the composition of Chopin’s “Nocturn” can be seen as the 
theme while the various performances of it are its variations. Niccolò Paganini’s 
“Caprice” and its later interpreters is another example. Paganini’s work can be taken 
as a theme while the creation based on it by later musicians, such as “Rhapsody on a 
Theme of Paganini” by Sergie Rachmaninoff, can be regarded as its variations. 
Analogically, Dao can be seen as the principle of music or the theme of a 
musical piece. The universe can be taken as an orchestra while humans and myriad 
things dwelling in it are different kinds of instruments. Each of them inherits 
something from Dao and has its own way of realising the Dao. Ideally, like a good 
performance, all in the universe should coexist in a harmonious and correlative state. 
Human beings, as the most intelligent beings, can apprehend the idea of Dao by 
contemplating and investigating the patterns of the ways led by myriad things. They 
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in turn follow their knowledge of Dao from the observation on myriad things to 
actualise what Dao has given to them. As it has been presented in Confucian Doctrine 
of the Mean, “The Dao to which Junzi has committed himself is to be found 
everywhere, and yet it is a secret. The simple intelligence of ordinary men and women 
may understand something of the Dao; but in its utmost quests there is something 
which even the wisest and holiest of men cannot understand.”11 What can be further 
reasoned from this expression is that the Dao or Li is the ultimate reality on the one 
hand and it is ubiquitous, on the other. It can be found by human beings and then 
observed and embodied by human behaviours at any time in any place. It is also the 
root of all dimensions of human life.  
    This cosmological vision implies three motifs: continuity, wholeness and 
dynamism. By continuity it refers to the linkage that will always be found between 
any given pair of things in the universe. What can be inferred from this idea of 
continuity is the motif of wholeness, which means that all under Heaven has been 
included in the flux of self-generating life processes. These two motifs imply the third 
one, dynamism, which denotes that the universe is an organistic unity. It is an open 
                                                 
11
 Original English translation is “The moral law is to be found everywhere, and yet it is a secret. The 
simple intelligence of ordinary men and women of the people may understand something of the moral 
law; but in its utmost reaches there is something which even the wisest and holiest of men cannot 
understood.” See Ku Hung-ming 辜鴻銘, trans., The Conduct of Life (Taipei: Xien-zhi, 1976), 19. I 
replace some of its words according to my understanding and in order to let the wording be consistent 
with the whole thesis. 
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system that is always in unceasing transformation to manifest the Dao.12 This vision 
has also been conceptualised as “the continuity of being.”13 The implication of these 
three motifs is that it shows a pluralist insight in terms of their linkage, taken as the 
consequence of and the manifestation of the ubiquity of Dao. On the other hand, in 
terms of wholeness, the Dao can be apprehended or grasped in the investigation of 
every part and element of the universe. As the ideal status of the universe is 
harmonisation, the continual adjustment of each part thus reflects the dynamism of the 
Dao. Dao is one and ubiquitous while it also manifests itself in the myriad things of 
the universe. Thus forms the basic idea of Chinese pluralistic insight.       
 
6.2 The Li Is One But Its Manifestations Are Many: Its Origin and Development 
6.2.1 Pluralistic Idea within Chinese Thoughts  
Under the influence of the cosmology introduced above, the idea with pluralistic 
insight emerged quite early in Chinese thinking. In the Commentary on the Appended 
Phrases of the Book of Changes (易經繫辭傳 Yi-jing xi-ci zhuan), regarded as one of 
the main theoretical resources of Chinese metaphysics, one passage highlights this 
idea: “What does the world have to think and deliberate about? As all in the world 
                                                 
12
 Tu, Confucian Thought, 38-39. Similar view was suggested by Frederick Mote. See F. Mote, 
Intellectual Foundations of China, chapter 2.  
13
 This is a term coined by a term coined by TU Wei-ming. For the details, see Tu Wei-ming, “The 
Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature,” incorporated as chapter 3 into his Confucian Thought: 
Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985). 
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ultimately comes to the same end, though the roads to it are different, so there is an 
ultimate congruence in thought, though there might be hundreds of ways to deliberate 
about it.”14 Originally, it is said to be Confucius’ elucidation of the phrase of “You 
pace back and forth in consternation, and friends follow your thought” of the 
commentary of the fifth Yang of the hexagram of Sensing (咸卦 Xian-gua).15 This 
phrase is about how an individual could be influenced by his own particular thought 
and thus could depart from an impartial position or good intention. Actually the 
impartial attitude is the initial stage of human mind that is shared by everyone. If one 
can behave in accordance with the initial good status of mind, then one can move 
one’s fellow people and not go wrong.16 
Even in the saying of Confucius, as recorded in his Analects, there exist records 
of pluralistic insight. One of them is the phrase of “The Junzi harmonises but does not 
identify himself with others.”17 In Confucianism, to be a Junzi is to fully develop and 
realise one’s own human nature that is endowed by Heaven. The human nature 
endowed by Heaven to every individual is essentially the same; however, due to the 
biological structure of human body and the situation it embodies, the ways and the 
                                                 
14
 Lynn, trans., The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, 
81. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Lynn, trans., The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang 
Bi,p.332; Cheng Yi, I Ching: The Tao of Organization, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston & London: 
Shambhala, 1988), 99-100. 
17
 The Analects, 13:23. Cited originally from Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 41, with an 
amendment based on my own understanding of the idea of Confucianism.  
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styles of its manifestation are different. Thus, what a Junzi commits to is both the 
actualisation of his humanity and the harmonisation of his own personality with the 
diverse embodiment of humanity, as found in his colleagues and friends, through a 
process of communication and interaction.  
The Hua-yan school(華嚴宗 hua-yan-zong) of Chinese Buddhism was known 
for its idea of the correlation between the one and the all. The following paragraph 
from Mastering the Ten Mysteries (十玄門 Shi-xuan-men) of this school may 
properly show its basic idea:18 
 
In each of the lion’s eyes, ears, limbs, joints, and in each and every hair, there is 
the golden lion. All the lions embraced by all the single hairs simultaneously 
and instantaneously enter a single hair. Thus in each and every hair there are an 
infinite number of lions, and in addition all the single hairs, together with their 
infinite number of lions, in turn enter into a single hair. In this way the 
geometric progression is infinite, like the jewels of Celestial Lord Indra’s net. 
This is called the gate of the realm of Indra’s net. 
 
    In brief, it is a philosophy and a worldview that all things in this world are 
“coexistent, interwoven, interrelated, interpenetrating, mutually inclusive, reflecting 
one another, and so on.”19 Later Confucians would develop this pluralistic insight 
based on both the theoretical background of Chinese cosmology and the tradition of 
Hua-yan Buddhism.20 
                                                 
18
 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 412. 
19
 Ibid., 407.  
20
 It has been argued that since some of the Neo-Confucians had ever studied the teachings of 
Buddhism and some of them even in turn developed Confucian metaphysics to criticise Buddhism, 
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This cosmological vision has been philosophically expressed by a number of 
Chinese philosophers. ZHANG Zai 張載 (1020-1077), a Neo-Confucian in the 
Northern Song Dynasty (北宋 Bei Song, 960-1127 CE), was inspired by the idea 
from the Book of Changes and connected the concept of Qi 氣, often translated as vital 
force or as material force, with the Great Ultimate (太極 Tai-ji),21 a technical term 
used to describe the universal operation of the Li which can operate in all things and 
throughout all time.22  
Briefly speaking, in Zhang Zai’s philosophy, Qi is something eternal in the 
process of changing between the two principles of Yin 陰 and Yang 陽, negative and 
positive, respectively. Further, the change of anything from condensation to dispersion 
or from visibility to invisibility does not indicate the quantitative extinction of the 
thing in question. Based on this idea, the whole universe is not just a repetitive 
process but a transformation and dynamical process. This is a dynamic process of 
transformation toward harmonisation. It is in the process of the harmonisation that the 
transformation of everything is possible since each of them will need to adjust itself 
towards a position that fits the whole environment. Like most Chinese thinkers, Zhang 
                                                                                                                                            
although there had been a theoretical background for their understanding of the universe, the influence 
of Buddhism on them should not be neglected. See, for example, Liu Shu- hsien, Understanding 
Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), chapter 7; Chan, 
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 406-408. However, the communication between Confucianism 
and Buddhism has been a complicate and hence controversial issue in the study of the history of 
Chinese thought. Reader who is interested in this field can consult any books or volumes of Chinese 
philosophy or intellectual history to learn about it. 
21
 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 495. 
22
 Ch’en Ch’un, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, 116. 
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Zai does not concern himself with the existence or non-existence of a Creator and its 
essence. In Zhang Zai’s philosophy, Qi is a self-moving force that makes all changes 
and motion in the universe possible.23 
For Chinese thinkers, the universe is one, however, due to the function of the Qi, 
it is always transforming. Thus, the way the vital force functions can be seen as a 
principle while each stage of the transformation of the universe is one of its 
manifestations. This idea was implicit in Zhang Zai’s philosophy and reinterpreted in 
each generation of Confucians. This idea was later summarised in the phrase “the Li is 
one but its manifestations are many.”24 
 
6.2.2 Confucian Conceptualisation 
The proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many” was coined by 
CHENG Yi 程頤 (1033-1107), a Neo-Confucian of the Northern Song Dynasty, when 
he answered his student YANG Shi’s 楊時(1053-1135) question about the essay, 
“Western Inscription (西銘 Xi Ming),” authored by Zhang Zai. Zhang Zai did not 
clearly articulate this idea in his essay. It was Cheng Yi who interpreted some 
                                                 
23
 There are still other key notions such as the Great void or Great Vacuity (太虛 Tai-xu) in Zhang Zai 
philosophy. There is a complicate relation between these notions which, due the main concern of this 
study, must be ignored here. For the characteristics of Zhang Zai’s concept of Qi and the main idea of 
his philosophy, see Siu-chi Huang 黃秀璣, “Chang Tsai’s Concept of Ch’i,” Philosophy East and West 
18, no. 4 (October 1968), 247-260. A more comprehensive discussion can be found in TANG Chün-i 
唐君毅, “Chang Tsai’s Theory of Mind and Its Metaphysical Basis,” Philosophy East and West 6, no. 2 
(July 1956), 113-136. 
24
 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 495. 
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thoughts from Zhang Zai’s work and contended that this idea was the real intention of 
Zhang Zai. Besides, according to Cheng Yi, the implication of this proposition can be 
traced back to the ancient Confucian teacher Mencius’ doctrine of moral mind. In 
“Western Inscription,” Zhang Zai mentioned that: 
 
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I 
finds an intimate place in their midst. 
Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which 
directs the universe I consider as my nature. 
All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions….25 
 
    For some Confucians, what seems to be bewildering is the idea that was shown 
in the sentence of “All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my 
companions.” Through this expression, Zhang Zai seemed to depart from the main 
thrust of Confucianism with its thematic idea of Ren 仁. Similar to the idea of 
humanity in the West, Ren originally meant the authentic relationship between two 
persons with gradations of love (for example, one’s love of parents is different and 
should be of the highest degree when its compares to one’s love of spouse or love of 
friends) and was subject to the mundane world. Zhang Zai’s expression that appeared 
to advocate for a universal love without differentiation led to an impression that his 
doctrine was actually an explanation of Mozi’s 墨子 (ca. 468-376 BCE ?) doctrine of 
                                                 
25
 These are the three opening paragraphs of “Western Inscription.” The whole English translation can 
be found in Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 497-498. Its original text in Chinese, together 
with “Eastern Inscription,” renamed as Qian-chen-pian 乾稱篇, can be found in A Collection of the 
Works of Zhang Zai (張載集 Zhang-zai-ji)(In Chinese) (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1978 
[reprinted in 2006]), 62-66. 
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“love without differentiation (兼愛 Jian-ai).” Yang Shi, for instance, questioned the 
idea in Zhang Zai’s essay and argued that he only discussed the substance (體 Ti) of 
Ren without considering its function (用 Yong).26 This question was then answered by 
Cheng Yi in “A Letter in Reply to Yang Shi’s Letter on the Western Inscription”:  
 
[…]The “Western Inscription” makes it clear that Li is one but its 
manifestations are many, but Mo Tzu’s teachings involve two bases without 
differentiation. (To treat the elders in one’s own family with respect and the 
young with tenderness and then extend that respect and tenderness to include 
the elders and young in other families shows that principle is one, whereas Mo 
Tzu’s doctrine of universal love without distinction means that there are two 
bases [one’s own parents as the source of life and also other people’s parents]). 
The fault of having [only] the many manifestations [that is, distinctions in 
human relations but no universal principle underlying them] is that selfishness 
will dominate and humanity (jen [ren]) will be lost. On the other hand, the sin 
of having no manifestations is that there will be universal love for all without 
righteousness. To establish the many manifestations and to extend the one Li in 
order to check the tendency of being dominated by selfishness, is the method of 
jen [ren]. To make no distinction in human relations and to be deluded in 
universal love to the extreme of recognizing no special relationship with the 
father, is to do violent injury to righteousness.[…] its intention is to enable 
people to extend [principle] and put it into practice. The purpose is primarily for 
its function (practice).…27 
 
What Cheng Yi contended here was that although Zhang Zai’s essay had mainly 
tackled the idea of Ren as universal love, it did not mean that Zhang Zai betrayed 
Confucian doctrine. He argued that since the essay did not only show the idea of Ren 
                                                 
26
 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp.498-499; 550-551. 
27
 Ibid., 498-499; 550-551. Here the “principle” in English translation is replaced by Li, which is the 
original transliteration of 理. For its Chinese text, see, A Collection of the Works of the Two Cheng 
Brothers(二程集 Er-cheng-ji) (in Chinese) (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2004), vol. 1, 609. 
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as humanity and universal love as the substance of how people conduct themselves in 
this world, but it also presented that, in practice, there are different manifestations of 
the idea of Ren. Ideally, the result of those manifestations in the practice should be in 
a righteous state. That is, the idea of Ren should be realised properly in every human 
relationship. In addition to the pluralistic idea that is implicit in it, this proposition 
presents a dyadic relationship between Li and its manifestations: Li is the ground for 
its manifestations while without the latter the former could not be understood and 
comprehended by humans. For example, the idea of filial piety based on human 
consciousness can not be understood without its embodiment in the practice of the 
father-son relationship while the father-son relationship could be distorted without the 
idea of filial piety as its criterion.28 
It could be said that it was during this time that the idea of Ren as the substance 
of human behaviour that Ren became an ontological term in the Confucian tradition.29 
Additionally, the role of the Li also became significant and began to be considered in 
the perspective of metaphysics at this moment. Yang Shi recorded Cheng’s teaching 
and this was passed on from one generation to another.30 
                                                 
28
 This idea was inspired by Ch’en Ch’un. See Ch’en Ch’un, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, section 
127 (p.107). 
29
 However, this does not mean that in classical Confucian text the idea of Jen (Ren) was lack of this 
dimension and was merely a notion of morality or ethics. For the relevant discussion, see Tu 
Wei-ming’s “Jen as a Living Metaphor in the Confucian Analects,” incorporated as chapter V into his 
Confucian Thought. The most relevant discussion can be found on pages 87-90 of that book. 
30
 Cf. Liu Shu-hsien, “Liyi fenshu (Li-i fen-shu): Principle and Manifestations,” in Encyclopedia of 
Chinese Philosophy, ed. Antonio S. Cua (New York: Routledge, 2003), 409-410. 
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Whether Cheng Yi’s exposition of the theme of Zhang Zai’s essay tallied with its 
original meaning is another question and, again, is not the concern of this study. It was 
Cheng Yi who clearly addressed this in his letter that “the Li is one but its 
manifestations are many.” Cheng Yi also used this idea when he discussed the 
paragraph of the Commentary on the Appended Phrases of the Book of Changes that 
was mentioned at the beginning of this section. He explained a relevant sentence of 
hexagram of Sensing that corresponds to this phrase as “There is only one Li; though 
the roads may be different, the goal is the same, and though there may be many plans, 
the aim is the same. Though people are different and things change, take them in as 
one and you cannot go wrong.”31 According to the exegesis of ZHU Xi 朱熹 
(1130-1200), a Neo-Confucian of the Southern Song Dynasty (南宋 Nan Song, 
1127-1279 CE) with abiding and great influence on the intellectual history of China 
since then, the “same end” in this context referred to the Li and showed that there is 
one Li in this universe.32 Furthermore, what this phrase implies is that the ways to 
grasp, experience, embody and display the Li are different but each of them has 
something in common. Zhu Xi’s explanation and interpretation of the proposition “the 
Li is one but its manifestations are many” had further developed its cosmological and 
                                                 
31
 Cited from Cheng Yi, I Ching: The Tao of Organization, 99. Here this research just replaces the term 
“Truth” with “Li” in accordance with its original Chinese text. For the Chinese text, consult A 
Collection of the Works of the Two Cheng Brothers, vol. 2, 858 
32
 Zhu Xi, Original Meaning of the Book of the Changes (易本義 Yi-ben-yi)(in Chinese)(Taipei: 
Jin-feng publisher, 1997), 416.   
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metaphysical implications.33 For example, when elucidating Confucius’s teaching of 
“there is one thread that runs through all my doctrine” recorded in chapter 4 of the 
Analects, Zhu Xi contended that the Li as substance is the one and the same root of 
myriad things in this world and that it is the function of Dao that make everything 
situated properly and righteously possible.34 Zhu Xi also suggested that “every thing 
in the world has this Li; all these Lis come from the same root. Merely because every 
of them is in a different position, the function of Li is variant.”35 Again, against the 
background of Chinese cosmology, especially the relationship between the Heaven 
and humans (especially the theory that the “isness” implies “oughtness”), both Cheng 
Yi and Zhu Xi emphasised the methodology of investigating things to gain the 
knowledge of the Li (即物窮理 Ji-wu-qiong-li). A formulation made by Zhu Xi 
demonstrated this idea: 
 
The words, ‘the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things,’ 
mean that we should apply ourselves to things so as to gain an exhaustive 
knowledge of their Li. This is because there is no human intelligence (utterly) 
devoid of knowledge, and no single thing in the world without Li. But because 
(the knowledge of) these Lis is not exhaustive, this knowledge is consequently 
                                                 
33
 See Liu, “Reflections on Approaches to a Universal Ethics from a Contemporary Neo-Confucian 
Perspective,” in For All Life: Toward a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethics: An Interreligious 
Dialogue, ed. Leonard Swidler (Ashland: White Cloud Press, 1999), 159.  
34
 For the time being I can not find out any English translation of the relevant phrases. For the Chinese 
text, see Zhu Xi, A Collection of the Annotation of the Four Books of Confucianism (四書章句集註, 
Si-shu-zhang-ju-ji-zhu) (Taipei: Legein Society, 2000), 72. 
35
 LI Jingde 黎靖德, ed., A Record of Master Zhu’s Dialogues with His Students(朱子語類
Zhu-zi-yu-lei), vol. 18. (http://www.guoxue.com/gxzi/zhuziyulei/zzyl018.htm; accessed 2 October, 
2010). As a consummate philosopher of the works of his forerunners, Zhu Xi’s theoretical system is too 
complicate to be presented with mere few lines of words. What has been indicated here is just Zhu Xi’s 
basic idea of the proposition of the Li and its manifestations, which is of most relevance to the present 
inquiry. 
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in some way incomplete. That is why the first instruction of the Great 
Learning is that the student must, for all the separate things in the world, 
proceed, by means of the Lis already known to him, to gain a further 
exhaustive knowledge of those others (with which he is as yet unfamiliar), in 
this way seeking to extend (his knowledge) to the furthest point.  When one 
has exerted oneself for a long time, finally a morning will come when 
complete understanding will open before one. Thereupon there will be 
thorough comprehension of all the multitude of things, external or internal, 
fine or coarse, and every exercise of the mind will be marked by complete 
enlightenment.”36 
 
This proposition soon became a very influential thesis among Confucian 
intellectuals. However, since each Confucian school has a different emphasis, there 
have been variant interpretations of this proposition. There are three main schools of 
Neo-Confucianism: the school of Xin or mind/heart (心學 Xin-xue), the school of Qi 
(氣學 Qi-xue) and the school of Li (理學 Li-xue).  
Generally speaking, the school of Xin sees this proposition with Li as identical 
with human moral consciousness. Thus all the Lis of the myriad things can be found 
within human beings. For example, LU Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139-1193), one of the 
most important figures of this school, had even claimed that “The Mind is one and the 
principle is one. Perfect truth is reduced to a unity; the essential principle is never a 
duality. The mind and principle can never be separated into two.”37 
As for the school of Qi, its followers stress the idea that the way of the 
                                                 
36
 See Fung Yu-lan 馮友蘭, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), 561. Here the “principle” in the English translation is replaced by Li, which is 
the original transliteration of 理. 
37
 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 574. 
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circulation of Qi is Li; thus the Li is within and pervades this universe with every part 
of the universe partially reflecting the Li. The Qi is the substance of all things in this 
universe. They share the Li but are different from one another in terms of their 
composition of Qi. 
For the school of Li, its followers highlight the objectivity and the transcendence 
of Li and contend that although the Li is manifested and embodied in everything in the 
world, human beings still need to comprehend the Li by contemplating everything 
outside themselves. This would enable them to learn the way of Tian and further help 
themselves in moral self-cultivation as a path to embody the Dao. Consequently, it 
can be said that, to some extent, this proposition is the Li while all its interpretations 
within different Confucian schools and in different era are the various manifestations 
of this particular proposition.38  
The proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many” is further 
developed during the modern era (1920s–). Chinese scholars and thinkers, especially 
the followers of Confucianism, responded to domestic issues and challenges from the 
                                                 
38
 For a brief introduction of characteristics and the development of these schools within Confucian 
philosophy, Reader can consult Liu Shu-hsien, Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and 
Sung-Ming (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), chapter 7; Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96-114. What needs to be mentioned here is that, 
generally speaking, it is known that there are two main schools of Confucianism, the school of Xin and 
the school of Li, after the rising of Neo-Confucianism. This is the basic position of these two books. 
And the aim of referring to them is merely to offer some materials for a basic understanding of the 
ideas of Neo-Confucianism. Was there ever a school of Qi in the history of Confucianism is a still 
debatable question. Scholars who suggest that there were three schools within Neo-Confucianism will 
argue that Zhang Zai and his successor WANG Fu-zhi 王夫之(1619-1692)can be seen as the main 
representatives of the school of Qi. 
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West, such as the Global Ethic and inter-religious dialogue, which emerged in the 
encounter of the East and the West.  
 
6.3 A Modern Interpretation Proposed 
As mentioned previously (§1.1.5.3), when facing the problems of religious 
diversity, some Chinese scholars also offered their suggestions through interpreting or 
exploring the theoretical resources of Chinese thought. Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先 
(1934-), one of the representatives of the third generation of Contemporary 
Neo-Confucianism, is perhaps the most renowned scholar who inherits the spirit of 
“the Li is one but its manifestations are many” and has tried to consider it 
systematically in the modern era.39 Some works inspired by Liu’s approach have also 
emerged in Chinese.40 
Although trained widely in Chinese, Western and Indian philosophy, Liu’s 
thought was first inspired by Ernst Cassirer’s (1874-1945) Philosophy of Symbolic 
                                                 
39
 For the details of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, see those books mentioned in the footnote 53 of 
Chapter 5. 
40
 PENG Guoxiang’s 彭國翔 anthology, Confucian Tradition: Crossing Religion and Humanism (儒
家傳統：宗教與人文主義之間 Ru-jia-chuan-tong zong-jiao yu ren-wen-zhu-yi-zhi-jian) (Beijing: 
Peking University Press, 2007), can be taken as an instance. What needs to be mentioned here is that, 
HONG Handing 洪漢鼎, a celebrated scholar of Hermeneutics in Chinese academic circle, suggests 
that there is methodological implications of this proposition. See Hong,“On the Changing Meaning of 
the Proposition “li-i erh-fen-shu” (One Principle, Many Manifestations) in Traditional Chinese 
Philosophy － from the Perspective of Hermeneutics (從詮釋學看中國傳統哲學「理一而分殊」命
題的意義變遷 Cong quan-shi-xue kan zhong-guo-chuan-tong-zhe-xue li-yi-er-fen-shu ming-ti de yi-yi 
bian-qian),”Newsletter of Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy (中國文哲研究通訊 
Zhong-guo-wen-zhe-yan-jiu-tong-xun Zhong-guo-wen-zhe-yan-jiu-tong-xun ) 9, no.3 (September 1999), 
33-57. But Hong’s discussion is about the philosophical implication and thus is not the concern of the 
present research. 
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Forms and his idea of functional unity and the distinction between constituent 
principle and regulative principles. Later on, Liu explored Paul Tillich’s (1886-1965) 
notion of ultimate concern in the discussion of the religious dimension of 
Confucianism. With the aid of these theoretical resources, Liu returns to the study of 
Chinese philosophy and applies himself to the reinterpretation and the further 
development of Confucianism.41  
The influence of Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolism on Liu can be seen mainly 
in Liu’s reinterpretation of the philosophy of The Book of Changes. Cassirer indicates 
the difference between the substantial and functional unity. By substantial unity 
Cassirer refers to any metaphysical definition or any presupposition of homogeneity 
of men suggested by traditional philosophers. Aristotle’s definition of man as rational 
animal can be taken as a case. Rather, according to Cassirer, the unity of men should 
be a functional unity because all the aspects (Cassirer refers to myth, language, 
religion, history, art and science) of human creativity involve the use of symbols and 
reflect the notion of men and human nature. In terms of this, the notion of human 
nature is dynamic and always changing and can not be defined in light of any 
particular dimension of human work. Liu applies the idea of functional unity into his 
understanding of the Book of Changes. He identifies four dimensions of the 
                                                 
41
 Liu has offered a brief review of the development of his thought and his academic career in his book, 
Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy (London: Greenwood, 2003), 131-135. This 
present research will merely refer to the most relevant parts in the following discussion.    
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symbolism of the Book of Changes: mystical, natural/ rational, cosmological and 
ethical/ metaphysical. Furthermore, he points out that there is a functional unity, 
rather than a substantial unity, of all these dimensions. All these dimensions are to 
some extent related to one another and reflect the Chinese idea of “Heaven and man 
in union (天人合一 Tian-ren-he-yi).” However, none of these dimensions can be taken 
as the only correct expression of that concern.42 It is also in terms of this that this 
unity is a “unity in diversity.” 
Another related notion that is employed by Liu is Cassirer’s discussion of a 
regulative principle. According to Liu, by regulative principle, Cassirer means an 
ideal that can guide and regulate our thinking. For example, though there are different 
laws of contradiction in different logical systems. Each of them is a constituent 
principle and can only work in a relevant system. They are the constituent principles 
in the sense that they are about the knowledge of their corresponding objects in 
question. However, the ideal of contradiction is the regulative principle that makes all 
logical systems coherent, consistent and self-contained.43  
                                                 
42
 See Liu Shu-hsien, “On the Functional Unity of the Four Dimensions of Thought in the Book of 
Changes,” originally published on the Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 17, no.3 (Sep., 1990), 
pp.359-385, incorporated later into Collected Papers of Liu Shu-hsien: A Contemporary Interpretation 
of Confucian Philosophy (in two volumes)(Taipei: Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy 
Library of Academia Sinica, 2004), pp.271-298. YAO Caigang 姚才剛, Integration of Ultimate Faith 
and Pluralistic Value: A Study of Liu Shu-hsien’s Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy (終極信仰
與多元價值的融通－劉述先新儒學思想研究 
Zhong-ji-xin-yang-yu-duo-yuan-jia-zhi-de-rong-tong-liu-shu-xian-xin-ru-xue-si-xiang-yan-jiuo)(in 
Chinese)(Chengdu: Ba-shu-shu-she, 2003), 105-111. A fully-developed illustration of Liu’s 
reinterpretation can be found in the Chapter 5 of his Understanding of Confucian Philosophy: Classical 
and Sung-Ming (Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1998).  
43
 Yao Caigang, Integration of Ultimate Faith and Pluralistic Value, 111-113. Liu’s understanding of 
                                    
270 
 
Liu also finds value in the thinking of Paul Tillich. On the one hand, Liu was in 
line with Tillich’s argument that the human concept of God is a religious symbol 
which points beyond to “the God above God” and his understanding of Religion as 
the ultimate concern of human beings. However, on the other hand, Liu doubted the 
possibility for human beings to make anyone symbolic statement of God as Tillich has 
                                                                                                                                            
Cassirer’s notion of regulative principle is not the concern of this research. Nonetheless, certain 
relevant paragraphs of Cassirer’s idea are still cited as follows. (1) “[…] Principles are invariably such 
bold anticipations that justify themselves in what they accomplish by way of construction and inner 
organization of our total knowledge. They refer not directly to phenomena but to the form of the laws 
according to which we order these phenomena. A genuine principle, therefore, is not equivalent to a 
natural law. It is rather the birthplace of natural laws, a matrix as it were, out of which new natural laws 
may be born again and again.” (2) “Every special assumption concerning the form of natural events 
now derives from the general statement of the causal law. What we can find unambiguously and as fact 
without hypothetical interpolations- so he [H. L. F. von Helmholtz] claims- is the fact of orderliness 
according to law (das Gesetzliche) in phenomena. This orderliness is the first product of the conceptual 
grasp of nature. What we call “cause” can be understood and justified only in this sense, even though in 
the common use of language the word is employed in a very confused way for antecedent or condition. 
We cannot achieve more than a knowledge of orderliness according to law in the domain of the real, 
though the latter is represented, to be sure, merely in the sign system of our sense impressions. Every 
rightly framed hypothesis in keeping with its factual meaning sets up a law concerning phenomena 
more general than what has till then been directly observed; it is an attempt to ascend to an orderliness 
ever more general and comprehensive. How far this attempt will succeed cannot be predetermined; in 
each particular case we must leave the decision to experience. But the search after ever more general 
laws is a basic feature, a regulative principle of our thought. It is precisely this regulative principle, and 
nothing else, that we call the causal law. In this sense it is given a priori, it is a transcendental law: for 
a proof of it from experience is not possible. It is true on the one hand, however, that we have no other 
warrant for its applicability than its success. We could live in a world in which every atom differed 
from every other and no regularity was perceivable. In such a world our intellectual activity would 
necessarily come to rest. But the investigator does not reckon with such a world. He trusts in the 
intelligibility of natural phenomena; and every particular inductive inference would be untenable for 
him, if this universal trust did not form its basis. “Here only one counsel is valid: Trust the inadequate 
and act on it; then it will become a fact.”” (3) “[…] All scientific thought is dominated and guided by 
two opposing tendencies that are engaged in a continual process of mutual adjustment. The demand of 
“specification” is the counterpoise to the claim of “homogeneity.” The struggle between these two 
cannot be decided purely objectively from the nature of the object. It is a dissension and competition 
that belongs not so much to the nature of things as to scientific reason itself. In this sense homogeneity 
and specification were introduced into Kant’s Critique of Reason, not as constitutive principles, 
pertaining to the knowledge of objects but as regulative principles, as maxims of scientific inquiry. 
They are subjective principles that derive not from the constitution of objects but from the interest of 
reason. According to Kant, therefore, it is not surprising that one investigator should have a great 
interest in multiplicity while for another the interest in unity should be dominant. A true conflict 
between the two goals does not exist. Strife arises between them only when, being in truth nothing 
more than logical rules of pedagogy, they are mistaken for pronouncements of metaphysical wisdom.” 
For all these three paragraphs cited here, see Ernst Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern 
Physics: Historical and Systematic Studies of the Problem of Causality, trans. Theodor Benfry, with a 
preface by Henry Margenau (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 
Oxford University Press, 1956), 52-53; 62- 63; 80.  
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interpreted God as “being itself,” which is inaccessible to human cognition. 
Furthermore, Liu disagrees with Tillich’s claim that only Christianity can offer the 
true ultimate concern and religious faith. Liu further suggests that it is obligatory for 
human beings to realise the religious depth within themselves and that their final end 
is to be human. Liu believes Confucian understandings of humanity’s profound depth 
within and its relationship with Heaven can support Tillich’s argument of the 
exploration of the meaning of ultimate concern.44  
One of Liu’s contributions to the development of Confucianism over the past 
years is his participation in the interreligious dialogue and the meeting for discussing 
the feasibility of drafting a Declaration for Universal Ethics.45 In his relevant articles 
on this topic published in Chinese and English, Liu proposes that the copious 
implications of proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many” could 
benefit the conception of universal ethics and religious pluralism when it is properly 
translated into the modern world.  
Liu first mentions the significance of the interpretation of this proposition in  
his 1993 book On the Complexity of Interaction between Ideals and the Real World 
                                                 
44
 See Liu Shu-hsien, “A Critique of Paul Tillich’s Doctrine of God and Christology from an Oriental 
Perspective,” originally published in Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogues, edited by Charles 
Wei-hsun FU 傅偉勳 and Gerhard E. Spiegler (New York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 
1989), 511-532; incorporated later into Collected Papers of Liu Shu-hsien, 633-654. The topic of Liu’s 
PhD dissertation is about Paul Tillich. But for the time being, the ongoing research does not have 
access to it. For readers who might be of interest, see Liu Shu-hsien, A Critical Study of Paul Tillich’s 
Methodological Presuppositions (PhD Dissertation of Southern Illinois University, 1966). 
45
 An article entitled “Reflection on Approaches to a Universal Ethics from a Contemporary 
Neo-Confucian Perspective” by Liu has also been incorporated into For All Life: Toward a Universal 
Declaration of a Global Ethic, ed. Leonard Swidler. See Leonard Swidler, For All Life, 154-171. 
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(現實與理想的糾結 Xianshi yu lixange de jiujie).46 In Global Ethic and 
Interreligious Dialogue (全球倫理與宗教對話 Quan-qiu lun-li yu zongjiao dui-hua) 
(2001),47 Liu further suggests that the proposition of “the Li is one but its 
manifestations are many” could be an alternative framework of pluralism, interfaith 
dialogue and Global Ethic. According to Liu, although it is impossible to trace back to 
the original meaning of the proposition of “the Li is one but its propositions are 
many,” it is still reasonable to unpack its insight into our situation according to our 
own concern since, as Confucius had put it, “there is one thread that runs through my 
teaching (吾道一以貫之 Wu-dao-yi-yi-guan-zhi).”48 For Confucians, the “one thread” 
is the ideal of Ren as humanity, sometimes being expressed alternatively as Dao or Li. 
Different collages can be seen as various manifestations of Confucius’ teachings.  
    Under the background of Liu’s interpretation of the proposition of “the Li is one 
but its manifestations are many,” what can be inferred from this proposition is that the 
ways of those who commit themselves to the actualisation of the ideal of Ren can be 
seen as different manifestations of the ultimate concern of the Confucian tradition. 
Moreover, the Confucian schools adopt and emphasise different ways and methods to 
                                                 
46
 See Liu, “A Modern Interpretation of Li-i-fen-shu (理一分殊的現代解釋 Li-i-fen-shu de 
xian-dai-jie-shi),” in On the Complexity of Interaction between Ideals and the Real World (現實與理想
的糾結)(in Chinese)(Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1993), 157-188. 
47
 Liu, Shu- hsien, Global Ethic and Interreligious Dialogue(全球倫理與宗教對話 Quan-qiu-lun-li 
yu zong-jiao-dui-hua)(in Chinese) (Xindian: New Century [立緒文化 Li-xu-wen-hua], 2001). 
48
 The Analects, 4: 15. Cited originally from Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 27. 
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actualise the ultimate concern; these can be regarded as various approaches to pursue 
the ideal of Ren or Dao. Thus, within the Confucian tradition, there is the possibility 
for its members to discuss and communicate with one another the picture of the ideal 
of Ren to explore its meaning and to tolerate the distinction among their ways of 
realisation of the ideal of Ren or Dao. There is also a possibility for the dialogues, or 
to use the term “intra-religious dialogue” in its contemporary discourse of religious 
studies, to be conducted between the schools or sects of the Confucian tradition.  
A brief review of the development of Confucianism can help in illustrating the 
above idea. Like any of the great traditions in this world, Confucianism was originally 
a school of competing thoughts and that arose from a small group of individuals who 
followed, elucidated and spread Confucius’ teaching in the Spring and Autumn and 
Warring States periods (春秋戰國時代 Chun-qiu-zhan-guo-shi-dai)(ca. 770-221 
BCE). Like other traditions of this time, this group did not originally bear the name 
“Confucianism” (儒家 Ru-jia).49 Confucius, as one of the major thinkers, proposed 
the actualisation and the expansion of Ren as the way to cope with the problems of his 
                                                 
49
 There have been some reflections on the proper English translation of the schools and the tradition 
that originated from the teachings of Confucius. See Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, “A New Direction in 
Confucian Scholarship: Approaches to Examining the Differences between Neo-Confucianism and 
"Tao-hsüeh",” Philosophy East and West 42, no. 3 (July 1992), 455-474, for example. Similar 
discussion has also been made by some Chinese scholars. HE Guanghu’s 何光滬 article, “The Origin 
and Development of Chinese Culture” (中國文化的根與花──談儒學的“返本”與“開新” 
Zhong-guo-wen-hua-de-gen-yu-hua—tan-ru-xue-de-fan-ben-yu-kai-xin), can be taken as an example. 
He’s article is also incorporated in Ren Jiyu 任繼愈, ed., .A Collection of the Debates on “the 
Problematique of Confucianism as a Religion”(「儒教問題」爭論集). )(in Chinese)(Beijing: Religion 
and Culture Press, 2000). 
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contemporaries. Then, what was the central meaning of Confucius’s idea of Ren? 
There are various explanations made by Confucius and his disciples. But the most 
significant one is that of Zengzi, one of his disciples. Zengzi said, “The way of the 
Master consists in doing one’s best and in using oneself as a measure to gauge others. 
That is all.”50 As Liu has already pointed out, Zengzi’s understanding can be taken as 
a manifestation of the spirit of Confucius’ Ren as humanity.51 
    After the death of Confucius, his students were divided into eight branches 
according to their own understanding of their teacher’s teachings. In spite of their 
division, the theme of each branch was still the ideal of Ren as humanity. What 
appeared to be a divergence between the opposing teachings of Mencius and Xunzi 
(荀子, 313-238 BCE), two Confucian masters in the Warring states period, was an 
extreme example of this time. Nonetheless, the commonalities between Mencius’ 
argument that the original tendency of human nature is good and Xunzi’s theory of the 
human nature is bad were the aims to actualising the ideal of Ren and the belief in the 
possibility of perfection of human nature. In this regard, it can be said that the ideal of 
Ren that Confucius had advocated was the Li while what had been transmitted by his 
students and followers at that time are its manifestations. 
    Confucianism later became the official doctrine in Han Dynasty (ca. 202 BCE 
                                                 
50
 The Analects, 4:15. Cited from Confucius: The Analects, translated with an introduction by D. C. 
Lau, 74. 
51
 See Liu, The Contemporary Significance and Religious Import of Confucianism (Singapore: The 
Institution of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), 5-6. 
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-220 CE). The main concern of Han-Confucianism was still the actualisation of the 
ideal of Ren. In contrast with Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, Han Confucianism 
adopted ideas from other schools such as Legalism (法家 Fa-jia) and the Yin-yang 
school (陰陽家 Yin-yang-jia) to reconstruct its teachings and doctrines to be more 
persuasive to the ruler of the Empire. Dong Zhongshu’s theory can be taken as an 
example. Dong Zhongshu’s position was much closer to Xunzi. He critised Mencius’s 
theory of the original tendency of human nature is good by maintaining that the 
goodness in human nature needs to be trained to be realised. Dong Zhongshu also 
combined the idea of yin and yang to argue that the goodness of human nature is 
equivent to yang while the feelings as the sources of evil correspond to yin. Besides, 
Dong Zhongshu also made Confucianism welcomed by the Han rulers as the state 
ideology.52    
However, after the Han Dynasty, Confucianism was forced into an underground 
ideology during this time. This was partially due to the social and political chaos in 
the midst of war. But it was also due to the revival of Daoism, the introduction of 
Buddhism in Wei-jing and Southern and Northern Dynasties (魏晉南北朝 
Wei-jing-nan-bei-chao)(ca. 220-589 CE) and the later flourishing of Chinese 
Buddhism in Sui (隋)and Tang (唐)Dynasties (581-907 CE). However, Confucian 
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 See Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, chapter 14. 
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themes and main ideas were still transmitted through the generations and were also 
sometimes incorporated into the Daoist and Buddhist classics. HAN Yu 韓愈 
(768-824) and LI Ao 李翱 (fl.798)’s efforts to save Confucianism from being 
annihilated by Daoism and Buddhism and to direct its revival set the stage for the 
development of a new epoch.53  
    The Song (宋), Yuan (元) and Ming(明) Dynasties (960-1644 CE) were times of 
significant revival for Confucianism. The so-called Neo-Confucianism emerged in 
this period of the history of Chinese philosophy. As stated before, there were three 
schools within this movement: Qi, Xin and Li. Although their emphases on the aspects 
of Confucianism were different, the actualisation of the ideal of Ren in the mundane 
world was still their common concern. The central understanding of Confucius’ Ren at 
this stage is considered in terms of the views of, in Liu’s words, “Heaven as the 
ultimate creative ontological principle in the universe and man as being endowed with 
humanity in his mind and nature.”54  
    There were also some influential Confucian scholars in the Qing (清) Dynasty 
(1644-1912 CE) who stressed historical research, evidential studies and the social 
practice of the Confucian doctrines. DAI Zhen 戴震 (1723-1777) can be seen as one 
of the leading figures during this period. Briefly speaking, instead of taking the Li as a 
                                                 
53
 For Han Yu and Li Ao’s contribution to Confucianism, see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese 
Philosophy, chapter 27. 
54
 Liu, Understanding Confucian Philosophy, 185. 
                                    
277 
 
transcendental concept, Dai zhen argued that it is nothing but the order of “daily 
affairs such as drinking and eating.” Meanwhile, in Dai Zhen’s system, “humanity” 
refers to “the character of production and reproduction” of the transformation of the 
Nature and the idea that “one person fulfills his life and by extension helps all others 
to fulfil their lives.”55   
    Like their predecessors had done when confronting the challenge of Buddhism 
during Tang and Song Dynasties, the Confucian scholars and intellectuals at the turn 
of 20th century tried to reaffirm and re-establish the spirit of Confucianism when 
China faced the invasion of Western culture and thus triggered the rise of the 
Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Moreover, like their predecessors who even 
borrowed some Buddhist notions to reinterpret the doctrines of Confucianism, the 
figures of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism reconstructed Confucianism by adopting 
Western thought, especially the philosophical ideas of German Idealism. Generally 
speaking, these Confucian scholars tended to reinterpret Confucius’s ideal of Ren in 
terms of Western philosophical terminology of ontology and cosmology. For example, 
Mou Zong-san 牟宗三 (1909-1995) was renowned for his re-establishment of 
Confucianism with Immanuel Kant’s philosophy and conceptualised Ren analogically 
within human nature as free will.56 As already discussed, further developments of this 
                                                 
55
 For the details of Dai Zhen’s theory, see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, chapter 38. 
56
 For Mou and Tang’s philosophical systems, see Liu Shu-hsien, Essentials of Contemporary Neo- 
Confucian Philosophy (London: Greenwood, 2003), chapters 6 and 7, for example. For an overview of 
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time include Liu Shu-hsien’s reinterpretation of “the Li is one but its manifestations 
are many” with the insights of Cassirer’s philosophy and Tillich’s theology, and his 
suggestion of taking Ren as the Li as the regulative principle that runs through the 
Confucian tradition.  
    With the communication between the East and the West and the tendencies of 
globalisation, Confucianism was later introduced into other areas of the world and 
developed its own indigenous characteristics. For example, the movement of Boston 
Confucianism emerging in North America can be seen as a new branch of 
Confucianism. Its members hope to deal with problems in the modern society by 
reinterpreting some basic ideas of Confucianism, especially Xunzi’s theory, and by 
combining their own interpretation of Confucianism with the Western philosophies.57  
There were different epochs of the development of Confucianism. Each epoch 
was a manifestation of the basic idea of the teaching of Confucius. Theoretically, even 
though those Confucians in their stages may have their own picture of so-called 
Confucian tradition, none of them can claim that their own version was the orthodox 
understanding of Confucianism.58 However, any manifestation of the Confucius’ 
                                                                                                                                            
the movement of modern Confucianism, see Yao Xinzhong, An Introduction to Confucianism, 251-273. 
57
 For the details, see Robert Neville, Boston Confucianism. For an overview of this school and this 
monographic study, see Jay Goulding’s book review of Boston Confucianism, published in Dao: A 
Journal of Comparative Philosophy 4, no.1 (winter 2004), 193-196. 
58
 Like any other traditions in the world, there have been different and competitive schools of 
Confucians understanding and interpreting Confucianism according to their own living situation. It is 
therefore impossible and unrealistic to exhaust all the theories and practices of Confucian schools or 
groups of literati within this chapter. Any understanding and interpretation of a tradition according to a 
particular purpose and based on a situation will inevitably like a “collage” or a picture gallery.  Any 
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ideal of Ren are guided and regulated by this ideal. Ren thus plays the role of the 
regulative principle and the role as the functional unity and ultimate concern of 
Confucian tradition. 59  
 
6.4 Li as Regulative Principle and Its Implication for Religious Pluralism 
    In light of Liu Shu-Hsien’s interpretation, the Li of this proposition is not 
something substantial or something with an imprint of any particular tradition or 
period of human history. It should rather be taken as a regulative principle to give 
human beings guidance of ways of living and coexistence.60 The Li is then employed 
by Liu in the discussion on the possibility of Global Ethic. Briefly speaking, in 
agreement with the theologians and representatives from different religious groups or 
traditions engaged, Liu thinks that the Latin word “humanum” can serve as the Li and 
as a starting point to develop a global consciousness. 
    It is possible for human beings from different traditions and various cultural 
backgrounds to actualise the idea of “the unity in diversity” wherein the unity is a 
                                                                                                                                            
particular series of pictures that forms “Confucianism” could have some features that differ itself from 
others. The idea of “collage” or a picture gallery is from Ninian Smart, The Phenomenon of Religion 
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973), 20-25. 
59
 The brief story of the development of Confucianism in these paragraphs relies on John Berthrong’s 
introduction of Confucianism in its six epochs. See Berthrong, All Under Heaven, 77-83, for the details. 
Here this study does not follow the idea of three epochs of Confucianism defined by Contemporary 
Neo-Confucianism for its purpose in these sections is to display the implications of the proposition of 
“the Li is one but its manifestations are many.” Yao Xinzhong also proposes a four-stage picture of the 
development of Confucianism. See Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism, 4-9. 
60
 See Liu Shu-hsien, “On the feasibility of Global Ethic from a Comparative Perspective,” Ching 
Feng, vol. 41 nos.3-4 (September- December 1998), pp. 233-247; incorporated later into Collected 
Papers of Liu Shu-hsien: A Contemporary Interpretation of Confucian Philosophy, pp.805-819. 
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“functional unity” to be achieved by endless communication and interaction among 
human traditions. From this point of view, the Li is “transcendent” because as a 
regulative principle it can not be exhausted by human beings as the finite beings 
situated in any particular space and time. Meanwhile, the Li is “immanent” since it 
can be realised by humans with their limited capacities within any particular group. 
The expressions of the Li from any tradition can be seen as its manifestations.61 
    From this perspective, Liu further points out that an inductive approach under the 
background of Western culture to find out the commonality or universal principle of 
the “humanum” of all religions may neglect the divergence among the contents of 
their doctrines. It can only achieve the Wittgensteinian conclusion that there is only a 
family resemblance among the idea of “humanum” of all religious traditions. Liu 
thinks that the universality among religions could be considered in light of “the Li is 
one but its manifestations are many.” The universality could lie in the Li.62 Followed 
the above discussion, this “universality” is the universality in the sense of “unity in 
diversity.”  
    Liu’s theory is Contemporary-Neo-Confucian-centred. The basic doctrine of 
Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is the idea of the “correlation between the Way of 
                                                 
61
 See Liu’s article in Swidler, (ed.), For All Life, especially pp.159-167. The more complete 
expression of this idea is presented in Liu’s essays in Chinese. Reader who is interested in its details, 
please see Liu, Global Ethic and Interreligious Dialogue, chapters 7-9; Attempts on the Exploration of 
Confucian Thought (儒家思想開拓的嘗試 Ru-jia-si-xiang-kai-tuo-de-chang-shi)(Beijing: Chinese 
Social Science Press, 2001), chapter 4. 
62
 Liu, Shu- hsien, Global Ethic and Interreligious Dialogue, pp. 15-38; 203-230; Essentials of 
Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy, p.135. 
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Tian and the inner virtue of human beings,” a principal idea that they claim to be the 
theme of Confucianism.63 They further use this as a criterion to determine which 
epoch of Confucianism and which Confucian intellectual can be included into the 
“orthodox” Confucianism. Liu’s perspective on the development of Confucianism is 
basically in line with this criterion. Apparently, this criterion seems to contradict Liu’s 
own position regarding the Li as a regulative principle and his argument that the 
doctrine of any traditions or any schools of a particular tradition should not be taken 
as the best expression of the Li as regulative principle. In Confucian tradition, the Li 
should be understood in a broader idea – the ideal of Ren as humanity or benevolence. 
Liu has emphasised the ideal of Ren as the regulative principle, but he seems to 
restrict it within the teaching of the correlation between the Way of Heaven and the 
inner virtue within human beings. Nonetheless, Liu’s exploration of this proposition is 
still instructive.  
It could be tenable for Liu to hold that if we search for the “humanum” of all 
religions by means of inductive approach of empirical science we can merely achieve 
a “family resemblance” among the idea of “humanum” of all religious traditions since 
any consequence from the induction might be limited by the given evidence and 
                                                 
63
 In discussing the problem of orthodoxy of Confucianism, Liu contends that “[…] we must agree 
with Neo-Confucian philosophers when they claim that there is continuity between classical 
Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism and that they teach something quite different from Buddhist and 
Taoist thoughts, as those two schools do not believe in the classical and Neo-Confucian views of 
Heaven as the ultimate creative ontological principle in the universe and man as being endowed with 
humanity in his mind and nature.” See Liu, Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and 
Sung-Ming, 185. 
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examples and thus might not be applied to any case which may occur in the future. 
When this criticism is reconsidered in light of a specific religion, things may be 
different. What makes all religious events, traditions and activities "religious" or be 
regarded as members of the religious family, and thus share some family resemblance, 
are certain core traits or characteristics. These traits or characteristics make religious 
activities distinguishable. These traits or characteristics can thus be seen as a pattern 
that can be found among all religious traditions.  In this sense, this pattern might be 
further understood as the Li as the regulative principle that guides and regulates 
human religious activities and thus the development of human religions. Putting it 
differently, if the ideal of Religion can be taken as the regulative principle, then 
various definitions and concrete realisations of it can be seen as its manifestations. 
Further, when the proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many” is 
connected to the vision of Chinese cosmology, namely, the continuity of being, some 
further insight can be unpacked. 
    As mentioned above, there are three motifs of Chinese understandings of nature: 
continuity, wholeness and dynamism. For continuity it means a linkage between any 
given pair of things in the universe. This leads to the motif of wholeness, which 
means that the myriad things have been included in the rhyme of the universe. These 
two motifs imply the dynamism of the universe since it is an organistic unity that is in 
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unceasing transformation. When the proposition of “the Li is one but its 
manifestations are many” is considered in this picture, the linkage of motif of the 
continuity shows that the Li is the regulative principle that runs through all its 
manifestations. To some extent, all its manifestations reflect the Li as the regulative 
principle and thus they correlate to each other as a whole. Since the Li is the 
regulative principle that can not be exhausted by, but can serve as the guidance of its 
manifestations, it is always dynamic and thus open to any future manifestations. 
    The ideal of Religion could also be considered in terms of this picture. In this 
picture, there is supposed to be a linkage between any two religions. Due to this 
linkage, all religions are included in the ideal of Religion (Corresponding to the motif 
of wholeness). Besides, any religion should also be treated as one of the concrete 
manifestations of the ideal of Religion. Any communication and interaction between 
religions via these linkages might put the understanding of the ideal of Religion 
further and at the same time motivate the continual reflection on the given models of 
expressing the ideal of Religion (related to the motif of dynamism). There thus comes 
the tension between any given model and the reality of the diversity of religions and 
further leads to a re-understanding of that ideal and to the refinement, revision or even 
abandonment of any given model. Those reflections on these models might further 
lead to the search for any model that would be better depicting the idea of the 
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Religion and thus the phenomenon of the diversity of religions. At this point, any 
model developed for describing the ideal of Religion could be considered analogically 
as a constituent principle that is set for the knowledge of religions, while the ideal of 
Religion as the regulative principle guides those constituent principles. Actually this is 
also the process that has been implied within the aforementioned formulation of Zhu 
Xi. 
Analogically, like those theoretical patterns within the natural sciences that are 
developed to depict and predict events occur in nature, any model of pluralism is 
suggested as a pattern that account for various religious traditions of human beings. 
Like any scientific pattern might fail to explain the natural phenomenon when some 
anomalies emerge, any framework of religious pluralism might also fail to explain the 
religious diversity. Further, just as the anomalies might trigger a revision or even the 
abandonment of the existing pattern for better understanding and prediction of the 
natural events, any so-called “anomalies” in the field of religion might also serve as 
reference for reflecting any given model of religious pluralism. The interaction 
between the ideal of Religion, any established model of religious pluralism and the 
diversity of religions can thus be illustrated as follows: 
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The above procedure can be described as a logic of religious discovery, which is 
a term that is inspired by the title of Karl Popper’s The logic of Scientific Discovery. 
When tackling various issues of the diversity of religions and religious pluralism, 
keeping this “logic” in mind will help us on the one hand be aware of the potential 
limitations of our understanding of religious phenomenon and on the other hand make 
us open-minded to consider any so-called “irregularities” and accept any possible 
change of the given understanding of the ideal of Religion and any shift of paradigm 
of the model of religious pluralism. 
Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis for the explanation of the diversity of religions is 
established on his understanding of the nature of human religions, namely, all of them 
are the results of human responses to the Real an sich. A close investigation has 
shown that Hick’s understanding of religion is a variant of the ideal of the Religion 
that is based on the monotheist tradition in the West. Although Hick also uses 
Hinduism and Buddhism as supporting evidences to argue for the universality of his 
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hypothesis, it has been indicated in the previous chapter that it is because the religious 
traditions and affairs mentioned by Hick are pertaining to the Indo-European language 
group the members of which sharing similar ideas and concepts. When it encounters 
the religious traditions outside this group, some difficulties in explaining them do 
occur. A refined model of Hick’s hypothesis is thus proposed, which to some extent 
reflects a further understanding of the ideal of Religion when considering those 
traditions emerging within Eastern Asia (see §5.3). In this regard, both Hick’s 
hypothesis and the refined model can be taken as constituent principles that are 
guided by the ideal of Religion as the regulative principle. Both of them are to some 
extent reflecting the ways of human understanding of the ideal of Religion. 
Meanwhile, the suggestion of the refined model embodies the spirit of the motif of the 
dynamism implied in the Chinese cosmology and thus in the proposition of “the Li is 
one but its manifestations are many.” 
    The refined model proposed suggests that “the spiritual quest of the meaning of 
life of human beings that might be answered by the Transcendent or the Absolute that 
is perceived, culturally experienced, postulated and articulated by the prophets, wise 
men and enlightened persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals 
and so forth” can be the pattern. The pattern can work as a constituent principle that 
are on the one hand being guided by the ideal of Religion as the regulative principle 
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and while on the other characterises the “religions.” The pattern can be taken as a 
constituent principle in the sense that it provides an approach for the quest of the 
understanding of the ideal of Religion as the regulative principle by considering and 
investigating various past and present religious traditions. Theoretically, various 
religious traditions and activities in one way or another exhibit this pattern. For 
example, in Christianity it can be embodied with the concept of God and the relevant 
teaching and rituals while in Confucianism it is comprehended as the ideal of Dao or 
Ren and being experienced through moral practice of self-cultivation. By the same 
token, the Chinese, Tibetan, Japanese Buddhism in its practice and details of teaching 
might be different from Buddhism in India and Sri Lanka. However, there are still 
some shared ideas, such as that of Kong (空) as emptiness, among them. Nonetheless, 
as what has been indicated before, their concerns might differ from each other. 
    Although the foregoing understanding of “the Li is one but its manifestations are 
many” is inspired by Liu’s proposal, there are some differences between them. First, 
Liu’s purpose is to suggest an approach for the seeking of a starting point to develop a 
global consciousness as the foundation of the establishment of Global Ethic while that 
of the application of the Li- proposition discussed in this research puts more emphasis 
on the ideal of Religion as the regulative principle to regulate any relevant hypotheses 
or models on religious pluralism.  
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In Liu’s theory, “humanum” or “humanity” can be taken as the Li as the 
regulative principle and functional unity in two aspects: one is considered within a 
particular tradition and the other among all religious traditions. In a particular 
tradition, say Confucianism, the humanum or humanity is expressed as Ren or Dao, 
which in turn serves as the regulative principle of that tradition. The regulative 
principle can guide its students and anyone who is interested in it to investigate the 
relevant documents, rituals, activities and so on to learn about its spirit. Meanwhile, 
no matter how divergent and conflicting the ways of understanding and relevant 
practices are, the theme or the principal spirit of that tradition will be the common 
element among its adherents. As for its implications for considering the issue among 
all the religious traditions, the humanum or humanity is suggested to be the regulative 
principle as the potential common ground for guiding and regulating the development 
of a Global Ethic, as well as the functional unity since any expression of the ideal of 
“humanum” or “humanity” should be taken as being related to one another and 
various reflections of that ideal.  
Similarly, the present research suggests that the ideal of Religion can be taken as 
the regulative principle in directing the discussion of the phenomenon of the diversity 
of religions and religious pluralism, and also the developments in subdisciplines of 
religious studies, such as the history of religion, anthropology of religion, and relevant 
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human activities. The ideal of Religion can also be considered in light of the idea of 
functional unity seeing that any manifestations and descriptions of it made by various 
studies should be treated as being related to one another and different manifestations 
of it. It would not be possible to investigate all human religious traditions to find out 
the common element(s) among them. But it is possible to confirm such element(s) by 
studying the past and present religious traditions and by means of communication and 
mutual understanding among them. When the element(s) is or are found, it or they can 
in turn work as another point of departure to consider the feasibility of any existing 
constituent principle that partially exhibits the ideal of Religion.  
Compared to Liu’s application, this research also borrows the notion of 
constituent principle illustrated by Liu to account for the different models set for the 
discussion on the religious pluralism. The pattern suggested in this present research is 
the pattern as a constituent principle of describing the ideal of Religion. It suggests 
that the ideal of Religion could be expressed as the spiritual quest of the meaning of 
life of human beings that might be “answered” by the Transcendent or the Absolute 
that is perceived, culturally experienced, postulated and articulated by the prophets, 
wise men and enlightened persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, 
rituals, etc. This pattern might be found among all past and present religious traditions 
and activities (reflecting the motif of continuity/linkage). At this point, this pattern as 
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a constituent principle can serve as the Li whereas any concrete religious traditions 
and activities can be taken as its manifestations. This type of Li and its manifestations 
are also the exhibitions of the ideal of Religion and thus can be included in this ideal 
(corresponding to the motif of wholeness). Meanwhile, since it is supposed to be 
guided by the ideal of Religion as the regulative principle in the endless process of 
religious quest of human beings, this pattern is subject to modification when 
encountering any “anomalities” of religious phenomenon or facing any new religions 
emerging in the future (mirroring the motif of dynamism). In this regard, the pattern 
as a constituent principle of expressing the ideal of Religion can be employed as an 
alternative pattern for the discussion of religious pluralism. 
    Then, to what extent can this pattern be taken as a refined model of Hick’s 
hypothesis? How does it work in accounting for the diversity of religions? What is the 
picture that it brings into the issue of religious pluralism? These questions will be 
answered in the following chapter. 
 
Summary 
    In order to present the insight of the Confucian proposition of “the Li is one but 
its manifestations are many” for the topic of religious pluralism and the diversity of 
religions, this chapter has introduced the Chinese cosmology, certain expressions of 
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the pluralistic ideas that emerged in ancient China, and the origin and the 
development of this proposition as a background for understanding its implication. It 
has turned to an interpretation of the Li of this proposition as a regulative principle 
proposed by a Confucian scholar Liu Shu-hsien, whose concern is the establishment 
of Global Ethic on the ideal of humanity (humanum), as inspired by Ernst Cassirer’s 
idea of functional unity and his distinction between the constituent and regulative 
principles. According to Liu, the regulative principle is an ideal that is guiding the 
formation and the function of any relevant constituent principles. At the same time, 
any constituent principles can be regarded as various manifestations of the regulative 
principle. This chapter has then attempted to apply these two principles into a 
discussion on the religious pluralism. It has firstly suggested that the ideas of the 
pattern and the refined model can be combined together and expressed as the spiritual 
quest of the meaning of life of human beings in this ambiguous universe that might be 
answered by the Transcendent or the Absolute that is perceived, culturally 
experienced, postulated and articulated by the prophets, wise men and enlightened 
persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, etc.. Secondly, the 
ideal of Religion can be considered in terms of the idea of functional unity and be 
taken as the regulative principle while any theories of religious pluralism that are 
developed to account for the diversity of religions can be regarded as one of the 
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constituent principles in this pursuit. In this regard, any theories on religious pluralism 
should be guided by the ideal of Religion. In this case, John Hick’s pluralistic 
hypothesis and the refined model are two of the constituent principles that describe 
the ideal of Religion. 
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CHAPTER 7  
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN A UNIVERSE OF FAITHS 
    In order to answer the questions raised by the end of last chapter, this chapter 
will focus on presenting a refined model of Hick’s hypothesis. It will review the main 
ideas of Hick’s hypothesis, the relevant problems and the theoretical resources 
indicated in previous chapters. It will then propose an alternative understanding of the 
ideal of Religion which can be characterised as “the spiritual quest for the meaning of 
life by human beings in this ambiguous universe (i.e. the Real an sich) that might be 
“answered” by the Transcendent or the Absolute that is perceived, culturally 
experienced, postulated and articulated by the prophets, wise men and enlightened 
persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, etc..” It will argue that 
this pattern is expressed variously within different religious traditions. Further, it is 
suggested to be a framework of considering the diversity of religions. Still further, it 
will show that the picture it is painting is a vision of “a universe of faiths.”  
 
7.0 Prolegomena 
At the end of the last chapter, it was indicated that in light of the Confucian 
proposition “the Li is one but its manifestations are many,” the ideal of Religion can 
be considered in light of the idea of functional unity and be taken as the regulative 
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principle while any model developed to account for the diversity of religions can be 
regarded as constituent principles. Just as the constituent principles are regulated and 
guided by the regulative principles, any understandings of the ideal of Religion on 
which those models of religious pluralism are based shall likewise be directed by the 
ideal of Religion. At the same time, just as the constituent principles are the 
reflections of the regulative principle, so shall the understanding of Religion on which 
the models of religious pluralism are based be the manifestations of the ideal of 
Religion.  
Any pattern or model that claims to present properly the ideal of Religion should 
be found among all past and present religious traditions and religious activities and 
thus be applicable in explaining the diversity of religions. At this point, this pattern as 
a constituent principle can serve as the Li whereas any concrete religious traditions 
and activities can be taken as its manifestations. This type of Li and its manifestations 
are also the exhibitions of the ideal of Religion and thus both can be included in this 
ideal. Meanwhile, that pattern or model is subject to be modified when encountering 
any “anomalities” of religious phenomenon or facing any new religions emerging in 
the future. 
In the present study, both of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis and an alternative 
pattern for defining the ideal of Religion as suggested in chapter 6 are taken as two 
                                    
295 
 
constituent principles in considering the diversity of religions. The suggestion of the 
alternative pattern for understanding the ideal of Religion and for investigating the 
diversity of religions is a consequence of a detour to the religious traditions of East 
Asia where the claim to the universality of Hick’s hypothesis becomes questionable. It 
proposes that the ideal of Religion could be expressed as the spiritual quest of the 
meaning of life of human beings that might be answered by the Transcendent or the 
Absolute that is perceived, culturally experienced, postulated and articulated by the 
prophets, wise men and enlightened persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, 
symbols, rituals, etc.. This alternative pattern as a constituent principle of expressing 
the ideal of Religion can be employed as an alternative pattern for the discussion of 
religious pluralism.  
     Nonetheless, Hick’s hypothesis is still informative. The most significant part of 
Hick’s hypothesis is that he appropriates both Kant and Wittgenstein’s philosophies to 
argue for possibility of the plurality of religious experiences of human beings. 
However, there seems to be some elements that need to be further explored so that it 
can work more properly in the explanation of the making of religious experience and 
that of the diversity of religions. At this point, some theoretical resources that are 
within Hick’s hypothesis for refinement have been indicated. This refined model of 
epistemology might also be well connected to the alternative pattern of describing the 
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ideal of Religion when it comes to the issue of the diversity of religions. Based on this 
attempt, it might open a different vision of religious pluralism.  
In order to fully demonstrate the preceding idea, this chapter will offer a brief 
review of the idea of Hick’s hypothesis and the relevant difficulties that have been 
exhibited in previous chapters. This step is a preparation for the discussion of the 
refined model (§7.1). Next, followed from the all relevant analyses and discussions, a 
refined model will be suggested. Hick’s hypothesis and the refined model as two 
constituent principles will be taken as manifestations of the ideal of Religion as the 
regulative principle. A comparison between them will then follow (§7.2). This chapter 
will then apply this refined model in considering the diversity of religions (§7.3). It 
will contend that from Hick’s hypothesis to the refined model is another shift from the 
perspective of the Real-centredness to a vision of a universe of faiths, where the 
diversity of religions could be better explained (§7.4).  
 
7.1 A Brief Review of Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis 
The notion of the Real an sich, the thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as, 
and the standard of soteriological transformation are at the centre of Hick’s 
understanding of the plurality of religions.  
Considering the objective side of religious experience of Hick’s hypothesis, the 
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aim to assume the place of the Real an sich is to assure that human religious 
experience is genuine and that it is not the product of the subjective projection, 
delusion of human consciousness or not merely a play of human linguistic terms. 
According to Hick, the Real is technically a substitute for the term of God on the 
ground that the concept of God might not be properly applied to the explanation of 
other religious traditions such as Buddhism and Daoism. The term “the Real” is not 
exclusive and is familiar within all religious traditions. Hick maintains that the 
advantage of the term the Real is that it has no property that is exclusive of any one 
tradition and could be accepted by all of the world religions seeing that it is familiar to 
them. “The Real” is therefore a good generic name for what has been affirmed in the 
transcendent religious belief.1 Further, Hick argues that it is the epistemic distance 
between human beings and the Real an sich that is set by the Real an sich itself that, 
on the one hand, makes the universe we human beings inhabit ambiguous and, on the 
other hand, allows human beings to respond to the Real an sich freely, either 
religiously or naturalistically.  
Interestingly and noteworthily, what could be inferred from the logic of Hick’s 
thinking is the approach in which he tackles the problem of evil. Now that the Real an 
sich has “set” an epistemic distance between Itself and human beings, on the one hand, 
                                                 
1
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 9-11.  
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human beings can respond to the Real freely without “bearing very much reality.”2 
On the other hand, the Real an sich appears to be a Being not intervening the secular 
world but judging the outcome of the soteriological transformation of human 
behaviours sometime in the unforeseen and nebulous future. In this regard, the way of 
considering the problem of evil can justify itself in Hick’s theory and it seems to some 
extent to sidestep the attacks and questions from those who suffer many varied 
difficulties and are eagerly devoting themselves to wrestling with them in their real 
life. 
As for the subjective side of religious experience, Hick illustrates the cognitive 
faculty of human beings by using some philosophical ideas for the argument of his 
theory. In short, what Hick means by interpretation is basically founded on the idea 
conceptualised by cognitive psychology that it is a complex process of “selecting, 
grouping, extrapolating, excluding, projecting, relating and imposing its own 
interpretive categories.”3 It is in this process that the significance of the object of 
human consciousness occurs and that it could direct human behaviour. Hick firstly 
demonstrates that there is an interpretative element in human experience and explains 
this idea by introducing some physical phenomena such as the experience of drinking 
water. When drinking water, we actually experience a cloud of electrons in rapid 
                                                 
2
 This phrase is adopted from one of T. S. Eliot’s lines, “human kind/ Cannot bear very much reality,” 
which Hick quotes frequently when he discusses religious experience. See ibid., 162, for example. 
3
 See Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 32. 
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swirling motion as a continuous shiny substance. Hick claims that this happens in all 
human experience, which accordingly results in that all human experiencing is 
experiencing-as, a thesis inspired by Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing-as. In order to 
highlight the interpretive element, Hick also uses analogically Kant’s idea of 
categories and argues that the religious concepts and ideas within religious traditions 
play the similar role in the activity of human understanding. 
When this idea is applied into the discussion of religious field, all the religious 
phenomena can be regarded as the outcome of human religiously experiencing-as. 
    Hick further discriminates between the objective and subjective sides of human 
experience with the aid of Kant’s dichotomy of noumenon and phenomenon. Based 
on Kant’s insight, Hick coins the pair of the Real an sich and the Real as being 
humanly perceived and contends that the phenomenon of the diversity of religions are 
the exhibition of the Real an sich as the Real that is experienced by humans and 
attributes it to the multiplicity among the cultural background of human beings. That 
is to say, it is the variety of background of human beings that makes them respond to 
the Real an sich differently. All human religions shall be taken as different responses 
to the Real an sich and thus shall be treated equally. And, in this regard, the conflict 
between their truth-claims is superficial. However, for Hick, there is still some 
criterion for judging the truthfulness of a religion, that is, the soteriological 
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transformation that occurs in their adherents as re-centring their concerns from 
self-interest to the commitment to the Real an sich. 
The soteriological transformation is a process of a “transformation of our human 
situation from a state of alienation from the true structure of reality to a radically 
better state in harmony with reality.”4 Basically, it is supposed to be achieved after 
one has experienced a series of lives. Hick argues that this notion can be treated in a 
broader sense because there is a striking similarity of this phenomenon within the 
world religions. For example, in Buddhist tradition it should be referred to as 
“enlightenment,” it manifests itself as “liberation” in Hinduism while, in Islam, it 
displays itself as the total surrender of the self to the God. Hick further opines that this 
transformation can be taken as the criterion for distinguishing the true religions from 
the false ones.  
Hick’s framework could serve as a second-order theory for the reflection on the 
diversity of religions. However, Hick’s work to some extent homogenises varied 
doctrines and teachings of different religious traditions as if all of them should 
respond to the same and identical, though vague, Real an sich and should be validated 
under the same criterion. It reflects that there is a certain gap between Hick’s 
philosophically pluralistic hypothesis and those theological discourses and religious 
                                                 
4
 An Interpretation of Religion, 10. 
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realities.  
Although the term of the Real an sich is on the surface seemingly less 
controversial and more acceptable for all human religious traditions, when it is placed 
in or works with other parts of Hick’s hypothesis it results in no obviously substantial 
change in treating the transcendent dimension of all human religious traditions. On 
the one hand, it seems that it is too hasty for Hick to replace the concept of God by 
that of the Real which he thinks as much more neutral and feasible in a claim-to-be 
universal religious theory. On the other hand, to the greatest extent, the term the Real 
an sich in Hick’s system appears to be something like a medal that has had its relief, 
inscription and so on rubbed out. It thus becomes an empty blank without any 
significance, though it could be taken as being with an inestimable value.5 Hick’s 
project can still not avoid the attack of the linguistic imperialism and of the 
post-Enlightenment Western imposition which he thinks he has already dealt with 
seeing that at least the Real is still a tincture of monotheism. Hick’s framework will 
inevitably be Procrustean in spite of the fact that he has tried to account for the 
diversity of religions by introducing Wittgensteinian and Kantian epistemological 
                                                 
5
 This idea is inspired by Anatole France’s simile: “the metaphysicians, when they make up a new 
language, are like knife-grinders who grind coins and medals against their stone instead of knives and 
scissors. They rub out the relief, the inscriptions, the portraits and when one can no longer see on the 
coins Victoria or Wilhelm or the French Republic, they explain: these coins now have nothing 
specifically English or German or French about them, for we have taken them out of time and space; 
they now are no longer worth, say, five francs, but rather have an inestimable value, and the area in 
which they are a medium of exchange has been infinitely extended.” See Anatole France, The Garden 
of Epicurus, originally cited in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 368; Griffith-Dickson cites this simile in his work. See Gwen 
Griffith- Dickson, The Philosophy of Religion (London: SCM Press, 2005), 70. 
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ideas. Some scholars thus characterise Hick’s hypothesis as a sort of reductionism and 
is theologically arrogant.6 This position will inevitably lead to an overgeneralisation 
of the complexity of the religious phenomena and the procrustean interpretation of 
religious ideas.  
For example, Hick has even applied the dual concept of the Real to the concepts 
of the Dharmakaya (“dharma body,” 法身 fa-shen), Sambhogakaya (“body of bliss,”
報身 bao-shen) and Nirmanakaya (“manifest body,” 應身 ying-shen) of Mahayana 
Buddhism and identifies the Dharmakaya as the Real an sich. In Hick’s 
understanding – although he claims that he is following Hans Wolfgang Schumanan’s 
exposition – the Sambhogakaya consists of a plurality of transcendent Buddhas who, 
can merely be experienced spiritually and the Nirmankaya consists of earthly human 
beings who have attained final enlightenment and become the perfect vehicle of 
transcendent Buddhas. Hick even considers the implication of the notion of 
Sambhogakaya for the status of the divine personae: one is that it is as the appropriate 
expression of the Dharmakaya and the other is that it is as objectively existing, 
supramundane and subtle being; both can be applied into the consideration on the 
personal manifestations of the Real an sich.7 However, it seems that according to the 
Buddhist classics, the Dharmakaya should be regarded as a realisation of the truth, the 
                                                 
6
 Kenneth Rose has offered a brief review of these two stances. See Kenneth Rose, Knowing the Real: 
John Hick on the Cognitivity of Religions and Religious Pluralism (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 
99-106. 
7
 See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 272-275; The Fifth Dimension, 94-95.  
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Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya are at times understood as the further manifestations 
of the Dharmakaya, and in other times they are another two manifestations of the truth 
to different groups of human beings.8 That is to say, the corresponding concept of the 
idea of Dharmakaya of Buddhism in Hick’s hypothesis might not be that of the Real 
an sich but of the Real as humanly experienced.  
As for the dual concept of the Real, since it is the product of Hick’s application 
of Kant’s noumenon/phenomenon distinction, the questions that have been launched 
toward Kant in the realm of philosophy are thus naturally being applied by Hick’s 
critics to his quasi-Kantian position. The issue of whether the relation of the Real an 
sich to this world is causal is one of these questions. Further, what Hick has contended 
is that the Real an sich is ineffable or beyond the reach of human conceptual systems. 
Those holy images in different traditions are the product of the combination of human 
exercise of their religiously linguistic systems and human experiences. Still further, as 
it has been presented before, it appears that Hick has never clarified the relationship 
between the Real and his idea of the ambiguous universe but merely claims that the 
Real an sich can “impinge” on human consciousness in some mysterious way.  
For Hick, the term “interpretation” refers to the process of human cognition 
which is an act resulting from the combination of the physical structure of human 
                                                 
8
 See the entry of “三身(San-shen),”  Fo Guang Buddhist Dictionary (佛光大辭典 Fo guang 
da-ci-dian)(in Chinese). Available from http://www.fgs.org.tw/fgs_book/fgs_drser.aspx. Accessed on 
10 November 2010. 
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perception which selects the information input from the outside9 and human beings’ 
exercise of their language. However, it seems that what Hick contends to be “an 
interpretative act” is still something to be recognised as the common structure and 
procedure of human cognition and thus normally in this aspect there should be 
nothing different being produced. As Hick has noticed, the freedom of human 
cognition is fairly restricted at this level. Hick is right at this point and indicates that 
there is a common cognitive structure for human beings to survive in the natural 
environment. But it seems that Hick slides his argument of this interpretation as 
universal by introducing the idea of the interpreting act by comparing human 
cognition with other living beings in the world rather than confining his analysis only 
to human understanding.10 The difference of the visions of nature and the related 
reactions to them between human beings and other living beings is caused by the 
distinction between their physiological structures. It is the various linguistic systems 
that make the different interpretation and thus the diversity of religious traditions 
possible. That is to say, Hick’s thesis of “all experiencing is experiencing” should be 
considered at least in terms of linguistic and cultural systems. Meanwhile, it is in this 
context that the implication of the interpretative act can be displayed. Otherwise, it 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 32-33; An Interpretation of Religion, chapter 8, for example. 
10
 Although Hick ever mentioned a case that people who living in dense forests and never experiencing 
objects at a distance will see distance things at first as small instead of as distant, this phenomenon is 
caused by living habit and might change when those people get used to the new situation. Thus, this 
case can not be used as an example for arguing the interpretative elements in human cognitive faculty. 
This case can be found in Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 34. 
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could be merely a mechanical course of stimulus-response and has nothing to do with 
interpretation. It is at this point that human consciousness can freely work and that 
comes out of the multiplicity of the interpretation.  
    The transformation and criterion could only work among those religions that are 
similar to Christianity or are of a monotheistic pattern. As it has been analysed before, 
Hick’s reinterpretation of what he thinks to be strikingly similar among religious 
traditions might to some extent distort the original meaning of the relevant doctrines 
of other religions. Not all religious traditions will presuppose the notion of rebirth or 
reincarnation in a series of life. In addition to the examples discussed in chapter 5, 
Chinese folk religions can serve as another case to rethink Hick’s hypothesis. Apart 
from the worship of ancestors, in Chinese folk religion, there are roughly three groups 
of the cults that have influence on people’s mind: the cults related to Heaven, Earth 
and the underworld, that of deified personalities and that of Confucius and literary 
deities. Basically, these deities determine the fate of every individual according to his 
or her moral behaviour. At the same time, supernatural beings give rewards and 
punishment to people in this life.11 Some scholars even argue that the religion of 
ordinary people is mainly focused on the personal welfare of worshippers.12  
                                                 
11
 See the discussion in C. K. Yang 楊慶堃, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary 
Social Functions of Religion and Some of their historical Factors (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1994), 
chapter 7, for example. 
12
 See the discussion in Poo Mu-chou, In Search of Personal Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese 
Religion (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), for example. 
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    The ideal of Religion from the perspective of Hick’s model is understood as 
“centres upon an awareness of and response to a reality that transcends ourselves and 
our world, whether the ‘direction’ of transcendence be beyond or within or both.”13 
“Such definitions,” Hick continues, “presuppose the reality of the intentional object of 
religious thought and experience; and they are broader or narrower according as this 
object is characterised more generally, for example as a cosmic power, or more 
specifically, for example as a personal God.”14 Nonetheless, Hick has also indicated 
that “religion” can not be adequately defined but only described and, thus, suggested 
that “the worship of a ‘higher unseen power’ is a widespread feature among this 
family of phenomena.”15 Based on this understanding, Hick suggests his 
epistemology of religion to explain the phenomenon of diversity of religions.   
    Hick’s understanding of the ideal of Religion can be taken as a constituent 
principle that presents the ideal of Religion. In his understanding, Hick tries to cover 
both personal and non-personal traditions and all the possible directions of the 
transcendence. At this point, it is convincing. However, when it is connected to his 
pluralistic hypothesis, certain difficulties occur.    
    As analysed before, Hick’s model is still under the influence of monotheistic 
tradition from the West. Hick presupposes the notion of the Real an sich and contends 
                                                 
13
 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 3. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid., 5. 
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that the concepts of God, Allah or Dao should be understood as the Real as perceived, 
which are the manifestations of the Real an sich. However, Hick introduces the idea 
of soteriological transformation that hinge on the Real an sich as the criterion of 
measuring the truthfulness or genuineness of religions. As was discussed in chapter 5 
(§5.3), this setting could be applicable when considering those religions that originate 
from the Indo-European group, but it might not work outside this group. In brief, 
when the investigation is extended to those religions, it reflects that the Real an sich 
might not necessarily refer to a holy Transcendent that is beyond and above our world 
and will make the last judgement of human behaviours. It could rather point to the 
universe in which human beings have been dwelling. Besides, religious traditions 
might follow some type of transformation of human life but not all of them are 
soteriological (see §5.3 for the details).  
    It could be said that although the ways of human responses to the given situation 
might be different, all the traditions share some basic elements that, on the one hand, 
makes them religious and, on the other hand, distinguish them from other human 
activities. As it was suggested before, behind or under those transformations could be 
human beings’ spiritual quest for the meaning of life within this world itself. The 
spiritual quest might be satisfied in terms of various methods in different fields of 
human activities, but at the centre of those activities that can be characterised as 
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“religious,” the human quest for the meaning of life might be answered by those 
Transcendent, Truth or Absolute that are culturally postulated, “experienced” or 
“found” by the prophets, wise men and enlightened persons in this world with the 
operation of the spiritual capacity of human nature. At this point, Hick’s epistemology 
is convincing in explaining the diversity of religions. However, there are also some 
elements of it that can be improved.  
    When Hick’s theory is considered in light of the proposed interpretation of the 
proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many,” then Hick’s hypothesis 
can be seen as one of the manifestations of the ideal of Religion. The ideal of Religion 
is the regulative principle while Hick’s hypothesis is one of the constituent principles 
that reflect it. All the world religions are also reflected in the ideal of Religion. When 
it is found that the hypothesis can not present the reality of the world comprehensively, 
then it is about to be revised, be refined or even be replaced by another one. Some 
resources for the refinement within Hick’s hypothesis have been indicated in the 
previous chapters.  
 
7.2 Towards A Refined Model 
As analysed before, in Hick’s metaphysical system, there are two entities, the 
Real an sich and the ambiguous universe. It seems that whether the Real an sich and 
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the ambiguous universe is one and identical or not is the question that Hick never 
makes any clear statement. From the perspective of Hick’s epistemology, there should 
be only one entity. Therefore if the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe can be 
taken as one and identical, then this potential tension can be eased. On the one hand, 
the Real an sich as the ambiguous universe can be experienced by human beings 
physically, morally or religiously. On the other hand, it is still rational to argue that we 
human beings experience the Real an sich, the ambiguous universe, as God, Allah, 
Dao or Brahman in accordance to our cultural background.  
Further, the discussions of chapters 3, 4 and 5 show that there are two types of 
categories in Hick’s hypothesis. One is the Kantian set of two basic categories, 
namely the personal Deity and the non-personal Absolute. The other set, connected 
with Wittgenstein’s language-game, are religious categories that change and vary 
from time to time and are different from one tradition to another.  
    Concerning the first set of the categories, it has been suggested that they can be 
understood in light of Kant’s transcendental idea. These two transcendental ideas are 
schematised with various religious concepts into either the images of God, Allah or 
that of Dao and Nirvana. As for the second set, they are still the concepts in the 
context of cultural and linguistic systems and are learnt by human beings posteriorly.  
    Next, it has pointed out that the possibility of the communication between the 
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Real an sich and human beings lies in the spiritual aspect – the special capacity – of 
human cognition or a faculty as Kantian “intellectual intuition.” As for the wide range 
of cultural-relative categories within human understanding, they are the elements that 
make human beings’ experience of the Real an sich as the ambiguous universe vary. 
Along with the reinterpretation of the spiritual aspect within human nature, the thesis 
of all experiencing is experiencing-as can be understood and connected more closely 
to Wittgenstein’s notion of language-game and family resemblance.   
    In Wittgenstein’s philosophy, seeing is an immediate experience while the 
experience of seeing-as is the result of employing certain concepts or ideas from a 
linguistic system or cultural background. The religious experience that is based on the 
exercise of the “intellectual intuition” is inevitably being projected into human 
physical language. Analytically, the stage of the manifestation of the intellectual 
intuition can be regarded as the immediate experiencing, while that of its being 
comprehended and expressed is experiencing-as. That is to say, due to the diversity of 
languages, any expression of the experience of the intellectual intuition is 
experiencing-as. Later, the relevant notions may follow to express and record these 
experiences and thus may constitute the basic and fundamental doctrines and 
teachings of religious traditions. The significance of the transcendental ideas, such as 
the concept of God in the Christian tradition, may change and be explored from 
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generation to generation.  
    These linguistic or cultural frameworks can be understood as various forms of 
language-game with some “family resemblance” among them. The particular capacity 
with human nature can be understood as an immediate experience while 
experiencing-as at the religious level is the outcome of applying various religious 
concepts from different religious traditions. These traditions can be understood as part 
of a religious language-game. Some of them may share some overlapping features 
while others have similarities with one another. That is to say, there is some “family 
resemblance” among them. All of them embody the ideal of Religion but none of 
them should be taken as the one and only criterion for the assessment of the others. 
Moreover, since the particular capacity of intellectual intuition is an immediate 
experience, the religious language-game will not merely be the games of language 
and empty concepts. Rather they are the tools by which such experience can be 
conceptualised and expressed. Further, as it can be expressed publicly and be 
understood by certain groups of people, this immediate experience will not merely be 
subjective projection or illusion from human consciousness.  
    Based on the foregoing analyses, an alternative model of Hick’s hypothesis 
emerges. In this model, the Real an sich is identified with the ambiguous universe in 
which human beings are dwelling. It is the ambiguity of the universe that leaves the 
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space for human responses in different ways. Meanwhile, it could stimulate the sense 
of its being ineffable, transcategorial and transcendent due to fact that the ambiguity 
of the universe is beyond human understanding and thus can not be explored and 
expressed thoroughly with a human conceptual and linguistic system. It could still be 
treated as things-in-themselves while what has been perceived and comprehended by 
humans is the phenomenon as the manifestation of the Real an sich. At this point, the 
idea of the ambiguous universe as the Real an sich could be compatible with the 
doctrines of those religions that are this-worldly oriented, since their Truth is to be 
found within this world itself. Concerning those religious traditions that recognise a 
Transcendent as the object of human religious experience, it can be said that such an 
object is the ambiguous universe but is being experienced variously. 
    The key element within human nature for human beings to perceive the Real an 
sich is the spiritual aspect of human cognition in Hick’s sense or some faculty as the 
“intellectual intuition” in the Kantian sense. Once the Real an sich as ambiguous 
universe is intuited intellectually with either of the two transcendental ideas (i.e., the 
personal God and the non-personal Absolute) of human reason, it can be first 
experienced as God or as Dao. With such capacity or intuition, holy images, such as 
God and Yahweh, or sacred ideas, such as Dao and Nirvana, can thus be created or 
conceptualised with the aid of the transcendental ideas of the personal Deity and the 
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non-personal Absolute. Meanwhile, it is at this point that the Kantian factors within 
Hick’s framework can be grafted into the idea of language of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy.  
    The spiritual capacity or the intellectual intuition can be taken as a particular 
immediate experience which is projected in our ordinary language with some degree 
of distortion. In this context, analytically, in the formation of religious experience, the 
object of human consciousness is the ambiguous universe. The particular immediate 
experience of the universe is later articulated in various and relevant religious words 
and phrases and thus is religious experiencing-as. It is first made by the two 
transcendental ideas as the personal God and the non-personal Absolute and later by 
the cultural-relative concepts formed in various religious language-games. The holy 
images in all religious traditions are the outcomes of human experiencing-as with a 
range of religious terms and concepts and all these terms and concepts are part of and 
should be understood in their relevant religious traditions as various forms of the 
language-game.  
    There are many categories under the generic concept of game, including the ball 
game, chess game and so on. Each category may have sub-categories. For instance, 
under the category of ball game, there are basketball, baseball, volleyball, etc. 
Similarly, under the generic concept of Religion there are a range of religious forms, 
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such as Christianity, Hinduism and Daoism. Each religious tradition may have its 
branches as it could be developed variously with its synchronic or diachronic 
accommodation to the environment it situates. For example, within the Islamic 
tradition, there are Sunni Islam, Shia Islam, Sufism and so forth. It can be said that 
“game” as a generic term is a super-ordinate concept to which all its categories and 
sub-categories are subject. That is to say, all the categories and subcategories of game 
partake of more or less some features that make them belong to the family of game. 
Similarly, the ideal of Religion can also be treated as a generic idea to which all the 
religious traditions and their branches or sub-traditions are subordinate. The way of 
experiencing and contemplating the ambiguous universe from the perspectives of the 
followers of different religious traditions can be regarded as the connotation of 
Religion while its embodiments in different religious traditions can be taken as its 
extension.16  
    This course leads to the development of a tradition and also to the emerging of 
its branches and even to its spread into other places. All religious traditions might then 
be seen as being accumulated in a similar course. The basic ideas of those religious 
traditions at their initial stage could be thought as the product of the understanding of 
the universe of their founding father(s) and leader(s) in accordance with their 
                                                 
16
 Concerning the idea of the intension and extension of Religion, this research was inspired by Eric J. 
Sharpe, though he did not use this pair of concept in discussing the definition of “Religion.” For 
Sharpe’s idea, see his Understanding Religion (London: Duckworth, 1983), chapter 3.  
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situations. However, due to the way the predecessors of these religious traditions 
understand the ambiguous universe may differ from one another, and the way their 
followers interpreting those original understandings apply them into new situations 
are various, the purposes of these traditions and the measures to fulfil them become 
different. Thus for a Christian the destination of the journey of his life is salvation by 
God in the future life while for a Confucian intellectual the aim of his life is to realise 
the ideal of Ren and commit himself to the actualisation of the ideal of Confucian 
commonwealth under the heaven.  
    In this regard, there seems to be no need to presuppose such criterion as the 
soteriological transformation to consider the value and truthfulness of religions. The 
ways of their search of meaning are various and are subject to the different 
backgrounds. Therefore, the ways for the evaluation of the corresponding 
consequences should be different.  
All the foregoing discussions do not mean that the insights from Hick’s project 
should be abandoned. It exhibits, instead, the work done by Hick and what can be 
pushed further. The difference between the original model of Hick’s hypothesis and a 
refined one can be seen in the following two diagrams: 
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Hick’s hypothesis, which comes from his understanding of the ideal of Religion, 
can be taken as a constituent principle. In his theory, Hick suggests that the Real an 
sich should be presupposed as the focus of all religions. Meanwhile, the soteriological 
transformation that seems to happen among the religions should be used as the 
criterion of their truth and falseness. In terms of these two principal elements, any 
religion that is lacking them might be excluded from the family of Religion. Further, 
it seems that only through Hick’s framework can the essential ideas and structure of 
any religion be reflected. However, as it has been shown above, it does lead to the 
distortion of the explanation of or misinterpretation of the doctrines and teachings of 
any particular religion. Thus, the universality and comprehensiveness of Hick’s 
hypothesis might fail.  
    However, along with the investigation of more religious traditions, a similar 
pattern in considering the ideal of Religion has been suggested. It proposes that the 
ideal of Religion could be expressed as “the spiritual quest of the meaning of life of 
human beings that might be answered by the Transcendent or the Absolute that is 
perceived, culturally experienced, postulated and articulated by the prophets, wise 
men and enlightened persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, 
etc..”  
When this pattern is connected to the idea of the refined model, it can be further 
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expressed as “the spiritual quest for the meaning of life by human beings in this 
ambiguous universe (i.e. the Real an sich) that might be “answered” by the 
Transcendent or the Absolute that is perceived, culturally experienced, postulated and 
articulated by the prophets, wise men and enlightened persons and the relevant 
doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, etc.” This is suggested as another constituent 
principle of defining the ideal of Religion. And, as a constituent principle, there are 
some differences between Hick’s hypothesis and this refined model. Besides, there are 
some advantages of this model. 
First of all, it suggests that Hick’s notion of the Real an sich can be equated 
with the ambiguous universe. As stated before, Hick’s argument for the neutrality of 
the notion of the Real can still not quell the doubt of its monotheistic mark. It rather 
traps him into the dilemma that since the Real an sich is ineffable, how can Hick 
ensure its quantity by arguing that it is the most natural and economical hypothesis 
and the best explanation. However, taking the ambiguous universe as the Real an sich 
might escape such doubt.  
Second, the identity of the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe can make 
Hick’s argument for the thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as more consistent 
since the ambiguous universe, at least, the object of human experience, is one and 
same. This can avoid the doubt that though the objects of human physical and 
                                    
320 
 
religious experience are different, Hick can still apply the same cognitive framework 
to them by merely arguing that there are degrees of the exercise of freedom of human 
cognition. Further, based on Hick’s epistemology of religion, the refined model 
suggests that there are two transcendental ideas, the Real as personal God and the 
Real as Non-personal Absolute, that are innate in human consciousness. With the aid 
of varied human religious concepts in variant traditions, either of them would be 
schematised as different holy images, such as Nirvana and Allah and various 
doctrines.  
    What is more important is that in this pattern the soteriological transformation is 
not one of the key common traits to review any religious traditions. As it has been 
discussed before (§5.3), any doctrine that is related to this transformation could be 
taken as merely a way of answering the quest of the meaning of life for human beings. 
The more Hick intends to include and broaden in the criterion of soteriological 
transformation, the more ambiguity and less significance would be left to that 
criterion. The “soteriological” might eventually become meaningless.       
This pattern is supposed to be found among all religious traditions. If it is so, 
then every religious tradition can be taken as the manifestation of this pattern. This 
pattern can be in turn treated as a characterisation of the family of Religion and as the 
pattern that distinguish human religious activities from other affairs and events.  
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This pattern then can be further taken as a constituent principle as one of the 
manifestations of the ideal of Religion as the regulative principle to be followed by all 
human religious activities and religious traditions. It is exhibited within different 
religions with different ideas, phrases, notions and so on and thus firstly leads to those 
holy images. As members of a family share certain characteristics, some of these 
religious traditions may share some similarities with each other while others may 
participate in other features. Each of them can be considered as one of the 
manifestations of the ideal of Religion but none of them should be regarded as the 
only criterion to judge the traits of other members. Any of them is a concrete example 
of the ideal of Religion. However, none of them should be regarded as or think of 
itself as the only criterion to judge the traits of other members.  
 
7.3 Diversity of Religions in the Perspective of the Refined Model 
The pattern can be further illustrated in light of the Confucian proposition of “the 
Li is one but its manifestations are many.” As a constituent principle, the pattern could 
be, on the one hand, understood as one of the manifestations of the ideal of Religion 
in a particular space and time. On the other, it can be exhibited variously in different 
traditions according to their own linguistic system and to their understanding of the 
ambiguous universe that is based on the natural environment in which they are 
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situated. This reaction then might create some holy or transcendent images and ideas 
that are being taken as the basic and fundamental teachings of these traditions and 
thus direct the way their adherents’ acts.  
The relationship among the ideal of Religion as regulative principle, the 
constituent principle and the existed and existing religious traditions can also be 
illustrated in terms of the three motifs that has been implied in the Confucian 
proposition. This pattern might be found among all past and present religions and 
relevant activities (reflecting the motif of continuity/linkage). At this point, this 
pattern as a constituent principle can serve as the Li whereas any concrete religious 
traditions and activities can be taken as its manifestations. The Li and its 
manifestations in this regard are also the exhibitions of the ideal of Religion and thus 
both can be included in the ideal of Religion (corresponding to the motif of 
wholeness). Since it is supposed to be guided by the ideal of Religion as the regulative 
principle in the endless process of the religious quest of human beings, this pattern is 
subject to be modified when facing any religious types emerging in the future. Also, 
this process might lead to the adjustment of our understanding of the ideal of Religion 
and thus lead to any refinement, revision and even replacement of any given model 
for pursuing the description or the definition of the ideal of Religion and the diversity 
of religions (mirroring the motif of dynamism).  
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The implication of foregoing pattern as a constituent principle of expressing the 
ideal of Religion does offer a more comprehensive framework in considering the 
diversity of religions than Hick’s hypothesis. In addition to Confucianism and Daoist 
religion that have been analysed in chapter 5, different images of those instances of 
religious traditions that are used by Hick to justify his hypothesis might be reflected 
through this pattern. 
    The constituent principle in Buddhism could be exhibited by its adherents 
through the spiritual quest of the meaning of life in this ambiguous universe, as seen 
in the idea of the Buddhist “nirvana.” Later, the way to embody this idea was 
suggested and conceptualised by the founder and followers as Dharma in Sanskrit, 
denoting the teachings of Buddha, forming the key idea of “the three jewels (三寶
San-bao)” together with Buddha, the one who is awake, and the sangha, the Buddhist 
community. The question of the meaning of life might be answered by the 
enlightenment on the reality of life and thus one can see through the illusion of his life 
and transcend it. Dharma was later taken as the core and has been observed by all the 
Buddhist schools. Even though the central concern of the Mahayana Buddhism, one 
of its major schools, is śūnyatā (Emptiness, Nothingness, Void, the Formless) as 
tathatā (pure suchness), as it was shown in chapter 5, the idea that is behind this 
remains the idea of nirvana.  
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    In Christianity, the pattern as a constituent principle could be exhibited as that 
the spiritual quest of the meaning of life of the Christians and its believers in this 
ambiguous universe is faith in Jesus as God. Jesus himself is also taken as the man 
who has incarnated the love of God and thus as the incarnation of God. The meaning 
of life might be realised in releasing oneself from the fear, guilt and the self/ego and 
being redirected towards God. This basic idea was later theorised (by the saints and 
theologians such as St. Paul and St. Augustine) and became various doctrines, 
teachings and so on that forms the Christian tradition. Though the emphases of each 
of the three main branches (i.e., Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and 
Protestantism) on the teaching of Jesus the Christ might differ from each other, they 
take this as their central theological theme.  
    In Islam, the pattern as a constituent principle is displayed as the spiritual quest 
for the meaning of life of Muslims and its followers in this ambiguous universe might 
be satisfied by those teachings revealed and encountered through their prophet 
Muhammad by Allah. As the word Islam itself has implied, the meaning of the life 
might lie in the search of the inner peace in the process of making oneself completely 
surrender his or her life to God. This is the theme that is followed by Muslims, no 
matter which branch or school they belong, whether it be Sunnis, Shi’ites or Sufism. 
   In Judaism, the pattern as a constituent principle is embodied as the spiritual quest 
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for the meaning of life of Jews and its believers in the ambiguous universe is revealed 
through their prophets by their God Yahweh in the experience of those prophets. They 
follow what has been revealed in the Ten Commandments and expect the coming of 
the Messiah, which includes the features of hope, national restitution and world 
upgrade. Similarly, this is mainly being followed by Jews until now. 
    In Hinduism, the pattern as a constituent principle is running as that the spiritual 
quest of the meaning of life of Hindus people and their students in the ambiguous 
universe is to see their different types of lives as the ways (knowledge, love, work and 
psychophysical experience) towards the liberation of themselves from the ego and 
desire nirvana or reunion with God, the status of mokṣa, through many stages of life. 
This is the central idea that is followed by its braches or schools (namely, monists and 
dualists).17  
    Apart from Confucianism and Daoist religion previously discussed, all the 
aforementioned religions were used by Hick in arguing for the feasibility of his 
hypothesis are the manifestations of the same pattern as a constituent principle of 
defining the ideal of Religion. What make them different from each other are their 
linguistic systems and cultural backgrounds. Further, although all of them are 
providing their own theories in replying to the meaning of life in the same ambiguous 
                                                 
17
 The main ideas of these five traditions under this survey rely on Huston Smith, The World’s 
Religions (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), chapters 2, 3, 6-8.     
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universe there seems to be no common trend of soteriological transformation among 
these traditions. Their approaches to the meaning of life are different and their 
outcomes will be various. The criterion for the judgement of the consequence should 
not be confined to any doctrine that comes from a particular tradition or a particular 
perspective of worldview. 
    Interestingly, what is common to these religious traditions is that they all 
emerged as a minority group of believers and followers at the initial stages of their 
development. For example, in the very beginning of Christian history, Jesus the Christ 
with its disciples was originally a small group that situated themselves in tension with 
Judaism and most of the Jewish people. Confucius with his students were also one of 
the groups that suggested the way to deal with the problems with social and political 
order in their time. Similar situations were met by all the religious traditions in the 
so-called post-modern era of our time where religions have to some extent be taken as 
one of the community of human affairs and events in a society and in a cultural 
tradition. Nonetheless, the pattern suggested might still work in considering the 
diversity of religions. It can be applied not only at the level of all religious traditions, 
but also at the level of groups of different religious faiths within a religious 
community of a modern society. 
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7.4 Religious Pluralism in A Universe of Faiths 
Hick describes his pluralistic hypothesis which hinges on the notion of the Real 
as its centre as a “Copernican Revolution in Theology” in his book God and the 
Universe of Faiths in contrast to what he calls the Ptolemaic theology that declares 
that outside the church or Christianity there is no salvation.18 However, as mentioned 
above, it seems that Hick’s manoeuvre is so imprudent that there appears to be no 
substantial difference between the significance of his notion of the Real an sich and 
the notion of God in monotheistic tradition. Hick may only evacuate the notion of the 
God and give this idea another name. Thus, what Hick’s claims is a Copernican 
Revolution is in fact a Procrustean treatment of the diversity of religions. 
The attempt of this pattern can be taken as a shift from Hick’s Real-centred 
position to a viewpoint of a universe of faiths seeing that it contends that all religions 
do not encircle the Real an sich in Hick’s sense and thus are not the consequence of 
their respective responses to the Real an sich. Rather, they are the accumulated 
traditions within which their adherents might satisfy their search for the meaning of 
life in this ambiguous universe by the ideas and teachings that have been proposed by 
the prophets, wise men and saints of their traditions.  
This pattern is like the model of depicting the function of a solar system while 
                                                 
18
 Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 124-125. 
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the particular capacity of human nature is like the gravitation of the universe. 
Different religious traditions are like various solar systems. Different manifestations 
of the pattern within various religions are like the idea of solar system that is found 
among the different types of solar systems. When human beings recognise that apart 
from their own solar system there are still hundreds of thousands of systems of 
celestial bodies operating in a similar way in this universe and thus can then be also 
considered as different sorts of solar system, they will no longer consider theirs as the 
only one and unique, or that the way their own system runs is the only possible way in 
the universe and will try to amend their own perspectives on the universe to make it 
more comprehensive. The vision of this model is not a Copernican one with the Sun 
as its centre. Instead, it is a model of universal scale, where multiple types of solar 
systems operate in the universe, with none of them being regarded as the only centre 
of the universe and the only standard model for others. If it is reasonable to analogise 
this picture to the diversity of religion, there could possibly be a shift from the 
Real-centred position to the vision of whole universe: a universe of faiths.  
Analogically, the pattern implied in the proposition of “the Li and its 
manifestation” can be illustrated by another analogy that comes from physics or from 
astronomy with the idea of Isaac Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Generally 
speaking, there is a range of solar systems that exists in the universe. Some have one 
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fixed star as their centre with plenty of planets, satellites (moons), asteroids, comets 
and so forth as their family members; others may have two or more fixed stars as their 
centre, known as “multiple star systems,” and other similar celestial bodies as their 
family members. Regardless of the difference between their forms, all the ways of the 
operation of these solar systems are basically observing the laws of universal 
gravitation in spite of the strength and the influence that gravity may differ from one 
system to another. At this point, the difficulties of explaining the polytheistic tradition 
in Hick’s hypothesis could be reconsidered seeing that any religious tradition can be 
taken as the manifestations of the pattern.  
Further, the place of the notion of the Transcendent(s) of every religious tradition 
is similar to the role of star or stars at the centre of every solar system. Just as a solar 
system may have more than one fixed star at its centre so that there can be more than 
one Transcendent at the core of a religious tradition. The way of the adherent’s 
practice of the relevant set of the rites, doctrines, teachings that centre on the 
Transcendent(s) within a religious tradition is like the way of those celestial bodies of 
a solar system orbit the star(s). And just as the relationship between the solar(s) and 
other celestial bodies within a solar system is based on universal gravitation, so as that 
between the Transcendent(s) and the adherents of a religious tradition hinges on some 
tendency or particular dimension of human nature as the core of religious experience.  
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    Still further, just as the idea of the so-called solar system could be found among 
the concrete solar systems in the universe, so is the pattern as constituent principle of 
human beings be found in every human tradition. Every particular solar system still 
belongs to the family under the name of solar system as some of them are sharing 
some features and others follow the same law which will differentiate them from 
other types of celestial phenomena occurring in the universe. By the same token, 
every particular religious tradition is a member of the family under the name of 
Religion. Some of them might have similar characteristics while others might share 
some characteristics with each other. Nevertheless, just as the condition and 
environment of each solar system might be different, so may there be a variety in the 
teachings, doctrines, symbols, languages and any relevant theories of each religious 
tradition. 
When it comes to the situation of post-modernity, the analogy still works. If the 
star clusters and the galaxies can be seen as different societies of human beings and 
the religious groups as the solar systems, then just as there are various kinds of 
quasi-solar systems and solar systems scattering in every one of those clusters and 
galaxies, there are also different religious groups which may co-exist in any human 
society. As religious activities of human beings, all of them share the same pattern. 
This pattern can be taken as the platform for the communication and mutual- 
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understanding of these religious groups within a human society and among all the 
religious traditions.     
All the illustrations show that this picture drawn by the refined model can be 
taken as a picture of a universe of faiths. It is a shift from Hick’s theologically 
Copernican view with the Real an sich as its centre to a vision of a universe of faiths 
where the pattern of “the spiritual quest for the meaning of life by human beings in 
this ambiguous universe (i.e. the Real an sich) that might be “answered” by the 
Transcendent or the Absolute that is perceived, culturally experienced, postulated and 
articulated by the prophets, wise men and enlightened persons and the relevant 
doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, etc..” Nevertheless, it does not mean that the 
improved model has already been an all-inclusive and perfect theory for considering 
the issue of religious pluralism. It is merely a refined model developed on the base of 
Hick’s achievement and, with the further understanding of human religions, is subject 
to be modified or even discarded in the future.  
In Hick’s Copernican picture, the Sun that was originally taken as orbiting the 
Earth has become the centre of all the celestial bodies within the universe and the 
latter as the centre of the universe is actually identical with the former that orbits the 
Earth. The revolution Hick has claimed is actually not so radical for the investigation 
on the plurality of religions. The shift made by the picture of a universe of faiths is 
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that the particular Sun of a particular solar system is no longer the centre of the 
universe. This picture indicates that there are numerous solar systems with their own 
sun(s) at the centre with the function of something more basic, universal gravitation. 
What parallels this view is that there are different religious traditions with one 
Transcendent image or more at their centre with the practice of the particular capacity 
of human nature that could be manifested by means of various religious concepts.  
Also, in Hick’s hypothesis, the certainty of the Real an sich could never be 
scientifically proven. It is rather presupposed as the centre to which human beings are 
responding. However, in the refined model, the Real an sich is suggested to be taken 
as the ambiguous universe that human beings are living in. The universe is thinkable, 
knowable, understandable but seemingly unfathomable and thus ambiguous and 
transcendent. Then, how is one to establish and develop a definition of Religion that 
might on the one hand serve as the cornerstone of the religious study as an objective 
discipline and on the other can meet the challenge launched from science?  
Hick has made some attempts in this direction by revisiting the religious 
experience of human beings. However, it seems that Hick merely contends the 
particularity of this experience by means of some studies from parapsychology rather 
than tackle this issue directly. As it has evolved from Hick’s hypothesis and inherits 
the basic idea of Hick’s epistemology of religion, the same issue seems to remain. 
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Although the main concern of the present study is to rethink Hick’s pluralistic 
hypothesis, some direction on this issue will still be suggested in the concluding 
chapter as a task for any future studies of religion.  
 
Summary 
Based on all the discussion and analyses conducted previously, the research in 
this chapter has proposed a refined model of Hick’s hypothesis. In this refined model, 
(1) the Real an sich is equated with the ambiguous universe; (2) the two categories of 
the personal God and the non-personal Absolute in Hick’s sense are translated into the 
transcendental ideas in Kant’s sense; (3) the particular capacity or spiritual dimension 
of human nature is understood in terms of Kant’s intellectual intuition and any 
experience of it is an immediate experience which is inevitably being projected into 
human language; and (4) the culture-relative categories of Hick’s hypothesis are 
confined to human linguistic systems and thus are connected to the idea of 
Wittgenstein’s idea of language-game and family resemblance. This chapter has tried 
to justify that this model, with the pattern of description of the ideal of Religion, can 
be found among the world religions and thus can serve better the explanation of the 
diversity of religions. This pattern is actualised variously among the past and present 
religious traditions. In comparison with Hick’s Copernican revolution of theology, the 
picture this chapter envisions is a picture of “a universe of faiths.”  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
This is the concluding chapter of this research. It will firstly conduct a retrospect 
on the whole journey of this research to outline the main ideas of each previous 
chapter. Then it will offer a comparison between Hick’s hypothesis and the refined 
model to demonstrate the improvements it has made on Hick’s project. Meanwhile, it 
will also indicate what can be further explored in this present research. Two 
approaches, philosophical and quantitative, of continuing this task will be suggested 
in the last part.  
 
8.0 Prolegomena 
The ground of any consideration and study of the diversity of the religions and 
any suggestion of a feasible theoretical framework of religious pluralism is the ideal 
of Religion. However, any study and framework for describing the ideal of Religion is 
to some extent reflecting that ideal in a particular space and time. It might have its 
own limitations or deficiencies and is thus subject to be refined, revised or even 
sublated.  
    In the realm of the studies of the diversity of religions, the intention of Hick’s 
enterprise and the way of his attempt is a paradigm. Its significance is that it is a 
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breakthrough as well as a starting point for religious pluralism. It is a breakthrough in 
the sense that it has developed a systematic theory for the way that Christian theology 
treats other religious traditions. Meanwhile, it also has given rise to a lot of 
discussions and debates in this field. It is a starting point in the sense of that its 
approach and framework is still informative and instructive and can serve as a 
reference for those who want to propose a more comprehensive model for accounting 
for the diversity of religions, whether he or she is in line with Hick’s tenets or not.  
In order to make his hypothesis much closer to the reality of religious 
phenomenon, Hick has tried, implicitly or explicitly, to revise his theory in his career 
after he declared the Copernican Revolution in Christian theology and religious 
studies. The most obvious one of the corrections of his theory is the replacement of 
the notion of God by that of the Real. As mentioned above, the main reason for this 
manipulation is to suggest a less controversial and more neutral term for the 
Transcendent Reality. In this case, Hick’s motivation is understandable. However, the 
next step of Hick’s approach is arguable. Hick claims that there is only one ultimate 
reality and that his framework is a “best explanation” and “the most economical 
hypothesis to account for the identity of the soteriological transformation.” As has 
been indicated above, it seems that this shift from God to the Real is a linguistic trick 
seeing that the role the Real an sich plays is still quite similar to the notion of God. 
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What distinguishes the former from the latter could be that the former has been 
stripped of its Christian clothes. Furthermore, a reflection provided in previous 
chapters has shown that the argument of the soteriological transformation is debatable. 
It should not be taken as a universal phenomenon that occurs among all religious 
traditions.  
Hick’s framework is a point of departure for another journey. In order to continue 
this journey, the present research focuses on the notion of the Real, the thesis of all 
experiencing is experiencing-as and the criterion of soteriological transformation of 
Hick’s hypothesis. It takes these three aspects as the triad of Hick’s hypothesis and 
argues that it can be used as the key to improve Hick’s model. This research has 
further exhibited that there are some theoretical resources within Hick’s hypothesis to 
conduct this task. The employment of these resources might lead to a refinement of 
Hick’s hypothesis. A detour to the religions in East Asia has also called for the 
necessity of that refinement. At this point, both Hick’s hypothesis and the refined 
model can be taken as two frameworks that are reflecting the ideal of Religion. When 
these are considered in light of Cassirer’s idea of functional unity and his distinction 
of the regulative and constituent principles, the ideal of Religion could be understood 
in light of the idea of functional unity and be taken as the regulative principle whereas 
the two frameworks as two constituent principles. This can be further illustrated in 
                                    
337 
 
light of the Confucian proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many” 
where the ideal of Religion as the regulative principle is the Li and the two 
frameworks as constituent principles are its manifestations. Compared to Hick’s 
Copernican theology, the picture drawn out by the refined model is that of “a universe 
of faiths.” Similarly, this refined model is not an all-inclusive theory of religious 
pluralism. It is open to be modified in the future.  
In this concluding chapter, this research will firstly give a general review of the 
establishment of the refined model (§8.1), then, through a comparison with Hick’s 
framework, demonstrate how far it has explored the development of a pluralistic 
hypothesis and how the difficulties of Hick’s work been overcome (§8.2), and, at the 
end, suggest some directions for future work (§8.3).  
 
8.1 Retrospect 
    With a brief introduction of the relevant studies on and a critical review of Hick’s 
hypothesis, this research has called the tune of its journey. This research has indicated 
that the theme of the long journey is an investigation into the triad of the notion of the 
Real, the thesis of all experiencing is experiencing-as and the criterion of 
soteriological transformation of Hick’s hypothesis because it is the linchpin of his 
theory of religious pluralism. The notion of the Real comes from Kant’s distinction 
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between the noumenon and phenomenon. The thesis of all experiencing is 
experiencing-as is an exploration of Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing-as. The criterion of 
soteriological transformation has its roots in Christian theology, and, as it has been 
demonstrated, can be seen as a variation of Kantian categorical imperative (chapters 
1-2). 
    Through an investigation on its theoretical origin, the research has suggested that, 
the Real an sich can be understood as the ultimate ground for all human activities and 
that the Real an sich and the ambiguous universe are to be taken as an identical entity. 
This can ease the tension between Hick’s dualistic metaphysics and monistic 
epistemology. Meanwhile, the criticisms of noumenal causality might be avoided. 
Secondly, the two categories of the personal God and the non-personal Absolute are 
both suggested to be interpreted in the sense of the transcendental idea in Kant’s 
epistemology. As for the “spiritual aspect” of human nature, this research has 
suggested that it can be understood as something like the “intellectual intuition” in 
Kant’s philosophy. In this way, the first step of the formation of religious experience 
can be understood as the combination of the exercise of intellectual intuition and the 
transcendental ideas. This is the process that runs before producing the holy images 
and sacred concepts such as God and Brahman with the different linguistic systems 
from different cultural traditions. All these come from Kant’s heritage within Hick’s 
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hypothesis (chapter 3). 
    The second step of the formation of religious experience, especially the 
possibility of its plurality, as what Hick has already made, should be conceptualised in 
the Wittgensteinian factor that has existed within Hick’s theory. It is the clarification 
of the idea of the culture-relative categories and an examination on Hick’s 
appropriation of Wittgenstein’s concept of seeing-as that opens the possibility of 
developing Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis further. This research has suggested that the 
thesis of all-experiencing is experiencing-as can be reconsidered in light of the triad 
of seeing-as, language-game and family resemblance of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy. In this manner, with the insight of intellectual intuition, the thesis of all 
experiencing is experiencing-as can be reinterpreted as all religious experiencing is 
the product of the combination of immediate experience of the intellectual intuition 
and the employment of human religious concepts and terms in this ambiguous 
universe (chapter 4).   
    Hick’s hypothesis is based on the five of the world religions, namely, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Judaism, which belong to the Indo-European 
language group. By reflecting on soteriological transformation in the cases of 
Confucianism, Daoist Religion and Chinese Buddhism, it shows that it is the concern 
of the search for the meaning of life that is more fundamental. Even the soteriological 
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transformation could merely be one of the approaches toward this spiritual quest of 
human beings. Therefore, their expressions and the achievements should not be 
measured by the same criterion. To be a philosophical and second order theory in 
considering religious pluralism, the criterion for determining the authenticity of any 
religion should be suspended. This can be seen as the Achilles' heel of Hick’s 
hypothesis when it claims to be universal and neutral. Further, based on the 
observance on those religious traditions, it came to the idea that “the spiritual quest of 
the meaning of life of human beings that might be answered by the Transcendent or 
the Absolute that is perceived, culturally experienced, postulated and articulated by 
the prophets, wise men and enlightened persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, 
symbols, rituals, etc.” can be the pattern. Still further, this journey to East Asia has 
also encountered a different vision of cosmology with a pluralistic insight implied in 
it. Besides, this insight might provide an alternative perspective on religious pluralism 
(chapter 5).” 
    In order to develop the above idea, this research continued its journey to the 
Chinese cosmology as the background for the understanding of Confucian insight. 
Then, this research came to certain pluralistic ideas as they have emerged from 
ancient China and offers a brief story of the origin and the development of the 
proposition of “the Li is one but its manifestations are many”. Next, this research 
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turned to an interpretation of the Li of this proposition as “functional unity” and as a 
regulative principle made by the Confucian scholar Liu Shu-hsien. Liu’s concern is 
the establishment of Global Ethic on the ideal of humanity (humanum). Liu’s 
discourse is inspired by Ernst Cassirer’s idea of functional unity and his distinction 
between the constituent and the regulative principles. According to Liu’s 
interpretation, the regulative principle can be taken as an ideal that is guiding the 
formation of any of the constituent principles. Meanwhile, any constituent principles 
can be regarded as various manifestations of the regulative principle. Based on Liu’s 
discussion, this research has attempted to employ these two principles in the field of 
religious pluralism. This research has suggested that the ideas of the pattern and the 
refined model can be combined together and be expressed as the spiritual quest for the 
meaning of life by human beings in this ambiguous universe (i.e. the Real an sich) 
that might be “answered” by the Transcendent or the Absolute that is perceived, 
culturally experienced, postulated and articulated by the prophets, wise men and 
enlightened persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, etc.. This 
research has also proposed that the ideal of Religion can be considered in terms of the 
idea of functional unity and be taken as the regulative principle while any theories of 
religious pluralism that are developed to account for the diversity of religions can be 
regarded as one of the constituent principles in dealing with this topic. Any theories 
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on religious pluralism should be guided by the ideal of Religion. In this case, John 
Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis and the refined model are two of the constituent 
principles that describe the ideal of Religion (chapter 6). 
Hick has contended that the noumenon/phenomenon distinction and the 
soteriological transformation can be found in world religions by analysing some cases 
he mentioned in his publications. However, it seems that the way he conducted his 
argument was by first abstracting certain seemingly common or similar characteristics 
among the religious traditions that he was familiar with and then “imposing” the 
structure onto other religions in a procrustean way. Therefore, as has been showed 
above, some relevant problems occur. Meanwhile, however, the theoretical resources 
of Hick’s hypothesis that might help in easing these problems have also been 
unpacked. Based on those resources, this research has proposed a refined model of 
Hick’s hypothesis. In this refined model, (1) the Real an sich is identified with the 
ambiguous universe; (2) the two categories of the personal God and the non-personal 
Absolute in Hick’s sense are translated into Kant’s transcendental idea; (3) the 
particular capacity or spiritual dimension of human nature is understood in light of 
Kant’s intellectual intuition and any experience of it is immediate experience which is 
inevitably being projected into human language; (4) the culture-relative categories of 
Hick’s hypothesis are confined to human linguistic systems and thus are connected to 
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Wittgenstein’s notions of language-game and family resemblance. This research has 
tried to justify that this model with the pattern of description of the ideal of Religion 
can be found among the world religions and thus can better serve the explanation of 
the diversity of religions. This pattern is exhibited variously within different religious 
traditions with the employment of different linguistic and cultural systems. Compared 
to Hick’s Copernican revolution of theology, the picture it envisions is a picture of “a 
universe of faiths” (chapter 7).  
 
8.2 The Strength and the Weakness of Hick’s Hypothesis and the Refined Model 
    As has been maintained above, any framework that is employed to account for 
the diversity of religions should be a philosophical and second order theory. This 
research has argued that it is Hick’s criteriology that makes his enterprise fail to meet 
this standard. However, this is what the refined model demonstrated in this research 
attempts to do. Its task is not to justify those theological issues such as the reality of 
the Transcendent and the number of the ultimate Reality. Rather, its task is to describe, 
analyse, explain and interpret the phenomenon of religious diversity and to suggest a 
perspective for considering it. Consequently, it will leave those questions, such as 
eternal life and the attributes of God, for theologians and those who have committed 
themselves to them.  
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A comparison between Hick’s hypothesis and the refined model can demonstrate 
to what extent this refined model has advanced in improving Hick’s hypothesis.   
 
Hick’s Hypothesis: Copernican Picture of Religious Pluralism 
A. Description of Religion 
a. Religion as a Family-Resemblance Concept: the worship of a “higher 
unseen power” is a widespread feature among this family. 
b. Religion centres upon an awareness of and response to a reality that 
transcends ourselves and our world, whether the ‘direction’ of 
transcendence be beyond or within or both. The reality of the intentional 
object of religious thought and experience is presupposed. 
B. The Structure 
 Main Idea Strength and Weakness 
Metaphysically 
1.Kantian distinction between 
the Real an sich and the Real 
as being perceived 
 
2.Two Entities: 
The Real an sich and the 
ambiguous universe 
Strength 
The Kantian distinction 
provides a platform for 
considering equally all the 
human religions and suggests 
a perspective on religious 
pluralism 
 
Weakness 
1. The question of the 
noumenal causality between 
the Real an sich and human 
consciousness can not be 
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properly dealt with.  
2. A tension between the its 
metaphysical and 
epistemological position: 
metaphysically dualist while 
epistemologically monist  
Epistemologically 
All experiencing is 
experiencing-as 
Strength 
1. It accounts convincingly for 
the formation of the diversity 
of religions. 
2. It has justified the reality of 
religious experience by means 
of indicating the common 
elements and structure of 
human experiences. 
 
Weakness 
The vacillation between two 
categories, one is universal 
while the other is 
culture-relative. 
Criteriologically 
Soteriological transformation 
from ego-centredness to 
Real-centredness 
Strength 
It suggests an ethical 
characteristic as the 
commonality of all religious 
traditions and argues that it 
can be used as the criterion for 
the judgment of the 
authenticity of any religion. 
 
Weakness 
It is a product of Christian 
tradition and thus can not 
serve as the criterion for 
considering the authenticity of 
any religion 
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The strength of Hick’s hypothesis has been kept and developed further in this 
refined model. Meanwhile, its weaknesses have been tentatively improved by using 
the theoretical resources from Kant and Wittgenstein’s philosophies. 
 
The Refined Model: A Universe of Faiths 
A. Description of Religion 
a. Religion as a family-resemblance concept: the search of meaning of life of 
human beings that is answered by any of the variation of the pattern.  
b. The spiritual quest of the meaning of life of human beings in this 
ambiguous universe as Real an sich that might be answered by the 
Transcendent or the Absolute as Real as being perceived that are culturally 
experienced and articulated by the prophets, wise men and enlightened 
persons and the relevant doctrines, teachings, symbols, rituals, etc. 
B. The Structure 
 Main Idea Strength and Weakness 
Metaphysically 
1. Kantian distinction between 
the noumenon and 
phenomenon with the 
emphasis on the noumenon as 
the ontologically sufficient 
reason for the phenomenon 
and epistemologically as the 
ground for the origin of 
various human experiences 
Strength 
1. The question of noumenal 
causality can be answered. 
2. The tension between 
metaphysical dualism and 
epistemological monism 
can be eased. 
3. The number of the Real an 
sich is set. 
                                    
347 
 
 
2.One Entity 
The Real an sich is identical 
with the ambiguous universe 
 
Weakness 
The “transcendent” aspect is in 
doubt.  
Epistemologically 
1. The cooperation of the 
greatest freedom of human 
cognition, two transcendental 
ideas and the universal 
categories of human 
understanding is the first step 
of the formation of religious 
experience. 
 
2. All experiencing is 
experiencing–as should be 
confined within the 
culture-relative categories, the 
various human linguistic 
systems. 
Strength 
1. The universal categories and 
the culture-relative ones have 
been separated from each 
other. The former is confined 
in explaining the faculty of 
human cognition while the 
latter in elucidating the 
phenomenon of diversity of 
religions. 
 
2. It argues that the “spiritual 
aspect” and the greatest 
freedom of human cognition in 
Hick’s theory can be 
understood as the intellectual 
intuition in Kant’s philosophy 
and as the immediate 
experience that constitutes the 
religious experience. 
 
Weakness 
   However the question of 
whether it is illusion or not 
returns. That is to say, the 
issue of the certainty or 
actuality of the spiritual 
aspect/ intellectual intuition 
still needs to be addressed. 
Criteriologically 
There is no one and universal 
criterion of judging the 
genuineness of any religion. 
Strength 
1. All religious doctrines, 
teachings and practices are the 
articulations of the spiritual 
quest; since the ways of the 
                                    
348 
 
embodiment of this quest are 
different, their criterion shall 
differ. 
 
2. It envisions a more 
comprehensive picture than 
that of Hick’s theory 
 
As exhibited above, even though this refined model can meet the challenge 
towards Hick’s hypothesis more appropriately, it still has its own Achilles’ heel: the 
notion of the spiritual aspect, intellectual intuition or the greatest freedom of human 
cognition. If the certainty of this notion can be justified or be verified, then, in 
addition to working as the common ground for considering religious diversity, it can 
be treated as the backbone of religious studies.  
 
8.3 Prospect 
    This research has indicated that this “spiritual aspect” can be a particular spiritual 
tendency or the Kantian “intellectual intuition” and that it appears to be shared by all 
human beings and is correlated to the issue of the search for the meaning of life. This 
research has even analogised this spiritual aspect to the idea of universal gravitation 
and thus has envisioned a picture of “a universe of faiths.” If this aspect can be 
articulated appropriately and even justified or verified rigorously, then the argument 
of this research can be further developed.  
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Actually, Hick himself has noticed this direction. He has already coped with the 
relevant issues. In order to defend the rationality of the religious experience, Hick 
argues with the aid of the studies of some neuroscientists, such as V. S. Ramachandran, 
Benjamin Libet, that since the mental state can not be identified with brain state, there 
is still some space for the free will of human beings and thus for their religious 
consciousness. The comprehensive discussion of Hick can be seen in his The New 
Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience, Neuroscience and the 
Transcendent (2006). Additionally, some relevant works, such as The Spiritual Quest: 
Transcendence in Myth, Religion, and Science by Robert M. Torrance1 and The 
Search for Spirituality by Ursula King2, on spiritual dimension of human beings have 
been published. However, it seems that the connotation of the notion of the spiritual 
aspect is still vague and thus the question of its certainty still remains and arguments 
they conduct to respond to the criticism from the naturalism and materialism seem to 
be unconvincing. Hick’s attempt has also reflected this problem. 
Hick’s attempt to argue for the reality of mind and free will seems to be 
unsustainable. The resource Hick employed in his argument mainly relies on his belief 
                                                 
1
 Robert M. Torrance, The Spiritual Quest: Transcendence in Myth, Religion, and Science (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1994). By spirit Rorrance means “the dynamic 
potentiality latent but unrealized in the given (much as form, in Aristotle’s terminology, is potential in 
matter), and by quest the deliberate effort to transcend, through self-transformation, the limits of the 
given and to realize some portion of this unbounded potentiality through pursuit of a future goal that 
can neither be fully foreknown nor finally attained.” (p. xii)  
2
 Ursula King, The Search for Spirituality: Our Global Quest for a Spiritual Life (New York: 
BlueBridge, 2008). 
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of parapsychology as a genuine science and in the reality of the extrasensory 
perception or out-of-the-body experiences.3 However, he might also trap himself into 
the fallacy of begging the question by assuming the certainty of the mind and free will 
which is still to be proved. Hick can not justify the certainty of the mind but launch 
with the assumption of the certainty of the mind his argument against some scientists’ 
refusal of the existence of mind. Moreover, if the mind and the brain are two different 
types of entity, one is immaterial while the other material, then Hick’s position might 
still result in the criticism from the naturalistic/scientific camp in regards to how the 
mind can have influence on brain and body in terms of causality.  
As some scientists who are sympathetic to religious studies have suggested, the 
approach to prove that the mind exists separate from the physical brain by claiming 
the certainty of near-death and out-of-body experience could be the most 
extraordinary in all of science. There is something more subtle and significant that 
might make the human faith immune to science’s demands for consensus, verification, 
and prediction.4 In this regard, the “something” can be, in Thomas Nagel’s words, the 
subject character of experience that might differ from one person to another.5   
Regarding this issue, there are at least two options for the further adventure. One 
                                                 
3
 See Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 87; Between Faith and Doubt: Dialogues on 
Religion and Reason (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), dialogues 8 & 9. 
4
 See, Kevin Nelson, The God Impulse: Is Religion Hardwired into the Brain? (London: Simon &. 
Schuster, 2011), 260, for example. 
5
 Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?,” The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, no. 4 (October 
1974), 435-50. 
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remains philosophical while the other is scientific. Both can be seen as alternatives of 
future work for the present research and for those who commit themselves to this field 
to establish a rigorous system of religious studies. 
It has been pointed out that Hick neglects the development of the continental 
philosophy after Kant’s philosophical enterprise, such as the trend of neo-Kantian and 
another development from Husserl’s phenomenology to Martin Heidegger’s 
phenomenological Hermeneutics to H.-G. Gadamer’s philosophical Hermeneutics. A 
similar opinion has been pointed out by Gavin D’Costa and Youngseok Cho. When 
talking about the facts coalesced in Hick’s development, D’Costa mentions that “Hick 
neglects continental trends such as existentialism, transcendental analysis, or the 
hermeneutical tradition” and that “Hick’s dialogue partners are primarily 
Anglo-Saxon positivists and analytical philosophers such as B. Russell, A. J. Ayer, L. 
Wittgenstein’s disciple D. Z. Phillips, R. B. Braithwaite, J. H. Randall, N. Malcolm 
and J. Wisdom.”6 Even so, Cho thinks that D’ Costa does not say why Hick overlooks 
the continental trends like existentialism, transcendental analysis, or the 
hermeneutical tradition.7 However, it seems that Hick does not ignore this tradition 
but simply benefits less from Hegel, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, etc., than those 
                                                 
6
 See D’ Costa, John Hick’s Theology of Religions (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987), 7, 
note 22. 
7
 See Cho, A Critical Dialogue with Hick’s Religious Pluralism and Newbigin’s Theology of Religions- 
For the Recovery of Mission in the Korean Christian Context- (Ph. D. Thesis. The University of 
Birmingham, 2004), 57, note 56.  
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lucid thinkers such as Anselm, Aquinas, Kant and Wittgenstein.8 
It can be said that the solution to Kant’s predicament could also be the answer to 
Hick’s. There are actually several attempts, either from the East or from the West, to 
overcome Kant’s theoretical difficulty and the related problems that originated from 
Kant. For example, in the movement of Phenomenology in the West, Edmund 
Husserl’s (1859-1938) wrestling with the notion of “transcendental reduction” and 
Martin Heidegger’s discussion of “transcendental power of imagination”9 can be seen 
as two obvious cases. They might also be beneficial to investigate the idea of 
intellectual intuition or even to develop a systematic argument of it. 
    Another possibility is the approach of developing quantitative approach of 
religious studies. This idea is inspired from the analogy between the law of universal 
gravitation and the particular capacity within human nature. Although Hick has tried 
to justify the credibility of religious experience by discussing the examples from the 
survey of psychology, the origin and the nature of the religious experience remain 
uncertain. If, in addition to observing it by the ways it is manifested, the strength of 
the particular capacity can be measured in one way or more, there could be a firmer 
cornerstone for the explanation of religious phenomenon and for the contention of the 
                                                 
8
 See Hick, “On Doing Philosophy of Religion (A talk given to the Open End, Birmingham University, 
UK, 2001)”, 1. John Hick’s Official Website. Available from http://www.johnhick.org.uk/articles.h, tml. 
Accessed on 19 August 2008. 
9
 See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft, 5th ed., enlarged 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), for example. 
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reality of religious consciousness.10 This could meet the challenge from the 
naturalistic and materialistic position and echo the request of unpacking the 
significant elements of the faith that can make it immune to the scientific rigorous 
demands. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This idea comes from a discussion with one of my friends, WANG Hang 汪航, a PhD Student of the 
School of  Metallurgy and Materials, when I was asking him for some opinions on the analogy of the 
universal gravitation. 
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CHINESE-ENGLISH GLOSSARY 
Phonetic Rendering(s) Chinese Characters English Rendering 
Bao-shen  報身 body of bliss 
Bei Song   北宋 Northern Song Dynasty 
(960-1127 CE, Chinese 
History) 
Bei-xi-zi-yi 北溪字義 Neo-Confucian Terms 
Explained (book title) 
Carsun Chang (Zhang 
Junmai)  
張君勱 Carsun Chang (1887-1969) 
Ch’en Ch’un (Chen Chun)   陳淳 Ch’en Ch’un (1159-1223, 
Chinese philosopher 
[Neo-Confucian]) 
Cheng  Hao  程顥 Cheng  Hao (1032-1085, 
Chinese philosopher 
[Neo-Confucian]) 
Cheng Chung-ying (Cheng 
Zongying)   
成中英 Chung-ying Cheng 
Cheng Yi  程頤 Cheng  Yi (1033-1107, 
Chinese philosopher 
[Neo-Confucian]) 
Chung-yung (Zhong yong) 中庸 The Doctrine of the Mean 
(book title) 
Chun-qiu-zhan-guo-shi-dai   春秋戰國時代 the Spring and Autumn 
(770-476 BCE) and 
Warring States Periods 
(475-221BCE) 
Chun-qiu-fan-lu 春秋繁露 Luxuriant Gems of The 
Spring and Autumn Annals 
(book title) 
Chuo  辶（辵） walking, following the way 
Cua, Antonio S. (Ke 
Xiongwen) 
柯雄文 Antonio S. Cua (1932- 
2007) 
Dai Zhen 戴震  Dai Zhen (1723-1777, 
Chinese Philosopher) 
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Dang-dai xin-ru-jia 當代新儒家 Contemporary 
Neo-Confucianism 
Dao (Tao) 道 Dao (the Way, the path) 
Dao-jia 道家 Daoist philosophy 
(Daoism/ Taoism) 
Dao-jiao 道教 Daoist religion (Daoism/ 
Taoism) 
Dao-zang 道藏 Daoist Canon 
Da-tong-shi-jie   大同世界 Confucian Commonwealth 
De  德 Virtue (literal meaning) 
Di   帝 God 
Din Cheuk Lau (Liu dianjue) 劉殿爵 D. C. Lau (1921-2010) 
Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 Dong Zhongshu 
(c.179-c.104 BCE, Chinese 
Philosopher) 
Er-cheng-ji   二程集 A Collection of the Works 
of the Two Cheng Brothers 
Fa-jia   法家 Legalism (Chinese 
philosophy) 
Fa-shen 法身 dharma body 
Fo guang da-ci-dian   佛光大辭典 Fo Guang Buddhist 
Dictionary    
Fu Pei-jung (Fu Peirong)   傅佩榮 Fu Pei-jung 
Fu Wei-hsun (Fu Weixun) 傅偉勳 Charles Wei-hsun Fu 
(1933-1996) 
Fung Yu-lan (Feng Youlan) 馮友蘭 Fung Yu-lan (1895-1990), 
Chinese Philosopher 
Han Yu 韓愈 Han Yu (768-824, mainly 
recognised as a literary 
master) 
He  和 Harmony/ Harmonisation 
He Guanghu   何光滬 He Guanghu   
Hong Handing 洪漢鼎 Hong Handing 
Hsiao Hsin-huang (Xiao 
Xinhuang) 
蕭新煌 Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao 
Hsu Foo-kwan (Xu Fuguan)   徐復觀 Hsu Foo-kwan (1904-1982, 
Chinese philosopher 
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[Contemporary 
Neo-Confucian]) 
Huai-nan-zi   淮南子 Huai-nan-zi (book title) 
Huang Sui-chi (Huang Xiuji) 黃秀璣 Huang Sui-chi 
Hua-yan  華嚴 Hua-yan 
Hua-yan-zong  華嚴宗 Hua-yan Buddhism 
Jian-ai   兼愛 love without differentiation 
Jing  經 Classics 
Jing-tu 淨土 Pure Land (Chinese 
Buddhism) 
Ji-wu-qiong-li 即物窮理 investigating things to gain 
the knowledge of the Li 
Junzi  君子 gentleman/ profound 
person/ superior man/ 
noble person/ paradigmatic 
individual 
Kong  空 Emptiness (Buddhism)  
Kongzi 孔子 Confucius (551-479 BCE) 
Ku Hung-ming (Gu 
Hongming)  
辜鴻銘 Ku Hung-ming 
(1857-1928) 
Lao Tzu Tao Teh Ching 
(Lao-zi dao-de-jing) 
老子道德經 Lao Tzu Tao Teh Ching 
(book title) 
Laozi 老子 Laozi(ca. 600-470 BCE, 
Chinese philosopher 
[Daoism]) 
Li  理 Li (normally being 
translated as “principle”) 
Li Ao 李翱 Li Ao (fl. 798, Chinese 
Philosopher)  
Li Chenyang   李晨陽 Chenyang Li   
Li Jingde  黎靖德 Li Jingde (?~?) 
li-i erh fen-shu (Li-yi er 
fen-shu)   
理一而分殊 The Li is one but its 
manifestations are many 
Li-i fen-shu (Li-yi fen-shu)  理一分殊 The Li is one but its 
manifestations are many 
Li-Ki (Li-ji ) 禮記 The Book of Rites 
Lin An-wu  林安梧 Lin An-wu 
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Liu An  劉安 Liu An 
Liu Shu-hsien (Liu Shuxian)  劉述先 Liu Shu-hsien 
Liu Xiaofeng 劉小楓 Liu Xiaofeng 
Li-xue   理學 school of Li 
(Neo-Confucianism) 
Lu Xiangshan  陸象山 Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193, 
Chinese philosopher 
[Neo-Confucian]) 
Lun-yu   論語 Confucius’ Analects 
Mengzi 孟子 Mencius (372-289 BCE, 
Chinese 
philosopher[Confucianism]
) 
Ming  明 Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644CE, Chinese 
History) 
Mozi   墨子 Mozi (ca. 468-376 BCE? 
Chinese philosopher) 
Mou Tsung-san (Mou 
Zongsan)  
牟宗三 Mou Tsung-san 
(1909-1995, 
[Contemporary 
Neo-Confucian]) 
Nan Song  南宋 Southern Song Dynasty 
(1127-1279 CE, Chinese 
History)  
Nü-kua (NV-wa) 女媧 Nü-kua 
Oe-hu (Er-hu)   鵝湖 Legein Society 
(Contemporary 
Neo-Confucian Society, 
which has invigorated 
Neo-Confucianism since 
1975) 
P’ang-ku (Pan-gu)   盤古 P’ang-ku 
Peng Guo-xiang  彭國翔 Peng Guoxiang 
Poo Mu-chou (Pu Muzhou) 蒲慕州 Poo Mu-chou   
Qi (Ch’i) 氣 Qi (Normally translated as 
“vital force” or “material 
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force”) 
Qian-chen-pian  乾稱篇 chapter of Qian-chen 
Qing 清 Qing Dynasty (1616-1912 
CE, Chinese History) 
Qi-xue  氣學 school of Qi (Neo- 
Confucianism) 
Ren (Jen)  仁 Ren, humanity 
(Confucianism) 
Ren Ji-yu  任繼愈 Ren Jiyu 
Ren-dao 人道 the way of humans 
Ru-jia  儒家 Confucianism 
Ru-jiao 儒教 Confucianism as a religion 
San-bao 三寶 the three jewels 
(Buddhism) 
San-guo-shi-dai 三國時代 Three Kingdoms Period 
(184[?]-280 CE, Chinese 
History) 
San-shen  三身 the three bodies 
(Buddhism) 
San-wu-li-ji 三五歷記 Record of Cycle in Threes 
and Fives (book title) 
Shang   商 Shang Dynasty (ca. 
1600-1040 BCE, Chinese 
History) 
Shan-hai-jing  山海經 The Book of Mountains and 
Seas 
Shi 士 educated man 
Shi-xuan-men 十玄門 Mastering the Ten 
Mysteries (Chinese 
Buddhism) 
Shou 首 head 
Shuo-wen-jie-zi 說文解字 Shuo-wen-jie-zi (A 
dictionary produced in Han 
Dynasty) 
Si-fu 四輔 the Four Supplements 
(Daoist religion) 
Song  宋 Northern and Southern 
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 Song Dynasties 
Sui 隋 Sui Dynasty (581-619 CE, 
Chinese History) 
Tai- ji- tu- shuo 太極圖說 An Explanation of the 
Diagram of the Great 
Ultimate (book title) 
Tai-he   太和 Great Harmonisation 
Tai-ji 太極 Great Ultimate 
Tai-ping-jing 太平經 The Classic of the Great 
Peace (book title) 
Tai-xu 太虛 Great void or Great Vacuity 
Tang  唐 Tang Dynasty (618-907 
CE, Chinese History) 
Tang Chün-i (Tang Junyi)   唐君毅 Tang Chün-I (1909-1978 
CE, [Contemporary 
Neo-Confucian]) 
Ti 體 substance (Chinese 
philosophy) 
Tian 天 Heaven 
Tian-dao  天道 the way of Heaven 
Tian-ren-he-yi 天人合一 Heaven and man in union 
(Chinese philosophy) 
Tian-tai 天臺 Tian-tai 
Tu Wei-ming (Du Weiming)   杜維明 Tu Wei-ming 
Wang Fuzhi  王夫之 Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692, 
Chinese philosopher 
[Confucianism]) 
Wang Hang  汪航 Wang Hang 
Wang Yang-ming (Wang 
Yangming) 
王陽明 Wang Yang-ming 
(1472-1529, Chinese 
philosopher 
[Neo-Confucian]) 
Wei Zhong-guo-wen-hua 
jin-gao shi-jie ren-shi 
xuan-yan wo-men dui 
zhong-guo-xue-shu-yan-jiu-ji
-zhong-guo-wen-hua-yu-shi-j
為中國文化敬告世界
人士宣言－我們對中
國學術研究及中國文
化與世界文化前途之
共同認識 
A Manifesto on the 
Reappraisal of Chinese 
Culture: Our Joint 
Understanding of the 
Sinological Study Relating 
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ie-wen-hua-qian-tu-zhi-gong-
tong-ren-shi   
to World Cultural Outlook 
Wei-jing-nan-bei-chao  魏晉南北朝 Wei-jing and Southern and 
Northern Dynasties (ca. 
220-589 CE, Chinese 
History) 
Wing-tsit Chan (Chen 
Rong-jie) 
陳榮捷 Wing-tsit Chan 
(1901-1994) 
Wu Ching-hsiung (Wu 
Jingxiong) 
吳經熊 John C. H. Wu 
(1899-1986) 
Wu-dao-yi-yi-guan-zhi  吾道一以貫之 there is one thread that runs 
through my teaching 
Xi Han 西漢 Western Han Dynasty (202 
BCE-9 CE, Chinese 
History) 
Xi Ming 西銘 Western Inscription 
Xi Zhou  西周 Western Zhou Dynasty (ca. 
1000-770 BCE, Chinese 
History) 
Xian-gua  咸卦 the fifth Yang, one of 
hexagram of Sensing of the 
Book of Changes  
Xin  心 mind/ heart 
Xin- xue  心學 School of Xin 
(Neo-Confucianism) 
Xin-ru-jia 新儒家 New- Confucianism 
Xu Shen  許慎 Xu Shen (ca. 58-147 BCE, 
Chinese philologist) 
Xu Yinjin  徐英瑾 Xu Yinjin  
Xu Zheng  徐整 Xu Zheng (?-?) 
Xunzi  荀子 Xunzi (313-238 BCE, 
Chinese philosopher 
[Confucianism]) 
Yang 
 
陽 Yang (the positive principle 
or aspect of Qi or Dao) 
Yang Ching-kun (Yang 
Qingkun) 
楊慶堃 C. K. Yang (1911-1999) 
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Yang Hui-chieh (Yang 
Huijie)  
楊慧傑 Yang Hui-chieh 
Yang Shi  楊時 Yang Shi (1053-1135, 
Neo-Confucian) 
Yao   堯 Yao (A legendary emperor 
of ancient China) 
Yao Caigan 姚才剛 Yao Caigan 
Yao Xinzhong 姚新中 Xinzhong Yao 
Yi Jing (I Ching) 易經 The Book of Changes (The 
Classic of Changes) (book 
title) 
Yi-ben-yi   易本義 Original Meaning of the 
Book of the Changes (book 
title) 
Yi-jing xi-ci zhuan  易經繫辭傳 The Commentary on the 
Appended Phrases of the 
Book of Changes (book 
title) 
Yin 陰 Yin (the negative principle 
or aspect of Qi or Dao) 
Yin-shen 應身 manifest body (Buddhism) 
Yin-yang-jia 陰陽家 Yin-Yang school (Chinese 
philosophy) 
Yong 用 function (Chinese 
philosophy) 
Yuan  元 Yuan Dynasty (1217-1368 
CE, Chinese History) 
Zen (Chen) 禪 Zen (Buddhism) 
Zengzi  曾子 Zengzi (ca. 505-432 BCE, 
disciple of Confucius) 
Zhang Longxi 張隆溪 Zhang Longxi 
Zhang Zai (Chang Tsai) 張載 Zhang Zai (1020-1077, 
Neo- Confucian) 
Zhao Kuiying  趙奎英 Zhao Kuiying 
Zhi 知 Knowing/ knowledge 
Zhi-yu-dao, ju-yu-de    志於道，據於德 I set my heart on the Dao 
and based myself on my 
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inner virtue 
Zhong-guo-wen-zhe-yan-jiu-t
ong-xun 
中國文哲研究通訊 Newsletter of Institute of 
Chinese Literature and 
Philosophy 
Zhou Dunyi  周敦頤 Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073, 
Neo-Confucian) 
Zhu Xi 朱熹 Zhu Xi (1130-1200, Neo- 
Confucian) 
Zhuangzi 莊子 Zhuangzi (ca. 369-286 
BCE, Chinese philosopher 
[Daoism]) 
Zhu-zi-yu-lei  朱子語類 A Record of Master Zhu’s 
Dialogues with His 
Students 
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